ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

DIVISIONAL COURT

COURT FILE NO.: DC-24-00000269-00JR

DATE: 20260210

Schreck, Shore and Brownstone JJ.

BETWEEN:

DR. SHARON LEA MATTILA Applicant – and – OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR and NIAGARA REGIONAL POLICE SERVICE Respondents

Dr. S. Mattila, self-represented

M. Shojaei, for the respondent Office of the Independent Police Review Director C. Gauley, for the respondent Niagara Regional Police Service

HEARD: January 29, 2026

REASONS FOR DECISION

SCHRECK J.:

[ 1 ] Dr. Sharon Mattila was arrested and charged with a number of criminal offences following two interactions with police officers from the Niagara Regional Police Service. The charges against her were later stayed by the Crown, after which Dr. Mattila made a number of complaints against the officers to the Office of the Independent Police Review Director. An investigation of the complaints by the Niagara Police Professional Standards Unit concluded that the complaints were unsubstantiated, a finding that was confirmed following a review by the Independent Police Review Director.

[ 2 ] Dr. Mattila applies for judicial review of the Director’s decision based on a number of grounds alleging various factual and legal errors. One of Dr. Mattila’s central concerns is her view that the Director’s decision was, in effect, a declaration that she was guilty of the charges that were stayed. She seeks a number of remedies, including that this court set aside the Director’s “declaration of guilt” and orders directing the Niagara Police to change the way in which officers are trained.

[ 3 ] As the following reasons explain, this court’s jurisdiction on an application for judicial review is narrow. We cannot substitute our view of the evidence for that of the Director, nor do we have the power to grant the broad remedies being sought. We can, however, confirm that Dr. Mattila is legally innocent of the charges that were stayed.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. The Charges

[ 4 ] On November 8, 2020, P.C. Andrew McMeekin and P.C. Tyler Burke of the Niagara Regional Police Service (“NRPS”) attended an apartment building in St. Catherines in response to a call from the landlady of the building alleging that she had been assaulted by a tenant, later identified as the applicant, Dr. Mattila. After speaking to the landlady, the officers attended the applicant’s apartment where there was a physical altercation involving her and P.C. McMeekin in which she sustained a number of injuries.

[ 5 ] The applicant was arrested for assaulting the landlady and assaulting a police officer and charges were later laid in relation to those alleged offences. The police took her to the hospital because of her injuries. She was later released on an undertaking with conditions, including a condition that she abstain from the consumption of alcohol and from communicating with the landlady. On February 19, 2021, the undertaking was varied so as to the delete the condition requiring the applicant to abstain from consuming alcohol.

[ 6 ] On April 21, 2021, P.C. Tyler Arp and P.C. Andrew Oreskovich attended the applicant’s building in response to a noise complaint. After conducting a brief investigation, the officers arrested the applicant for breaching her undertaking by communicating with the landlady and by consuming alcohol, even though the latter condition was no longer in effect. A charge was laid only in relation to the breach of the non-communication condition.

[ 7 ] On August 11, 2021, all of the charges against the applicant were stayed by the Crown pursuant to s. 579(1) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.

B. The Complaints

[ 8 ] On October 17, 2022, the applicant filed complaints with the Office of the Independent Police Review Director (“OIRPD”) alleging that several police officers involved in the investigations which led to her being charged had committed misconduct in a number of ways. [^1] In accordance with the procedure in force at the time, the complaints were screened and three allegations of misconduct were referred to the NRPS Chief of Police for investigation by the Professional Standards Unit (“PSU”).

[ 9 ] The allegations that were referred for investigation were: (1) that P.C. McMeekin and P.C. Burke unlawfully arrested the applicant and used excessive force against her; (2) that P.C. Burke engaged in discreditable conduct by insisting on addressing the applicant by her given name rather than using the honorific “Doctor”; and (3) that P.C. Arp and P.C. Oreskovich unlawfully arrested the applicant for breaching an undertaking and failed to explain the reasons for the arrest to her.

[ 10 ] On May 29, 2023, based on a report prepared by the PSU, the Chief of Police released a decision in which he stated that he believed that “there is insufficient evidence to support the allegations of misconduct” and that he was “satisfied that this complaint is unsubstantiated.”

C. The Decision Under Review

[ 11 ] The applicant exercised her right to have the Chief’s decision reviewed by the Director of the OIRPD and provided extensive written submissions in support of her request. On August 17, 2023, the Director released a 10-page decision confirming the Chief’s decision. His conclusion included the following:

Based on the available evidence, there was insufficient evidence to establish reasonable and probable grounds that any form of misconduct occurred. Therefore, the specific allegations against the Respondent Officers were unsubstantiated.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

[ 12 ] The Director’s decision is subject to judicial review by this court pursuant to ss. 2(1) and 6(1) of the Judicial Review Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. J.1. It is well established that judicial review of the Director’s decisions is conducted on a reasonableness standard: Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov , 2019 SCC 65 , [2019] 4 S.C.R. 653, at para. 23 ; Rossi v. Ontario Independent Police Review Director, 2024 ONSC 1310 (Div. Ct.), at para. 5 .

[ 13 ] The applicant acknowledges that decisions of this nature are usually reviewed on a reasonableness standard but submits that there are exceptional circumstances in this case requiring review on a correctness standard because the Director had, in effect, declared her to be guilty of the offences she was charged with. As I will explain, the Director had no authority to make any such declaration and did not do so. There is accordingly no basis for deviating from the presumptive reasonableness standard.

B. The Applicant’s Grounds

[ 14 ] The applicant’s Notice of Application sets out a number of grounds. However, in oral argument before this court, she narrowed her application and advised the court that she was no longer pursuing her excessive force complaint or taking issue with her arrest for assaulting the landlady. Her focus was on the arrest for assaulting a police officer and her arrest for breaching her undertaking by consuming alcohol when that condition had been deleted. However, her main concern was that she perceived the Director’s decision to be, in effect, a declaration that she is guilty of criminal offences.

C. The “Declaration of Guilt”

(i) The Basis for the Applicant’s Concerns

[ 15 ] The applicant’s concern appears to be based on the wording of the Director’s decision, which includes summaries of statements given by the subject officers to the PSU investigators. Those summaries include assertions that the applicant committed criminal offences. However, I do not read the Director’s decision as making any findings to the effect that the assertions were true. Rather, he was merely summarizing them, just as he also summarized the applicant’s submissions.

(ii) Arrests, Charges and Stays

[ 16 ] The focus of the Director’s decision was whether there were grounds to arrest the applicant. To effect an arrest without a warrant pursuant to s. 495(1) ( a ) of the Criminal Code , a police officer must have reasonable grounds to believe that the individual being arrested has committed a criminal offence. Reasonable grounds (often referred to interchangeably as “reasonable and probable grounds”) is not a high standard.

[ 17 ] Although the reasonable grounds standard is higher than “reasonable suspicion,” the police do not have to have a prima facie case for conviction before effecting an arrest, nor do they need to establish that the offence was committed on a balance of probabilities: R. v. Beaver, 2022 SCC 54 , 475 D.L.R. (4 th ) 575, at para. 72 ; R. v. Storrey , [1990] 1 S.C.R. 241, at p. 251; R. v. Shepherd , 2009 SCC 35 , [2009] 2 S.C.R. 527, at para. 23 . All it requires is a reasonable belief that an individual is “connected to the offence”: R. v. MacKenzie , 2013 SCC 50 , [2013] 3 S.C.R. 250; Beaver , at para. 72 . While the police can only act on “compelling and credible information,” they are not required to undertake further investigation, seek out exculpatory facts or rule out possible innocent explanations before making an arrest: R. v. Chehil, 2013 SCC 49 , [2013] 3 S.C.R. 220, at para. 34 ; Shepherd , at para. 23 .

[ 18 ] The same standard, reasonable grounds, applies to the laying of a charge: Criminal Code, s. 504. The legal effect of laying a charge is that it engages the judicial interim release provisions in Part XVI of the Criminal Code and begins the process which can eventually lead to a criminal trial on the charges. The laying of a charge does not amount to a finding that the individual charged is guilty of an offence. To the contrary, a person charged with an offence is presumed innocent, a constitutional right guaranteed by s. 11( d ) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms . The presumption of innocence can only be displaced if the Crown proves the individual’s guilt at a criminal trial beyond a reasonable doubt.

[ 19 ] In this case, the Crown did not attempt to displace the presumption that the applicant was innocent and instead stayed the charges pursuant to s. 579(1) of the Criminal Code . Section 579(2) provides that where a stay has been entered and the proceedings are not recommenced within one year, as in this case, “the proceedings shall be deemed never to have commenced.”

[ 20 ] It is clear from the foregoing that not only has the applicant not been found guilty of any offence, she was, in effect, never charged. [^2] Nothing in the Director’s decision has any effect on the applicant’s status in this regard.

(iii) The Complaints Process

[ 21 ] The purpose of the OIRPD process is to investigate complaints against police officers. The focus of the process was on the conduct of the police officers, not the applicant, and the conclusions reached by the Director must be considered in this context.

[ 22 ] While the Director reviewed the police officers’ version of events, his purpose in doing so was to determine whether the Chief of Police’s conclusion that the police had grounds to arrest the applicant was supported by the evidence. He ultimately concluded that it was. This means only that the Director was of the view that the evidence supported the Chief’s conclusion that the relatively low standard of reasonable grounds existed in this case. Nothing more can be taken from the Director’s conclusions. The Director could not have and did not make a declaration that the applicant was guilty.

D. The Arrest for Assaulting a Police Officer

[ 23 ] In her submissions, the applicant took us through various notes and statements made by P.C. McMeekin, the officer whom she was alleged to have assaulted, and pointed out what she submitted were inconsistencies between them. She submitted that the Director failed to give due consideration to these inconsistencies, which led him to erroneously conclude that there were grounds for the arrest and the complaint was therefore unsubstantiated.

[ 24 ] As noted, this court’s review is restricted to determining whether the Director’s conclusion was reasonable. This court is not entitled to substitute its own view for that of the Director and this court cannot engage in the type of factual review the applicant wishes us to undertake. We can only determine whether the conclusion reached by the Director “falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law”: Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick , 2008 SCC 9 , [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 , at para. 47 ; Vavilov , at para. 86 . In this case, the Director considered all of the evidence and the applicant’s submissions, and there is no basis upon which we can conclude that his decision did not meet the reasonableness standard.

E. The Arrest for Failing to Comply With an Undertaking

[ 25 ] The applicant is correct that she should not have been arrested for failing to comply with an undertaking by consuming alcohol when that condition had been deleted. However, this was not the only basis for the arrest as she was also arrested for failing to comply by communicating with the landlady. It therefore cannot be said that the Director’s conclusion that the arrest was lawful was unreasonable.

III. DISPOSITION

[ 26 ] The application is dismissed.

[ 27 ] The respondents do not seek costs and none are ordered.

Schreck J.

I agree. ______________________________

Shore J.

I agree. ______________________________

Brownstone J.

Released: February 10, 2026

COURT FILE NO.: DC-24-00000269-00JR

DATE: 20260210

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE DIVISIONAL COURT Schreck, Shore and Brownstone JJ. BETWEEN: DR. SHARON LEA MATTILA Applicant – and – OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR and NIAGARA REGIONAL POLICE SERVICE Respondents REASONS FOR DECISION Schreck J.

Released: February 10, 2026

[^1]: At the time, police complaints were governed by Part V of the Police Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.15. That Act was repealed on April 1, 2024 and replaced with the Community Safety and Policing Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c. 1 , which came into force on April 2, 2024 and which replaced the OIPRD with the Law Enforcement Complaints Agency (“LECA”).

[^2]: During oral argument, the applicant expressed a concern that the police retained her photographs and fingerprints taken at the time of her arrest pursuant to the Identification of Criminals Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-1. The applicant has the right to have those photographs and fingerprints destroyed upon request: R. v. Doré (2002) , 166 C.C.C. (3d) 225 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 71 ; Lin v. Toronto Police Services Board, [2004] O.J. No. 170 (S.C.J.) .