Ted R. Laan

The court considered motions by the plaintiffs to keep their claim alive and by the defendants to dismiss for delay.

The action, commenced in 2016, had experienced significant periods of unexplained delay.

The court found the delay inordinate and inexcusable, and that the presumption of prejudice to the defendants had not been rebutted.

The plaintiffs' action was dismissed for delay under Rule 24.01(1)(c).

The plaintiffs and defendants were part of a group of ten investors who purchased a property to improve and sell for profit.

Following the sale, a dispute arose over the distribution of the net proceeds.

The plaintiff claimed entitlement to three shares of the proceeds and compensation for lost rental income, while the defendants argued he was only entitled to one share, subject to a deduction for an unpaid promissory note.

The court found the plaintiff was entitled to a single one-tenth share, from which his debt under the promissory note was deducted, resulting in an award of $8,237.82.

The claims for additional shares and lost rental income were dismissed.

An applicant sought a declaration that properties and bank accounts held jointly with a family member were subject to a resulting trust, not a gift.

This application was brought to protect assets from a judgment creditor, which had obtained a fraud judgment against the family member.

The court addressed two preliminary issues: whether the transfer was a gift or created a resulting trust (requiring a trial), and whether the family member's registration on title necessarily gave them a beneficial interest enforceable by the creditor.

The court dismissed the creditor's argument that land titles registration was conclusive for third-party creditors, distinguishing it from conveyancing cases involving bona fide purchasers.

The court found that the indefeasibility principle of the Land Titles system does not apply to third-party creditors in this context, and therefore, a trial is necessary to determine the true beneficial ownership.

This case involved a dispute between former real estate investment partners regarding the nature and scope of their oral agreement.

The plaintiffs, Anish Gupta and Gurpal Sani, sought a declaration that a second property, Torbram Road, was part of their partnership with the defendants, Kamaljit Chauhan and Gurbir Chauhan, and that the defendants had misappropriated partnership funds.

The court found that an oral partnership agreement existed for both properties (Para Place and Torbram Road), and that the defendants breached their fiduciary duties by selling Torbram Road and using the proceeds to purchase their personal residence (Burlwood Road) without accounting to the plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs were declared beneficial owners of Burlwood Road via a resulting trust and awarded damages.

A claim for punitive damages was dismissed due to the absence of an independent actionable wrong.

The defendants brought a motion to strike parts of the plaintiffs' claim, specifically regarding unlawful interference with contractual relations, inducing breach of contract, breach of confidence, and conversion.

The court struck the pleadings for unlawful interference with contractual relations, granting leave to amend, on the basis that inducing breach of contract does not constitute the "unlawful means" required for the tort of unlawful interference with economic relations as per the Supreme Court's decision in A.I. Enterprises.

However, the court upheld the pleadings for inducing breach of contract, breach of confidence, and conversion, rejecting the defendants' argument that A.I. Enterprises implicitly eliminated the tort of inducing breach of contract.

The Bankrupt sought to expunge or reduce a creditor's claim, and the motion was entirely successful.

This endorsement addresses the costs of that expungement motion.

The court found the creditor's conduct in opposing the motion to be reprehensible, scandalous, or outrageous, having taken inconsistent legal and factual positions across various proceedings.

Substantial indemnity costs were awarded to the bankrupt due to the creditor's conduct and the complexity and importance of the issues.

The respondent father brought a motion to have the parties' 11-year-old daughter attend a French immersion school, while the applicant mother wanted her to attend a homogeneous French-language school.

The parties shared parenting time equally.

The court considered the best interests of the child, weighing factors such as the benefits of French-only instruction, the child's attachments to friends, the father's ability to participate in her education, and the status quo.

The court concluded that it was in the child's best interests to attend the homogeneous French-language school, as it represented the status quo and offered the benefits of full French instruction, despite the father's concerns about his ability to participate in her education.

The father's motion was dismissed.

The defendant lawyer brought a motion for summary judgment to stay the plaintiff's solicitor negligence action as an abuse of process.

The plaintiff sued her former family lawyer, alleging negligence in the negotiation of a separation agreement regarding spousal support, but had not first sought to set aside or vary the agreement under the Family Law Act.

The court granted the motion and stayed the action, holding that a family law litigant must exhaust statutory remedies against their former spouse before pursuing a civil action for damages against their lawyer to avoid circumventing the family law statutory scheme.

The defendant, Lawyers’ Professional Indemnity Company (LPIC), brought a motion seeking an order for enforcement costs against the third parties, Malkit Mangat and Jujhar Mangat, on a partial indemnity scale, totaling $51,749.39.

LPIC argued that Rule 60.19(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, read with Section 131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act, allowed for the recovery of all reasonable enforcement costs, including those related to settlement efforts, bankruptcy proposals, and a fraudulent conveyance action.

The third parties contended that Rule 60.19(1) is exhaustive, limiting recoverable costs to only those items specifically enumerated.

The court agreed with the third parties, finding that Rule 60.19(1) provides an exhaustive list of recoverable enforcement costs and that the phrase "unless the court orders otherwise" grants discretion over recoverability of listed items, not open-endedness.

Consequently, LPIC's principal request for fixed costs was denied, and the motion was dismissed, except for the alternative request to refer allowable costs (limited to those explicitly delineated in Rule 60.19(1)) to an Assessment Officer.

The respondents sought to purchase a property owned by the appellant organization and advanced $1,735,000 under a Control Agreement dated April 8, 2015.

The trial judge found the funds constituted a loan repayable regardless of whether the property purchase was completed, that interest at 12% per annum was payable, and that two individual appellants were jointly and severally liable for repayment.

The appellants appealed, arguing the loan was conditional on property acquisition, that no interest was payable, and that the individuals were not personally liable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's interpretation of the Control Agreement and finding the appellants' interpretation commercially unreasonable.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision declining to approve the sale of property (79 Bramsteele Road, Brampton, Ontario) by a court-appointed receiver to the appellant.

The property was owned by a religious charitable organization that became insolvent.

The receiver entered into an agreement to sell the property to the appellant, but the motion judge declined approval, instead establishing a process to permit assignment of the first mortgage held by the respondent mortgagee.

The Court of Appeal found the motion judge erred in applying the second Soundair duty by failing to properly consider the interests of creditors and the appellant as purchaser.

The court allowed the appeal and ordered a new hearing.

A child protection application brought by the Children's Aid Society against three respondents concerning three children: A. (age 17), N. (age 14), and S. (age 5).

The mother, J.K.V., suffers from untreated mental illness including bipolar disorder, borderline personality disorder, and substance abuse issues.

The court found all three children to be in need of protection based on patterns of neglect, failure to provide adequate care, supervision, and protection.

The court made A. a Crown Ward, placed N. in his father's care subject to a seven-month supervision order, and granted S.'s father sole custody with no access for the mother.

The decision emphasizes the serious impact of untreated parental mental illness on child protection outcomes and the court's duty to prioritize children's best interests over parental rights.

The plaintiff moved for an order compelling the defendant to produce a further affidavit of documents and, subsequently, to inspect the defendant's computer hard drive after learning the defendant destroyed its working paper file.

The court granted the order for hard drive inspection, citing the unusual circumstances of the defendant destroying relevant evidence in the face of fraud allegations and inconsistent testimony, and dismissed the request for a further affidavit of documents without prejudice.

In a family law proceeding, the court conducted a case management conference call with counsel to address trial preparation and streamline the issues.

The parties continued narrowing the matters in dispute and working to shorten the anticipated trial.

The court directed that a further conference call be scheduled to continue case management and facilitate efficient trial preparation.

In a family law trial regarding equalization, the respondent husband sought to exclude $219,000 from his net family property, claiming it was traceable to inheritances and gifts.

The court found the respondent failed to provide sufficient documentary evidence to trace the funds into his shareholder loan or subsequent investment accounts.

The court also determined the date of marriage value of the respondent's 20% interest in the family business was zero, rejecting the respondent's proposed expert evidence due to lack of independence and insufficient data.

A divorce judgment was granted.