E. Kruzick

This divorce proceeding addressed the applicant wife's claims for ongoing and retroactive spousal and child support, and a post-separation accounting, as well as the respondent husband's request for termination or reduction of spousal support and credit for overpayments.

The court granted the divorce, imputed income to both parties, and ordered the husband to pay ongoing spousal support of $6,500 per month, a reduction from the temporary order of $8,500.

All claims for retroactive spousal and child support by both parties were dismissed.

The wife's claims against the added respondent (husband's common-law partner) were also dismissed.

The husband was ordered to maintain health insurance for the wife and designate her as an irrevocable beneficiary on a life insurance policy.

Following an undefended trial in a common-law family dispute, the court addressed claims for child support, spousal support, and property remedies grounded in unjust enrichment, constructive trust, and proprietary estoppel.

The applicant alleged that the respondent used her assets to acquire numerous investment properties in Canada and Florida and concealed ownership through corporations solely controlled by him.

The court found that the parties had engaged in a joint family venture and that the respondent had wrongfully diverted and concealed assets, depriving the applicant of her contributions.

Applying principles from Kerr v. Baranow and related authorities, the court awarded a constructive trust remedy and ordered the respondent to pay US$2.2 million reflecting the value of the Florida properties.

The court also imputed income to the respondent for support purposes and ordered child support, lump sum spousal support, and related financial relief.

Following the dismissal of an appeal seeking to set aside an arbitration award concerning custody, child support, and spousal support, the successful party sought substantial costs.

The court applied Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules, emphasizing the presumption that the successful party is entitled to costs and assessing the reasonableness of the parties’ conduct throughout the litigation.

The court found the appellant’s conduct excessive, including the presentation of voluminous and inefficient materials, while the respondent’s counsel exercised restraint and efficiency.

After reviewing the bill of costs and relevant factors, the court exercised its discretion to award partial indemnity costs to the successful party.

Costs were fixed at $70,000 inclusive of HST, payable in instalments.

Following settlement of a family law motion to change concerning termination of child and spousal support, the remaining issue before the court was costs.

The applicant sought over $42,000 in costs arising from the respondent’s unsuccessful attempt to terminate support and related proceedings.

The court reviewed the parties’ conduct, the settlement outcome, and multiple offers to settle in accordance with s.131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 24(5) of the Family Law Rules.

The court found the applicant’s position was not unreasonable and rejected a claim relating to income tax penalties as outside the scope of a costs determination.

Costs were awarded to the applicant in a reduced amount.

Application under the Hague Convention seeking the return of a young child to Australia after the respondent parent remained in Ontario with the child following a trip from Melbourne.

The court considered whether the child’s habitual residence was Australia or Ontario and addressed defences of acquiescence and grave risk of harm under Article 13(b).

The evidence demonstrated that the parties had jointly relocated to Australia with a settled intention to live there, including relinquishing their Ontario residence and establishing living arrangements in Melbourne.

The court rejected claims that the move was merely exploratory and found no clear evidence of consent or acquiescence by the applicant to the child remaining in Ontario.

The respondent also failed to establish the high threshold of grave risk of harm necessary to prevent return.

The child was ordered returned to Australia with conditions and undertakings.

The plaintiffs brought a civil action alleging malicious prosecution, defamation, and slander after the defendant reported alleged assaults and threats to police, resulting in criminal charges that were later withdrawn following peace bonds.

The plaintiffs sought general and special damages and additional damages under the Family Law Act for the children.

The court found that although the police reports and charges occurred, the evidence was conflicting and insufficient to determine whether the alleged incidents actually happened.

The court also found no reliable evidence of reputational damage, loss of employment, or actionable defamatory publication beyond communications made to authorities and professionals.

In the absence of proof supporting the elements of defamation or malicious prosecution, the claims were dismissed.

Following a five‑year marriage with no children of the relationship, the parties sought divorce, mutual restraining orders, and spousal support.

The respondent alleged abuse and sought spousal support based on need and alleged underemployment by the applicant.

The court found the marriage was short, the respondent had become self‑sufficient since separation, and any economic disadvantage arising from the marriage was minimal.

A restraining order was granted against the applicant due to evidence of ongoing contact and harassment, but the respondent was denied spousal support.

Divorce was granted to both parties.

Following an earlier judgment, the parties were unable to agree on the calculation of special or extraordinary expenses under s.7 of the Child Support Guidelines.

The court reviewed written submissions regarding credits owed to the father for periods when a child was not attending school or was living away from the mother while attending school.

The judge calculated credits for overpaid child support and applied them against outstanding s.7 expenses incurred for education, extracurricular activities, travel, and medical costs.

After deducting the credits, the court determined the remaining amount payable to the mother.

The court also directed that future disputes regarding s.7 expenses should be addressed through mediation pursuant to the parties’ agreement.

The appellant mother appealed a child protection order declaring the child a Crown ward with no access following a summary judgment proceeding in the Ontario Court of Justice.

The trial judge had denied the mother’s adjournment request and proceeded despite her lack of counsel and late filings.

The appeal court held that, given the mother’s circumstances and the seriousness of permanently severing the parent‑child relationship, procedural fairness required granting an adjournment and allowing time to file an answer and parenting plan.

The record contained conflicting evidence regarding parenting ability, mental health, and access, raising credibility issues unsuitable for summary judgment.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant mother appealed an order of the Ontario Court of Justice making her child a Crown ward without access following summary judgment in a child protection proceeding.

The trial judge had denied an adjournment request and proceeded after the mother failed to file an Answer within the prescribed timeline.

The Superior Court held that, although procedural fairness was considered, the circumstances—including the mother’s lack of counsel, her efforts to obtain legal aid, and conflicting evidence regarding parenting ability and access—raised triable credibility issues inappropriate for summary judgment.

The court emphasized that credibility disputes and serious dispositions such as Crown wardship require careful procedural safeguards and, generally, a full trial.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

Following a prior costs endorsement, self-represented respondents sought leave to file a reply and requested reconsideration of the court’s costs determination.

The underlying application sought a declaration regarding the validity of several leases and had been dismissed, resulting in success for the respondents.

The self-represented respondents argued they should receive compensation for time spent preparing and attending the proceeding.

Applying Rule 57.04(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the principles in Fong v. Chan, the court held that costs for self-represented litigants are only appropriate where the work performed is equivalent to that ordinarily done by counsel.

The court found the respondents’ activities did not meet that threshold and declined to alter the previous costs award.

Following a family law motion concerning children’s schooling and daycare arrangements, the largely successful party sought a costs award.

The court applied the principles governing costs under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules, including the relative success of the parties, the parties’ conduct, offers to settle, and their respective financial circumstances.

Although the moving party sought full indemnity costs exceeding $13,000, the court considered that an earlier offer to settle could have resolved the issues and that the responding party had limited means.

Balancing these considerations, the court awarded a reduced costs amount.

Following a family law trial involving spousal support, child support, and claims for section 7 expenses, the parties were unable to agree on costs.

The respondent sought $52,000 in costs, while the applicant argued success was divided but conceded that $25,000 would be appropriate if costs were awarded.

Applying s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules, the court assessed the relative success of the parties, their conduct, and their financial circumstances.

The court found the respondent was largely successful, particularly on the central issue concerning the applicant’s income and the resulting support obligations.

The court fixed costs payable to the respondent at $42,000 inclusive of disbursements.

Self‑represented litigants sought costs after successfully defending an application concerning the validity of several leases.

The court applied the principles from Fong v. Chan governing costs for self‑represented parties, which require proof that the litigant performed work ordinarily done by counsel and incurred an opportunity cost by foregoing remunerative activity.

The applicants failed to demonstrate that they performed lawyer‑like work or suffered a compensable opportunity cost.

However, limited disbursements directly related to the proceeding were allowed.

The court awarded only $476.91 in recoverable disbursements and otherwise dismissed the claim for costs.

Following dismissal of a motion seeking to hold opposing counsel personally liable for costs under rule 57.07 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court addressed the costs of that motion.

The moving party alleged misconduct by experienced counsel and sought consolidation of his claim with the main costs issues in ongoing guardianship litigation.

The court found the allegations unfounded and determined that the motion unnecessarily prolonged the proceeding and increased litigation expense.

Applying the reasonableness principle in costs assessment, the court fixed substantial costs payable to the successful parties.

The applicant sought to reduce spousal and child support obligations established in a separation agreement, alleging a material change in financial circumstances and asserting that income originally imputed for support purposes was overstated.

The respondent opposed the variation, sought enforcement of the agreement, claimed arrears for special and extraordinary expenses under the Federal Child Support Guidelines, and requested conversion of periodic spousal support into a lump sum.

Applying the framework from Miglin v. Miglin and subsequent Supreme Court authorities, the court held the separation agreement was fairly negotiated and continued to reflect the parties’ intentions.

The court found the applicant’s income disclosure unreliable and maintained the imputed income used in the agreement.

Spousal support was not reduced, child support for an adult child was terminated when he ceased full‑time studies, and retroactive s.7 expenses were partially awarded.

The moving party sought leave under Rule 57.07 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to pursue personal costs claims against opposing counsel in litigation concerning a guardianship and related estate disputes.

The proceeding had already been set down for a costs trial, and a prior order imposed strict timelines requiring notice and particulars before such motions could be pursued.

The court found the moving party failed to comply with those timelines and had not demonstrated the substantial or unexpected change in circumstances required to obtain leave once a matter is set down for trial under Rule 48.04.

The allegations of professional misconduct, negligence, and perjury against counsel were vague, speculative, and unsupported by evidence establishing bad faith or abuse of process.

The court concluded the claims had no reasonable chance of success and granting leave would further delay already protracted proceedings.

Multiple motions arose in estate-related litigation involving allegations of undue influence over an elderly party.

Respondents sought leave to pursue costs against solicitors under Rule 57.07 and to consolidate related actions.

Counsel appointed under s.3 of the Substitute Decisions Act brought a preliminary motion after being unable to meet with the elderly party whose representation was in question.

Evidence suggested possible obstruction and undue influence affecting her ability to obtain independent legal advice.

The court held that the circumstances justified consideration of appointing a litigation guardian and granted leave for the motion to proceed, adjourning all related motions to allow a meeting between the party and s.3 counsel.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board finding her incapable of consenting to treatment and renewing a Community Treatment Order under the Mental Health Act.

The appeal raised issues concerning whether the Board applied the correct statutory test for capacity and whether its decision was unreasonable.

Applying the framework from Starson v. Swayze, the court examined whether the appellant could understand information relevant to treatment and appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of her decision.

The court held that while the appellant understood the information provided, the Board reasonably relied on expert medical evidence that she could not appreciate the consequences of refusing medication.

Given the deferential reasonableness standard applicable to the specialized tribunal, the court declined to interfere with the Board’s findings.