Trent Falldien

In a child protection proceeding, foster parents T.O. and M.L. brought a motion for party status concerning the child A.L., who had been in their care since early 2020.

The biological parents, A.H. and D.L., opposed the motion, arguing that the foster parents' input could be obtained through the Children's Aid Society, which took no position.

The court applied a five-factor test to determine if party status should be granted, considering the foster parents' ability to present a plan in the child's best interest, their legal interest (long-term adoption objective), the necessity of their direct evidence given the child's young age and lack of OCL involvement, potential for delay, and the child's best interests.

The motion for party status was granted, emphasizing the need for comprehensive, real-time evidence from primary caregivers.

This appeal concerned a motion to change a child support order, specifically challenging the calculation of arrears based on the child's enrollment in post-secondary education.

The appellant father argued that the lower court erred in finding the child entitled to support for periods where there was insufficient evidence of full-time educational enrollment.

The court found that while there was some evidence for certain periods, there was a complete lack of evidence for other periods (July 2018 - December 2018 and May 2019 - August 2019), constituting an error of law.

Consequently, the appeal was allowed in part, and the child support arrears owed by the father were significantly reduced.

The paternal grandmother brought a motion to be added as a party to a child protection proceeding.

She had been granted temporary care and custody of her two grandchildren under a previous without-prejudice order.

The society opposed the motion, arguing she was not a statutory parent and that adding her would cause undue delay.

The court found that the grandmother qualified as a statutory parent under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act because she had lawful custody of the children pursuant to the temporary order.

Alternatively, the court held she should be added as a party under the Family Law Rules, as her participation was necessary to determine the issues and was in the best interests of the children.

The motion was granted.

The Children's Aid Society appealed a temporary care order returning a child to the mother and sought a stay of that order pending appeal.

The court applied the three-part test for a stay, focusing on whether there was a serious issue to be tried.

The court found the Society failed to establish a serious issue, concluding that the motion judge's finding of speculative risk was entitled to deference and that the child could be adequately protected by a supervision order.

The motion for a stay was dismissed.

A motion to change regarding child support and section 7 expenses for two children from a marriage that ended in 2013.

The applicant father sought to vary the terms of a prior separation agreement and court order, proposing either a fixed monthly sum or a proportionate payment structure for extracurricular expenses.

The respondent mother sought a fixed monthly amount for extracurricular activities.

The court found that the children's extracurricular activities at an elite competitive level constituted extraordinary expenses within the meaning of the Child Support Guidelines.

The court fixed annual section 7 expenses at $16,000 and ordered the father to pay $400 per child per month, with arrears to be repaid at $200 monthly.

The court also ordered the mother to provide annual accounting of expenses.

The applicant sought interim spousal support following a seven-year relationship with no children of the marriage.

The parties maintained separate finances during the marriage, except for a joint account for specific household expenses.

The court found no evidence of economic disadvantage, career subordination, or economic merger.

The motion for interim spousal support was dismissed as the applicant failed to establish a prima facie case for entitlement.

The Crown defendants moved to strike the plaintiff's civil claim alleging negligence, Charter breaches, and bad faith arising from the Crown's intervention in a private prosecution and the OIPRD's handling of a police complaint.

The Superior Court of Justice granted the motion and struck the claims without leave to amend.

The court found the claims against the Crown were barred by issue estoppel and prosecutorial immunity, while the claims against the OIPRD constituted an impermissible collateral attack and were barred by statutory immunity under the Police Services Act.

A landlord leased commercial property to a tenant who operated a contracting business.

The tenant modified the property by dumping landfill in a regulated flood plain without proper authorization, leading to environmental remediation orders.

The landlord and tenant had an oral agreement whereby the tenant would pay rezoning costs and complete required site plan modifications.

When the tenant failed to complete remediation work and the relationship broke down, the landlord terminated the lease and seized the tenant's commercial equipment on the property.

The landlord sued for unpaid rent and property damage; the tenant counterclaimed for conversion of the seized chattels and lost business income.

The trial judge awarded damages to both parties and set them off.

Both parties appealed on liability and damages.

The plaintiff landlord leased a commercial property to the defendant tenant.

The tenant placed excessive landfill on the property, violating conservation authority regulations.

The landlord terminated the lease and seized the tenant's entire fleet of commercial vehicles, holding them for over four years as security for future remediation costs.

The court found the landlord's distraint was illegal and constituted conversion, as a landlord cannot both terminate a lease and distrain goods, nor can they distrain for non-rent damages.

The landlord was awarded damages for the remediation and site plan costs, while the tenant was awarded damages for the converted chattels and lost income.

After set-off, the tenant was granted a net judgment of $106,771.

The appellants appealed their convictions for assaulting and resisting peace officers.

The charges arose from an altercation with police who had entered the property to investigate a noise complaint.

The appellants argued the police were unlawfully on the property, breached their section 8 Charter rights, and that the trial judge misapprehended evidence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the police had an implied licence to enter the property, the appellants lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy, and the trial judge's factual findings were reasonable.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of an application challenging the Crown's assumption of a private prosecution and subsequent withdrawal of charges against a police officer for alleged assault in custody.

The appellant had commenced a private prosecution against Constable Labreche, and after a prima facie case was found, the Crown intervened to assume carriage.

The appellant challenged this intervention in the Superior Court, alleging breach of Charter rights and bias.

The application was dismissed.

The Crown subsequently withdrew the charge.

The appellant brought a second application asserting constitutional challenges to the legislative regime permitting Crown intervention.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the basis of issue estoppel, finding that both applications raised identical issues regarding the Crown's decision to take over the prosecution and the appellant's exclusion from it.

The applicant sought declarations that s. 507.1 of the Criminal Code and s. 11(d) of the Crown Attorney’s Act were unconstitutional, and to set aside the Attorney General's intervention and withdrawal of a private prosecution.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the issues raised had already been judicially determined in prior proceedings (a recusal application and an extension of time to appeal), and therefore the doctrine of issue estoppel applied.

Costs were awarded against the applicant.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application for a declaration that the name 'Domestic Violence Court' violated his rights under sections 7, 12, and 15 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the application judge that the appellant failed to demonstrate serious state-imposed psychological harm, cruel and unusual treatment, or discrimination.

The court noted that such applications risk trivializing important Charter rights.

The applicant sought prerogative relief challenging the Attorney General’s decision to intervene in and assume carriage of a private prosecution against a police officer for alleged assault during an arrest.

The applicant alleged bias and abuse of process, arguing that Crown counsel’s handling of prior charges against him and the disclosure of a police video demonstrated partiality.

The court held that the Attorney General has authority to intervene in private prosecutions and that such prosecutorial decisions fall within core Crown discretion, subject to review only for abuse of process.

The evidence relied on by the applicant was largely hearsay and insufficient to establish a reasonable apprehension of bias or abuse of process.

The court found no improper conduct in the Crown’s disclosure practices or earlier settlement discussions.

The applicant sought a declaration that the informal name “Domestic Violence Court” was unconstitutional and should be replaced with “Domestic Court”.

He alleged the name violated ss. 7, 12, and 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms by stigmatizing accused persons and affecting fairness in criminal proceedings.

The court held the applicant failed to establish any deprivation of security of the person or other Charter rights, noting that subjective feelings of stigma were insufficient without objective evidence of serious psychological harm.

The court also found the name rationally connected to the court’s legitimate purpose of addressing domestic violence cases and rejected claims of cruel and unusual treatment or discrimination.

The application was dismissed.