Valerie A. Edwards

This motion sought court approval for a class action settlement concerning systemic abuse at Grenville Christian College.

The plaintiffs requested approval of the $10.875 million settlement agreement, Class Counsel's fees of $3,122,187.50, payment of the Class Proceedings Fund's levy, and honoraria for the five representative plaintiffs.

The court approved the settlement and Class Counsel's fees, finding them fair and reasonable given the significant litigation risks, particularly the erratic and limited insurance coverage available to the judgment-proof defendants.

However, the court denied the request for honoraria, emphasizing that such awards should be rare and exceptional, despite acknowledging the representative plaintiffs' valuable contributions.

In this class action, the plaintiffs brought a motion, with the defendants' consent, seeking court approval for the notice of a settlement approval hearing, the notice distribution plan, the procedure for class member objections, and the appointment of a notice administrator.

The court granted the motion, finding that the proposed notice and distribution plan complied with the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, and were consistent with practices in similar class action settlements, ensuring class members would be adequately informed of the proposed settlement and objection process.

The appellants, holding unsatisfied judgments against a disbarred lawyer, appealed the dismissal of their motion to compel payment from the lawyer's insurer (LawPRO).

The core issues were the interpretation of the insurance policy's aggregate limit for dishonest lawyer coverage and whether LawPRO reasonably expended funds on defence and investigation, thereby exhausting the limit.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings that the $500,000 limit was an aggregate limit and that LawPRO's expenditures were reasonable, dismissing the appeals.

Following the dismissal of the Creditors' garnishment motions against LawPro, the parties could not agree on costs.

LawPro sought over $82,000 in partial indemnity costs, while the Creditors argued they were the successful parties because they recovered an indemnity payment after bringing the motions.

The court found LawPro's costs disproportionate and excessive, noting the Creditors acted reasonably in bringing the motions which prompted LawPro to discover an error and make a payment.

The court awarded LawPro $20,000 in costs.

The Creditors, 1770650 Ontario Inc. and 1062484 Ontario Inc., brought a motion under Rule 60.08(16) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to determine their entitlement to proceeds from a professional liability insurance policy issued by Lawyers’ Professional Indemnity Company (LawPro) to the Debtor, Paul McEnery, a disbarred lawyer.

The motion sought an order for LawPro to pay out policy proceeds to satisfy outstanding debts.

The issues were whether the $500,000 sublimit for dishonest acts was per claim or in aggregate, and whether LawPro had improperly eroded the policy limits through defence costs.

The court found the $500,000 sublimit was an aggregate limit and that LawPro had not eroded the policy limits, dismissing the Creditors' motion.

The applicant, an estate trustee and beneficiary, moved to appoint an institutional estate trustee during litigation for her father's substantial estate.

The motion was opposed by the other estate trustees (the applicant's mother and siblings) and another sibling.

The court found that the mother, Ida Rubin, likely lacked capacity, and the other estate trustees had engaged in questionable transactions, including retroactively characterizing assets as jointly held to avoid probate fees, making large gifts from the spousal trust to themselves, and failing to provide proper disclosure or pass accounts despite repeated requests.

The court emphasized its inherent jurisdiction to supervise estates and appoint an estate trustee during litigation to ensure neutral stewardship, protect beneficiaries' interests, and maintain a level playing field, especially given the conflicts of interest and animosity among the parties.

Following an appeal where the main appeal was dismissed but the co-appellants successfully appealed a personal costs order, the Divisional Court determined the costs of the appeal.

The respondents were awarded $115,000 in partial indemnity costs for the main appeal.

The co-appellants were awarded $58,406.50 in partial indemnity costs for their successful appeal, payable by all respondents, as the court declined to award substantial indemnity costs.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment awarding them nominal damages for breach of contract in the purchase of an audiology practice, and a costs order of over $1 million made personally against the non-party principals of the corporate appellant.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal of the trial judgment, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias by the trial judge and no error in his conclusion that damages could not be quantified.

However, the court allowed the appeal of the costs order, holding that under binding appellate authority, the court lacks jurisdiction to order costs against non-parties except where a 'man of straw' is put forward, which was not the case here.

The costs order was varied to be payable only by the corporate appellant.

The plaintiff brought a Rule 21.01(1)(a) motion seeking a determination that the defendant breached a mutual full and final release by applying to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board after the settlement.

The defendant cross‑moved for a determination that the release was not breached and that the action should be dismissed.

The court held that the release barred claims for contribution and indemnity against others but did not preclude an application to the Board under the Compensation for Victims of Crime Act.

Such an application is a claim against a statutory compensation fund rather than a claim against another person or corporation.

The defendant’s motion was granted, the plaintiff’s motion dismissed, and costs awarded to the defendant.

The plaintiff, a national not-for-profit umbrella organization, sought a declaration that it owned the real property of one of its local branches after the branch's leadership purported to secede.

The defendants, representing the seceding branch, argued the branch was autonomous and owned the property beneficially.

The court found that the corporate holding vehicle held legal title to the property in trust for the members of the branch from time to time.

The court also held that the branch's purported secession was invalid because it lacked the unanimous consent of its members, meaning the branch and its beneficial property interests remained within the parent organization.

Lawyers sought a declaration that their professional liability insurer owed a duty to defend them in an underlying negligence action arising from a client's failed business investment.

The insurance policy excluded coverage for claims related to investment advice unless the advice was a direct consequence of professional legal services.

Although the pleadings alone could potentially fall within the policy’s coverage for professional services, the policy contained a "notwithstanding" clause permitting the court to consider extrinsic evidence.

The evidence showed the lawyer provided investment advice before any professional legal services were rendered.

The court held the investment advice exclusion applied and the insurer reasonably denied coverage.

Following dismissal of a motion seeking to hold opposing counsel personally liable for costs under rule 57.07 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court addressed the costs of that motion.

The moving party alleged misconduct by experienced counsel and sought consolidation of his claim with the main costs issues in ongoing guardianship litigation.

The court found the allegations unfounded and determined that the motion unnecessarily prolonged the proceeding and increased litigation expense.

Applying the reasonableness principle in costs assessment, the court fixed substantial costs payable to the successful parties.

The moving party sought leave under Rule 57.07 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to pursue personal costs claims against opposing counsel in litigation concerning a guardianship and related estate disputes.

The proceeding had already been set down for a costs trial, and a prior order imposed strict timelines requiring notice and particulars before such motions could be pursued.

The court found the moving party failed to comply with those timelines and had not demonstrated the substantial or unexpected change in circumstances required to obtain leave once a matter is set down for trial under Rule 48.04.

The allegations of professional misconduct, negligence, and perjury against counsel were vague, speculative, and unsupported by evidence establishing bad faith or abuse of process.

The court concluded the claims had no reasonable chance of success and granting leave would further delay already protracted proceedings.

Multiple motions arose in estate-related litigation involving allegations of undue influence over an elderly party.

Respondents sought leave to pursue costs against solicitors under Rule 57.07 and to consolidate related actions.

Counsel appointed under s.3 of the Substitute Decisions Act brought a preliminary motion after being unable to meet with the elderly party whose representation was in question.

Evidence suggested possible obstruction and undue influence affecting her ability to obtain independent legal advice.

The court held that the circumstances justified consideration of appointing a litigation guardian and granted leave for the motion to proceed, adjourning all related motions to allow a meeting between the party and s.3 counsel.

The appellants appealed a decision granting priority to the respondent's equitable mortgage over their registered mortgage.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the appellants had actual notice of the intended priority of the respondent's mortgage, meaning s. 93(3) of the Land Titles Act did not preclude the equitable mortgage from having priority.

The appeal was dismissed, with minor amendments to the formal order regarding subsequent encumbrancers and notice for power of sale.

The applicants sought leave to appeal a decision adding two solicitors and their law firms as intervening parties in a complex land transaction dispute.

The disputing parties had each initiated separate actions against the same lawyers for negligence.

The court found no conflicting case law regarding Rule 13 of the Rules of Civil Procedure in the context of private litigation, noting that the benchmark of caution applies but the need to avoid multiplicity of proceedings justified the intervention.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed.

The Crown breached its fiduciary duty in 1886 by making an improvident sale of the appellant's timber rights.

The trial judge valued the timber rights at $31,600 and awarded simple interest adjusted for inflation, denying the appellant's claim for equitable compensation including compound interest.

The Court of Appeal upheld the valuation but allowed the appeal on compensation, finding that the trial judge erred in failing to compensate the appellant in equity for its lost opportunity to have the funds invested.

The Court held that an award of equitable compensation including compound interest is not barred by the Crown's historic immunity from paying interest, and ordered a new hearing to determine the appropriate compensation.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal which upheld the dismissal of a third party claim on the basis of abuse of process.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, agreeing with the dissenting reasons of Goudge J.A. at the Court of Appeal that it was not an abuse of process to allow the appellant to bring the claim or require the realtors to defend it.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed.

The appellants, a corporation and its undisclosed principal, breached an agreement to purchase land after the real estate market collapsed.

The trial judge assessed damages at the date of closing and held a third-party corporation and its principals liable on an undertaking as to damages given during an interlocutory injunction.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the damages assessment against the appellants, finding the sealed contract rule inapplicable.

However, the Court allowed the third parties' appeal, concluding that the injunction did not cause the appellants' damages, which resulted instead from the market collapse and their deliberate refusal to close.

The moving party sought an extension of time to serve and file a notice of appeal after missing the 30-day deadline by one day due to a failed facsimile transmission.

The moving party also argued the time period did not commence until the trial judge disposed of costs.

The Court of Appeal granted the extension, finding that the moving party had a firm intention to appeal, the delay was adequately explained by inadvertence, and the justice of the case favoured an extension as there was no prejudice to the responding parties.