Patricia G. Marcuccio

The Children's Aid Society brought a summary judgment motion seeking a finding that the child was in need of protection and an order for extended society care.

The father conceded the finding but argued that a trial was required for disposition, proposing that the child be placed in his care under a supervision order while residing with the paternal grandparents.

The court granted the finding that the child was in need of protection but concluded there was a genuine issue requiring a trial regarding disposition and access.

The court ordered a mini-trial with focused oral testimony to determine whether a supervision order or extended society care was in the child's best interests.

The Children's Aid Society sought leave to withdraw its child protection application concerning two children.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL) and the father opposed the withdrawal, arguing that live protection concerns and parental alienation issues required adjudication.

The court dismissed the society's motion, finding that the children's best interests required a full factual record and timely determination of outstanding issues.

The court ordered that the child protection application and the parents' Children's Law Reform Act application proceed to a combined trial, ensuring OCL involvement and preserving the option of continued society involvement.

The Children's Aid Society brought a child protection application, and the court *sua sponte* raised the question of whether the application was brought within the five-day statutory limit under s. 88 of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017.

The Society argued that Rule 3(2) of the Family Law Rules, which excludes weekends for periods less than seven days, applied.

The court held that Rule 3(2) does not apply to statutory timelines, as it would exceed the rule-making authority and conflict with the substantive legislative intent of balancing child protection with parental constitutional rights.

Consequently, the Society failed to bring the application within the five-day period, having done so on the seventh day.

The applicant mother filed a complaint with the Child and Family Services Review Board regarding the respondent children's aid society's actions, including access restrictions and safety planning involving the child's father.

The respondent argued the board lacked jurisdiction under section 120(8) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 because the issues were currently before the court in child protection proceedings.

The adjudicator reviewed the court documents and found that the issues raised in the complaint were squarely before the court.

The complaint was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The respondent mother, S.M.L., sought leave to bring a status review application for her child, Z., who had been in extended society care and with the same foster parents for over two years.

The court applied the five-part test from Catholic Children's Aid of Metro Toronto v. B.A.F., which requires the applicant to demonstrate bona fide intent, that relief cannot be obtained otherwise, unusual circumstances, that the review would accomplish the Act's purposes, and a prima facie case.

The court found that the mother failed to establish unusual circumstances (as a parent's improvement alone is not unusual) and failed to establish a prima facie case, primarily due to ongoing instability in her life and the significant disruption it would cause to the special needs child's established stability and attachment with the foster parents.

The application for leave was dismissed, prioritizing the child's best interests and permanency.

In a child protection proceeding, foster parents T.O. and M.L. brought a motion for party status concerning the child A.L., who had been in their care since early 2020.

The biological parents, A.H. and D.L., opposed the motion, arguing that the foster parents' input could be obtained through the Children's Aid Society, which took no position.

The court applied a five-factor test to determine if party status should be granted, considering the foster parents' ability to present a plan in the child's best interest, their legal interest (long-term adoption objective), the necessity of their direct evidence given the child's young age and lack of OCL involvement, potential for delay, and the child's best interests.

The motion for party status was granted, emphasizing the need for comprehensive, real-time evidence from primary caregivers.

The Children's Aid Society of the Districts of Sudbury and Manitoulin brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a finding that the child was in need of protection, an order for Extended Society Care, and dismissal of maternal access.

The respondent mother opposed, seeking the child's return with or without supervision, and access.

The respondent father agreed with the Society's position.

The court found the child to be in need of protection under s.74(2)(b)(i) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, based on the mother's history of neglect with prior children, mental health issues, substance abuse, residential instability, and inability to care for the child.

The court dismissed the mother's request for the child's return and for access, concluding that there was no genuine issue requiring a trial and that the Society had met its onus.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a finding that a child was in need of protection under subsections 37(2)(b)(i) and 37(2)(b)(ii) of the Child and Family Services Act and an order making the child a Crown ward without access.

The respondent mother opposed the motion with a brief affidavit containing blanket denials unsupported by specific facts.

The respondent father provided no response.

The court found the Society had discharged its burden at both the finding and disposition stages, establishing compelling evidence of the parents' inability to adequately care for the child, the mother's untreated mental health issues, and the father's complete lack of engagement.

The court made an order declaring the child a Crown ward with no access for purposes of adoption.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a finding that a newborn child (A.G.) was in need of protection under the Child and Family Services Act and requesting an order for crown wardship with no access.

The respondent parents had executed a written custody agreement transferring sole custody of the child to a third party (A.G.1) on the day of the child's birth.

The court dismissed the motion, finding genuine issues requiring trial on multiple grounds: (1) the identity of the person having charge of the child at the time of apprehension; (2) the validity and legal effect of the custody agreement; (3) whether A.G.1 qualifies as a statutory party to the proceeding; (4) whether the grounds for finding the child in need of protection (abandonment and risk of physical harm) were established; and (5) procedural and temporal issues arising from delays in the proceedings.

A child protection matter involving three children where the Children's Aid Society sought disposition orders following findings that the children were in need of protection.

The mother's relationship with a person with a serious criminal history and allegations of child sexual abuse posed significant risk to the children.

The mother repeatedly violated court orders by facilitating contact between the children and this individual.

The court granted sole custody of two older children to the father and made the youngest child a Crown ward without access, prioritizing continuity of care and the child's long-term stability and permanence.

The Children's Aid Society brought a summary judgment motion seeking crown wardship without access to two children.

The parents conceded the issue of finding and crown wardship but sought access, which the Society opposed.

The court applied the two-pronged test under section 59 of the Child and Family Services Act, requiring that the relationship between parent and child be beneficial and meaningful, and that access not impair future adoption opportunities.

The court found no material facts requiring trial and concluded that the parents' relationship with the children was not significantly advantageous.

The parents demonstrated inconsistent and erratic access patterns, cognitive deficiencies affecting parenting capacity, and an indifferent attitude toward the relationship.

The court granted crown wardship with no access.