Valerie A. Edwards

This motion sought court approval for a class action settlement concerning systemic abuse at Grenville Christian College.

The plaintiffs requested approval of the $10.875 million settlement agreement, Class Counsel's fees of $3,122,187.50, payment of the Class Proceedings Fund's levy, and honoraria for the five representative plaintiffs.

The court approved the settlement and Class Counsel's fees, finding them fair and reasonable given the significant litigation risks, particularly the erratic and limited insurance coverage available to the judgment-proof defendants.

However, the court denied the request for honoraria, emphasizing that such awards should be rare and exceptional, despite acknowledging the representative plaintiffs' valuable contributions.

In this class action, the plaintiffs brought a motion, with the defendants' consent, seeking court approval for the notice of a settlement approval hearing, the notice distribution plan, the procedure for class member objections, and the appointment of a notice administrator.

The court granted the motion, finding that the proposed notice and distribution plan complied with the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, and were consistent with practices in similar class action settlements, ensuring class members would be adequately informed of the proposed settlement and objection process.

The appellants, holding unsatisfied judgments against a disbarred lawyer, appealed the dismissal of their motion to compel payment from the lawyer's insurer (LawPRO).

The core issues were the interpretation of the insurance policy's aggregate limit for dishonest lawyer coverage and whether LawPRO reasonably expended funds on defence and investigation, thereby exhausting the limit.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings that the $500,000 limit was an aggregate limit and that LawPRO's expenditures were reasonable, dismissing the appeals.

Following the dismissal of the Creditors' garnishment motions against LawPro, the parties could not agree on costs.

LawPro sought over $82,000 in partial indemnity costs, while the Creditors argued they were the successful parties because they recovered an indemnity payment after bringing the motions.

The court found LawPro's costs disproportionate and excessive, noting the Creditors acted reasonably in bringing the motions which prompted LawPro to discover an error and make a payment.

The court awarded LawPro $20,000 in costs.

The Creditors, 1770650 Ontario Inc. and 1062484 Ontario Inc., brought a motion under Rule 60.08(16) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to determine their entitlement to proceeds from a professional liability insurance policy issued by Lawyers’ Professional Indemnity Company (LawPro) to the Debtor, Paul McEnery, a disbarred lawyer.

The motion sought an order for LawPro to pay out policy proceeds to satisfy outstanding debts.

The issues were whether the $500,000 sublimit for dishonest acts was per claim or in aggregate, and whether LawPro had improperly eroded the policy limits through defence costs.

The court found the $500,000 sublimit was an aggregate limit and that LawPro had not eroded the policy limits, dismissing the Creditors' motion.

The applicant, an estate trustee and beneficiary, moved to appoint an institutional estate trustee during litigation for her father's substantial estate.

The motion was opposed by the other estate trustees (the applicant's mother and siblings) and another sibling.

The court found that the mother, Ida Rubin, likely lacked capacity, and the other estate trustees had engaged in questionable transactions, including retroactively characterizing assets as jointly held to avoid probate fees, making large gifts from the spousal trust to themselves, and failing to provide proper disclosure or pass accounts despite repeated requests.

The court emphasized its inherent jurisdiction to supervise estates and appoint an estate trustee during litigation to ensure neutral stewardship, protect beneficiaries' interests, and maintain a level playing field, especially given the conflicts of interest and animosity among the parties.

The plaintiff brought a Rule 21.01(1)(a) motion seeking a determination that the defendant breached a mutual full and final release by applying to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board after the settlement.

The defendant cross‑moved for a determination that the release was not breached and that the action should be dismissed.

The court held that the release barred claims for contribution and indemnity against others but did not preclude an application to the Board under the Compensation for Victims of Crime Act.

Such an application is a claim against a statutory compensation fund rather than a claim against another person or corporation.

The defendant’s motion was granted, the plaintiff’s motion dismissed, and costs awarded to the defendant.

The plaintiff, a national not-for-profit umbrella organization, sought a declaration that it owned the real property of one of its local branches after the branch's leadership purported to secede.

The defendants, representing the seceding branch, argued the branch was autonomous and owned the property beneficially.

The court found that the corporate holding vehicle held legal title to the property in trust for the members of the branch from time to time.

The court also held that the branch's purported secession was invalid because it lacked the unanimous consent of its members, meaning the branch and its beneficial property interests remained within the parent organization.

Lawyers sought a declaration that their professional liability insurer owed a duty to defend them in an underlying negligence action arising from a client's failed business investment.

The insurance policy excluded coverage for claims related to investment advice unless the advice was a direct consequence of professional legal services.

Although the pleadings alone could potentially fall within the policy’s coverage for professional services, the policy contained a "notwithstanding" clause permitting the court to consider extrinsic evidence.

The evidence showed the lawyer provided investment advice before any professional legal services were rendered.

The court held the investment advice exclusion applied and the insurer reasonably denied coverage.

Following dismissal of a motion seeking to hold opposing counsel personally liable for costs under rule 57.07 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court addressed the costs of that motion.

The moving party alleged misconduct by experienced counsel and sought consolidation of his claim with the main costs issues in ongoing guardianship litigation.

The court found the allegations unfounded and determined that the motion unnecessarily prolonged the proceeding and increased litigation expense.

Applying the reasonableness principle in costs assessment, the court fixed substantial costs payable to the successful parties.

The moving party sought leave under Rule 57.07 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to pursue personal costs claims against opposing counsel in litigation concerning a guardianship and related estate disputes.

The proceeding had already been set down for a costs trial, and a prior order imposed strict timelines requiring notice and particulars before such motions could be pursued.

The court found the moving party failed to comply with those timelines and had not demonstrated the substantial or unexpected change in circumstances required to obtain leave once a matter is set down for trial under Rule 48.04.

The allegations of professional misconduct, negligence, and perjury against counsel were vague, speculative, and unsupported by evidence establishing bad faith or abuse of process.

The court concluded the claims had no reasonable chance of success and granting leave would further delay already protracted proceedings.

Multiple motions arose in estate-related litigation involving allegations of undue influence over an elderly party.

Respondents sought leave to pursue costs against solicitors under Rule 57.07 and to consolidate related actions.

Counsel appointed under s.3 of the Substitute Decisions Act brought a preliminary motion after being unable to meet with the elderly party whose representation was in question.

Evidence suggested possible obstruction and undue influence affecting her ability to obtain independent legal advice.

The court held that the circumstances justified consideration of appointing a litigation guardian and granted leave for the motion to proceed, adjourning all related motions to allow a meeting between the party and s.3 counsel.