Laura E. Oliver

The court granted the applicant's motion to strike the respondent's motion to change a final child support order, due to the respondent's persistent and ongoing failure to provide financial disclosure and comply with multiple court orders.

The court found the respondent's non-compliance to be egregious and willful, and concluded that no other remedy would suffice.

The decision also sets out the process for written submissions on costs.

The Applicant wife, S.P., brought a motion to amend her Application to add four new respondents and to plead the tort of civil conspiracy, alleging that the Respondent husband, D.D., and the proposed new respondents conspired to conceal D.D.'s income and assets, causing S.P. over $6 million in damages.

The Respondent opposed the motion and sought a substantial costs award.

The court applied the Family Law Rules 11(3) and the "plain and obvious" test for new causes of action, finding that the amended pleading sufficiently pleaded material facts to support the conspiracy claim.

The court also noted D.D.'s lack of transparency in financial disclosure.

The motion to amend was granted.

S.P. was deprived of costs for the motion due to unreasonable delay in bringing it, which led to trial adjournments.

D.D.'s request for costs was declined, though he was permitted to make further submissions on costs of the motion.

The applicant father brought a motion seeking temporary sole decision-making responsibility for the child's education and health, and primary residence in India, varying a previous order.

The respondent mother opposed and implicitly sought the child's return to Canada, but did not bring a formal motion for this relief.

The court found a material change in circumstances due to the child's relocation and inability to attend school.

Applying the test from Thomas v Wohleber, the court granted the father temporary sole decision-making authority for education and health, and primary parenting time in India, finding it to be in the child's best interests to ensure continued schooling and access to counselling.

The court retained jurisdiction as the child's habitual residence had not changed.

Following a final settlement on a Motion to Change, the applicant sought full indemnity costs of $175,000, while the self-represented respondent argued for no costs or a nominal amount.

The court found the applicant was the successful party, having secured equal parenting time, which was the most important issue.

The court rejected the applicant's claim for full indemnity costs as there was no bad faith, but awarded partial indemnity costs of $100,000, noting the respondent's uncooperative behaviour and meritless adjournment application.

The applicant mother sought exclusive possession of the matrimonial home, spousal support, child support, and disclosure, while the respondent father brought a cross-motion for immediate sale of the home.

The court dismissed the father's motion for immediate sale and granted the mother exclusive possession, finding it unfair to dislocate her and the children prematurely given the availability of an early trial.

The court also declined to impute income to either party on an interim basis, citing the complexity of the income analysis and the summary nature of motions.

Temporary child and spousal support were ordered based on the father's stated income, with all support determinations being without prejudice to re-determination at trial.

The respondent brought a motion to change a prior order regarding child support and spousal support.

The respondent sought to terminate child support for both children and opposed the applicant's claims for retroactive increases in child support and section 7 expenses.

The court granted the respondent's request to terminate child support for the son effective May 1, 2018, and for the daughter effective February 1, 2017.

The court rejected the applicant's claims for retroactive child support increases and section 7 expenses, finding no increase warranted based on the respondent's income averages and difficulties in accurately determining past special expenses or cost-sharing arrangements.

The respondent father sought to vary a 2006 child support order that imputed income to him at $88,000 per annum.

The father claimed changed circumstances: (1) he became a salaried employee at Mercedes-Benz earning $32,583.80 in 2012; (2) he suffered a workplace accident in March 2013 resulting in post-concussion syndrome and CPP disability benefits; and (3) the eldest child graduated from university and was no longer eligible for support.

The applicant mother opposed the motion, arguing the issues were res judicata and that the father was hiding income and leading a lavish lifestyle.

The court found a change in circumstances and varied the child support retroactively to July 1, 2013, imputing income at $30,000 per annum.

The court rejected the mother's retroactive claim for the eldest child's post-secondary expenses as barred by the DBS rule.

The father's obligation to contribute to the younger child's post-secondary expenses was left to be determined by the parties.

The court determined costs following a decision on two motions: one by the father to confirm a provisional order made in England under the Interjurisdictional Support Orders Act that would have substantially reduced his child support obligations, and one by the mother to release approximately $50,000 held in trust.

The court found the father had attorned to Ontario jurisdiction by commencing a motion to change and did not confirm the English provisional order.

The mother was successful on both motions.

The court awarded costs of $4,000 to the mother, finding the father acted unreasonably by failing to provide full disclosure and by commencing parallel proceedings in two jurisdictions.

The costs were to be enforced by the Family Responsibility Office as a support order.

The applicant spouse brought a motion for interim spousal support retroactive to shortly after separation in the context of a divorce proceeding.

The respondent opposed entitlement and brought a cross-motion for summary judgment seeking an equalization payment calculation and transfer of the matrimonial home.

Applying s. 15.2 of the Divorce Act and the principles in Bracklow v. Bracklow, the court held the applicant had established a prima facie entitlement to interim spousal support on a non-compensatory basis given the disparity in income and the economic hardship following separation.

Using the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines, the court ordered interim support within the mid-range and set a presumptive commencement date based on MacKinnon v. MacKinnon.

The respondent’s motion for summary judgment regarding equalization and transfer of the matrimonial home was dismissed due to genuine issues requiring a trial.

The applicant sought to vary a child support order of $2,148 per month made on consent in Ontario by obtaining a provisional order in England reducing support to £130 per month.

The respondent opposed the variation and sought release of funds held in trust from the sale of the applicant's Ontario home.

The court found that the applicant had attorned to Ontario's jurisdiction by commencing a motion to change in Ontario while proceedings were pending under the Interjurisdictional Support Orders Act.

The court declined to confirm the provisional English order, finding discrepancies and omissions in the applicant's financial disclosure and determining that Ontario was the more convenient forum.

The court ordered the applicant to proceed with a motion to change in Ontario and released the trust funds to the respondent.

In a family law trial regarding equalization, the respondent husband sought to exclude $219,000 from his net family property, claiming it was traceable to inheritances and gifts.

The court found the respondent failed to provide sufficient documentary evidence to trace the funds into his shareholder loan or subsequent investment accounts.

The court also determined the date of marriage value of the respondent's 20% interest in the family business was zero, rejecting the respondent's proposed expert evidence due to lack of independence and insufficient data.

A divorce judgment was granted.

Following an earlier judgment, the parties were unable to agree on the calculation of special or extraordinary expenses under s.7 of the Child Support Guidelines.

The court reviewed written submissions regarding credits owed to the father for periods when a child was not attending school or was living away from the mother while attending school.

The judge calculated credits for overpaid child support and applied them against outstanding s.7 expenses incurred for education, extracurricular activities, travel, and medical costs.

After deducting the credits, the court determined the remaining amount payable to the mother.

The court also directed that future disputes regarding s.7 expenses should be addressed through mediation pursuant to the parties’ agreement.

Following a family law trial involving spousal support, child support, and claims for section 7 expenses, the parties were unable to agree on costs.

The respondent sought $52,000 in costs, while the applicant argued success was divided but conceded that $25,000 would be appropriate if costs were awarded.

Applying s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules, the court assessed the relative success of the parties, their conduct, and their financial circumstances.

The court found the respondent was largely successful, particularly on the central issue concerning the applicant’s income and the resulting support obligations.

The court fixed costs payable to the respondent at $42,000 inclusive of disbursements.

The applicant sought to reduce spousal and child support obligations established in a separation agreement, alleging a material change in financial circumstances and asserting that income originally imputed for support purposes was overstated.

The respondent opposed the variation, sought enforcement of the agreement, claimed arrears for special and extraordinary expenses under the Federal Child Support Guidelines, and requested conversion of periodic spousal support into a lump sum.

Applying the framework from Miglin v. Miglin and subsequent Supreme Court authorities, the court held the separation agreement was fairly negotiated and continued to reflect the parties’ intentions.

The court found the applicant’s income disclosure unreliable and maintained the imputed income used in the agreement.

Spousal support was not reduced, child support for an adult child was terminated when he ceased full‑time studies, and retroactive s.7 expenses were partially awarded.