6 total
Foster parents gained discretionary party status but not as of right.
In a child protection proceeding involving an Indigenous child, long-term foster parents moved to be added as parties to the disposition phase.
The court held that foster parents do not have party status as of right under s. 13 of An Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families because “care provider” does not include foster parents whose role arises from a state-created placement.
Applying the discretionary framework under r. 7(5) of the Family Law Rules, together with the participation rights contemplated by s. 79(3) of the CYFSA, the court found that full party status was in the child’s best interests.
The foster parents’ lifelong caregiving role, ability to advance a plan of care, and unique evidence about the child’s needs justified their addition without undermining the Federal Act’s emphasis on cultural continuity, Indigenous jurisdiction, and family and community connection.
The court awarded costs against a First Nation for filing disrespectful submissions.
This is a costs endorsement following an appeal in a child protection case.
The appellant, T.M., sought partial indemnity costs against the individual respondents (parents and aunt) and the Oneida Nation of the Thames.
The Court of Appeal for Ontario, guided by the Family Law Rules, declined to award costs against the individual respondents but found it appropriate to order costs against the Oneida Nation.
The court noted that the Oneida Nation's costs submissions contained unsworn, unproven, and disrespectful statements attacking the appellant's character, and that the appellant had to bring a contested motion for continued access pending appeal.
The court ordered the Oneida Nation to pay $10,000 in costs to the appellant.
Kin caregiver granted party status in child protection proceeding; dismissal based on customary care agreement overturned.
The appellant, a kin caregiver for a First Nations child, appealed an order dismissing a child protection proceeding and denying her motion to be added as a party.
The motion judge had dismissed the proceeding based on a customary care agreement signed by the biological parents, the child's aunt, the First Nation, and the Children's Aid Society, which excluded the appellant.
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the appellant met the statutory definition of a 'parent' under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act and was entitled to party status.
The Court further held that the proceeding could not be dismissed on consent without the appellant's participation and a proper analysis of the child's best interests.
Costs ordered in the cause as neither party was substantially successful in the underlying matter.
Following a decision on the merits, both the applicant and respondent sought costs of $15,000 against the other.
The court found that neither party was substantially successful, despite both investing considerable time and expense.
Consequently, the court ordered that costs be in the cause.
Cross-motions to vary interim parenting orders dismissed for failing to show a material change in circumstances.
The parties brought cross-motions in a high-conflict family law dispute.
The applicant sought a section 30 assessment under the Children's Law Reform Act, variation of interim parenting orders, and an order dispensing with the respondent's consent for child counselling.
The respondent sought variation of the interim parenting orders.
The court ordered a section 112 investigation under the Courts of Justice Act on consent and dismissed the section 30 assessment request due to the parties' financial constraints.
The court dismissed both parties' motions to vary the interim parenting orders, finding neither established a material change in circumstances under the Gordon v. Goertz test.
The request to dispense with consent for counselling was also dismissed.
The court dismissed the mother's appeal of a disposition order granting custody to the father.
The respondent mother, S.A.P., appealed a final disposition order that placed her children in the custody of the respondent father, M.I., following a child protection application.
The appeal raised six grounds, including alleged errors in law regarding the mother's position on the children's need for protection, the test for future emotional harm, the consideration of services provided to the mother, the consideration of less disruptive alternatives, the weight given to the father's criminal record and behaviour, and the mother's willingness to maintain ties between the children and the father.
The court dismissed all grounds of appeal, affirming the trial judge's decision based on the children's best interests, emphasizing the importance of continuity of care and deference to the trial judge's factual findings and weighing of evidence.