Robin L. Saari

In a child protection proceeding involving an Indigenous child, long-term foster parents moved to be added as parties to the disposition phase.

The court held that foster parents do not have party status as of right under s. 13 of An Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families because “care provider” does not include foster parents whose role arises from a state-created placement.

Applying the discretionary framework under r. 7(5) of the Family Law Rules, together with the participation rights contemplated by s. 79(3) of the CYFSA, the court found that full party status was in the child’s best interests.

The foster parents’ lifelong caregiving role, ability to advance a plan of care, and unique evidence about the child’s needs justified their addition without undermining the Federal Act’s emphasis on cultural continuity, Indigenous jurisdiction, and family and community connection.

The applicant, a parent involved with the respondent children's aid society, filed an application alleging the society failed to provide her an opportunity to be heard under s. 15(2) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act.

The applicant raised five issues, including allegations of bias, failure to accommodate disabilities, and failure to hear requests for a new worker, service guidance, and flexible access scheduling.

The Child and Family Services Review Board dismissed four of the allegations, finding the society had reasonably heard and responded to the applicant's concerns.

However, the Board upheld the allegation regarding the request for a new worker, ordering the society to meet with the applicant, hear her reasons, and provide a written decision.

The applicant mother filed a complaint under section 120 of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, alleging that the respondent Children's Aid Society failed to hear her concerns regarding spousal abuse by the children's father.

The Child and Family Services Review Board conducted a written hearing and found that the respondent had indeed heard the applicant's concerns.

The respondent had acted on the reports by moving the applicant's supervised access outside the marital home to decrease the children's exposure to adult conflict.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant mother filed a complaint with the Child and Family Services Review Board regarding the respondent children's aid society's handling of spousal abuse allegations, supervised access conditions, and grooming allegations against her current partner.

The respondent argued the Board lacked jurisdiction under s. 120(8) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act because the matters were before the courts.

The Board found it lacked jurisdiction over the access and grooming issues, as they were actively before the family and criminal courts.

However, the Board retained jurisdiction over the spousal abuse complaint, as it related to a recent incident not yet raised in court.

In a child protection proceeding, foster parents T.O. and M.L. brought a motion for party status concerning the child A.L., who had been in their care since early 2020.

The biological parents, A.H. and D.L., opposed the motion, arguing that the foster parents' input could be obtained through the Children's Aid Society, which took no position.

The court applied a five-factor test to determine if party status should be granted, considering the foster parents' ability to present a plan in the child's best interest, their legal interest (long-term adoption objective), the necessity of their direct evidence given the child's young age and lack of OCL involvement, potential for delay, and the child's best interests.

The motion for party status was granted, emphasizing the need for comprehensive, real-time evidence from primary caregivers.

The paternal grandmother brought a motion to be added as a party to a child protection proceeding.

She had been granted temporary care and custody of her two grandchildren under a previous without-prejudice order.

The society opposed the motion, arguing she was not a statutory parent and that adding her would cause undue delay.

The court found that the grandmother qualified as a statutory parent under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act because she had lawful custody of the children pursuant to the temporary order.

Alternatively, the court held she should be added as a party under the Family Law Rules, as her participation was necessary to determine the issues and was in the best interests of the children.

The motion was granted.

The Children's Aid Society appealed a temporary care order returning a child to the mother and sought a stay of that order pending appeal.

The court applied the three-part test for a stay, focusing on whether there was a serious issue to be tried.

The court found the Society failed to establish a serious issue, concluding that the motion judge's finding of speculative risk was entitled to deference and that the child could be adequately protected by a supervision order.

The motion for a stay was dismissed.

A child protection agency sought summary judgment on a motion to establish that a child was in need of protection and to grant custody to the paternal grandparents.

The respondent mother opposed the custody order but took no position on the identification order.

The respondent father supported the motion.

The court granted summary judgment on custody to the paternal grandparents and supervised access to the father, but declined to grant summary judgment on the mother's access, finding that genuine issues remained regarding the accommodation of the mother's work schedule and exploration of third-party supervisors.

The court ordered a focused one-day hearing on the mother's access issue.

This is a child protection proceeding under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act (CYFSA) concerning maternal access to a three-year-old child (Amelia) who was found to be in need of protection and made a crown ward (now extended society care).

The trial addressed only the issue of maternal access following a prior summary judgment motion that established the child's need for protection.

The mother sought continued access to the child, but the court found that the mother failed to meet the best interests test, particularly in demonstrating that the relationship was beneficial and meaningful to the child.

The court terminated all access.

A child protection motion for summary judgment brought by the Children's Aid Society seeking a finding that a child is in need of protection under section 37(2)(b)(i) of the Child and Family Services Act, an order for crown wardship, and an order for no maternal access.

The child was apprehended at birth and had been in foster care for approximately two years with only supervised access to the mother.

The court found that the mother's severe intellectual limitations, history of unsuccessful parenting with three prior children, personality difficulties, and inability to comply with supervision orders created a risk of physical harm.

The court granted the motion for summary judgment, finding no genuine issue requiring trial on the grounds for protection, disposition, or access.

The Children's Aid Society sought a "with prejudice" section 51 order placing a child in interim care.

The child had been in care for over 554 days, exceeding statutory limits.

The respondent mother sought return of the child or placement with her mother; the respondent father sought placement with his mother.

The court found that while the parents had made some progress in addressing personal and parenting issues, the risk of harm remained.

The court ordered interim placement of the child with the maternal grandmother under Society supervision, finding the risk manageable under reasonable conditions.

The court also ordered separate supervised access for the respondent father and paternal grandmother, and directed the Society to conduct a home assessment of the maternal grandmother's residence.