Civita M. Gauley

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision confirming that police misconduct complaints were unsubstantiated following her arrests and stayed criminal charges.

The court held that the Director's decision was reviewable on a reasonableness standard and rejected arguments for correctness review based on an alleged implicit declaration of guilt.

The reasons emphasized the distinction between reasonable grounds for arrest or charge and criminal guilt, and confirmed that stayed proceedings not recommenced within one year are deemed never to have commenced under s. 579(2) of the Criminal Code.

The court found no reviewable error in the Director's treatment of the evidentiary record, including the arrest for breach of undertaking.

The application was dismissed without costs.

Following an appeal where the main appeal was dismissed but the co-appellants successfully appealed a personal costs order, the Divisional Court determined the costs of the appeal.

The respondents were awarded $115,000 in partial indemnity costs for the main appeal.

The co-appellants were awarded $58,406.50 in partial indemnity costs for their successful appeal, payable by all respondents, as the court declined to award substantial indemnity costs.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment awarding them nominal damages for breach of contract in the purchase of an audiology practice, and a costs order of over $1 million made personally against the non-party principals of the corporate appellant.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal of the trial judgment, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias by the trial judge and no error in his conclusion that damages could not be quantified.

However, the court allowed the appeal of the costs order, holding that under binding appellate authority, the court lacks jurisdiction to order costs against non-parties except where a 'man of straw' is put forward, which was not the case here.

The costs order was varied to be payable only by the corporate appellant.

The applicant requested reconsideration of a Tribunal decision that dismissed his human rights application against his employer and union.

The original decision found that a labour arbitration had appropriately dealt with the substance of the application under s. 45.1 of the Human Rights Code.

The applicant argued the decision conflicted with established jurisprudence regarding the application of s. 45.1.

The Tribunal dismissed the request for reconsideration, finding that the original decision correctly applied the Supreme Court of Canada's reasoning in Figliola and subsequent Tribunal jurisprudence.

The applicant alleged that her employment was terminated because of her pregnancy and related accommodation requests.

The respondent employer maintained that she was terminated for cause after an internal investigation concluded she had improperly obtained an employee discount for her husband's meal, which the employer viewed as theft.

The Tribunal found that while the employer's discount policy may have been unclear and inconsistently applied, there was no evidence to suggest that the applicant's pregnancy or accommodation requests played any role in the decision to terminate her employment.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant, who had a drug addiction, was terminated from his employment with the corporate respondent for violating a Last Chance Agreement.

His union grieved the termination, but a labour arbitrator upheld the discharge and found no violation of the Human Rights Code.

The applicant then filed an application with the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario alleging discrimination by both the employer and the union.

The Tribunal dismissed the application against the employer under s. 45.1 of the Code, finding that the labour arbitration had appropriately dealt with the substance of the human rights allegations.

The Tribunal also dismissed the application against the union, finding it had no reasonable prospect of success because the union's alleged failure to properly represent the applicant was not linked to a Code ground.

This was a post-trial costs decision arising from a lengthy commercial dispute over the purchase of a hearing clinic.

Although the plaintiff obtained only $423.20 for five minor breaches of contract, it had pursued extensive allegations of fraud, misconduct, and other wrongdoing, many of which the trial judge found were advanced through fabricated evidence and deliberate falsehoods.

Applying the costs factors under Rule 57.01(1), the court divided the case into issue-based components and awarded full indemnity costs for the fraudulent misrepresentation allegations, substantial indemnity costs for the professional misconduct-related allegations, and partial indemnity costs for most remaining contract issues.

The court also held that the directing mind behind the corporate plaintiff and its sole shareholder were jointly and severally liable for the full indemnity portion because they used the corporation to attempt to perpetrate a fraud upon the court.

Following a lengthy trial in which the defendants obtained a largely favourable judgment and anticipated a substantial costs award, the defendants brought a motion seeking the appointment of a receiver over the plaintiff corporation pending determination of trial costs.

The plaintiff argued that the motion was barred because it had filed a notice of appeal, triggering the automatic stay of money judgments under Rule 63.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court held that the requested receivership was not enforcement of a money judgment but a preservative measure intended to protect the corporation’s assets until costs were determined.

Accordingly, the automatic stay did not apply and the court retained jurisdiction to hear a motion for a receiver.

The defendants were permitted to return the motion for a full hearing on whether appointing a receiver would be just or convenient under s. 101 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The plaintiff purchased a hearing clinic from the defendants and later alleged numerous fraudulent misrepresentations relating to patient numbers, referrals, profitability, and other operational matters.

After a lengthy 72‑day trial spanning several years and extensive documentary evidence, the court found the plaintiff’s principal witness unreliable and rejected the majority of alleged misrepresentations.

While the defendants had knowledge that a former employee may have possessed a patient list, the court held that the plaintiff failed to prove reliance or damages arising from that nondisclosure.

Several minor breaches of the asset purchase agreement were established, including issues relating to keys, inventory removal, software discs, QuickBooks data, and Canada Post mail handling, but damages were minimal.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in employment based on disability.

The Tribunal addressed three preliminary requests.

First, the applicant's initial request to defer the application pending a grievance process was denied because the grievance process had concluded.

Second, the Union's request to intervene was denied because it was already named as a respondent and thus had full party standing.

Third, the City's request for further particulars was resolved as the applicant provided sufficient information, and the City was directed to file its Response.

During a civil trial arising from the purchase of a hearing clinic business, the plaintiff sought leave mid‑trial to adduce additional evidence from its first witness concerning alleged improper professional practices and billing irregularities by the defendants.

The defendants ultimately consented to the admission of the evidence on the condition that the trial be briefly adjourned and that they receive substantial indemnity costs.

The court granted the adjournment, finding the plaintiff’s late introduction of extensive new documentary evidence and allegations unjustified and disruptive to the defence.

Although the plaintiff succeeded in obtaining leave to present the additional evidence, the court held that the lateness of the motion constituted litigation misconduct warranting costs on a substantial indemnity basis.