Max Katz

Following a family law trial concerning a school-aged child, the court determined parenting, education, and child support issues under the Children’s Law Reform Act and the Child Support Guidelines.

The court found that both parents loved the child and both had committed forms of family violence, but concluded that the child required greater school-week stability and that the father had demonstrated stronger engagement with the child’s attendance and school functioning.

The existing 2-2-3 shared parenting regime was found not to be in the child’s best interests, although the mother’s time still met the s. 9 shared-parenting threshold when calculated hourly.

The court ordered primary residence with the father during the school year, preserved the child’s attendance at private school, prohibited homeschooling, imposed detailed decision-making and communication terms, imputed income to the mother from October 1, 2025, and ordered set-off child support together with proportionate section 7 contributions.

Following a family trial, the court resolved remaining issues concerning parenting decision-making, section 7 expenses, child support, the date of separation, and equalization.

The court granted the mother sole decision-making authority over extra-curricular activities, found the father’s opposition to dance classes unreasonable, and ordered section 7 expenses shared in a 5:6 ratio.

For child support, the court imputed annual income of $120,000 to the father from June 1, 2021, finding both that his true earning capacity exceeded his reported income and that he was intentionally underemployed within the meaning of the Guidelines.

On property issues, the court fixed the separation date at January 14, 2021 and valued the applicant’s Dreamfund investments at zero on that date, concluding an objective observer would have regarded them as worthless despite later sporadic payments.

The Children's Aid Society brought a child protection application, and the court *sua sponte* raised the question of whether the application was brought within the five-day statutory limit under s. 88 of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017.

The Society argued that Rule 3(2) of the Family Law Rules, which excludes weekends for periods less than seven days, applied.

The court held that Rule 3(2) does not apply to statutory timelines, as it would exceed the rule-making authority and conflict with the substantive legislative intent of balancing child protection with parental constitutional rights.

Consequently, the Society failed to bring the application within the five-day period, having done so on the seventh day.