Harry Korosis

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their application for specific performance of an agreement of purchase and sale for a modular mobile home park.

The core issue was whether the appellants delivered a notice of fulfilment of a condition before the deadline.

The application judge found they had not, rendering the agreement null and void.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the application judge's factual findings, credibility assessment, or weighing of evidence.

The appellate court declined to re-weigh the evidence, affirming the lower court's decision.

The testatrix executed her will on the back deck of her insurance agency during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The applicant, the testatrix's daughter and named executrix, sought to prove the will.

The two attesting witnesses, former employees of the testatrix who subsequently worked for the respondent, claimed they did not see the testatrix sign the will.

The court found the attesting witnesses lacked credibility, noting one witness refused to sign an affidavit of execution due to a dispute over severance pay.

The court accepted the applicant's evidence that the will was properly executed in the presence of both witnesses and declared the document to be the valid last will and testament.

The plaintiffs' action for negligence and breach of contract regarding a roofing installation was administratively dismissed for delay under Rule 48.14.

The defendant brought a motion for costs, including a substantial disbursement for an engineering expert.

The plaintiffs argued the court lacked jurisdiction to award costs following an administrative dismissal.

The court held that it retains jurisdiction under section 131 of the Courts of Justice Act to award costs after a Rule 48.14 dismissal.

The court awarded the defendant costs on a partial indemnity basis, finding the large expert disbursement proportionate given the plaintiffs had claimed $500,000 in damages.

The owners were successful on a motion to vacate a claim for lien registered by the contractor.

The owners sought substantial indemnity costs of $78,000, relying on a prior letter indicating their intent to claim such costs.

The court found no justification for substantial indemnity costs, as the contractor's unsuccessful opposition to the motion did not constitute misconduct.

Applying the factors under Rule 57.01, the court awarded partial indemnity costs fixed at $46,835.03, noting the modest amount of the claim and the lack of legal complexity, while acknowledging the contractor's failure to produce records contributed to factual complexity.

The Vendor (Rolling Meadows Land Development Corporation) sought a declaration that an Agreement of Purchase and Sale for 48 residential lots was unenforceable due to uncertainty in the closing date provision.

The Purchaser (2560262 Ontario Inc.) cross-applied for a declaration that the agreement was valid, binding, and enforceable.

The court found that the closing date provision, while problematic in its original wording, was not an essential term of the contract.

The court also determined that the parties had agreed to an amendment to the closing date range, and the Vendor's subsequent attempt to declare the contract frustrated due to the amendment not being signed by an uncommunicated deadline was invalid.

The Purchaser's application was granted, and the Vendor's application was dismissed, declaring the agreement binding and enforceable as amended.

Following an appeal where the main appeal was dismissed but the co-appellants successfully appealed a personal costs order, the Divisional Court determined the costs of the appeal.

The respondents were awarded $115,000 in partial indemnity costs for the main appeal.

The co-appellants were awarded $58,406.50 in partial indemnity costs for their successful appeal, payable by all respondents, as the court declined to award substantial indemnity costs.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment awarding them nominal damages for breach of contract in the purchase of an audiology practice, and a costs order of over $1 million made personally against the non-party principals of the corporate appellant.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal of the trial judgment, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias by the trial judge and no error in his conclusion that damages could not be quantified.

However, the court allowed the appeal of the costs order, holding that under binding appellate authority, the court lacks jurisdiction to order costs against non-parties except where a 'man of straw' is put forward, which was not the case here.

The costs order was varied to be payable only by the corporate appellant.

This was a post-trial costs decision arising from a lengthy commercial dispute over the purchase of a hearing clinic.

Although the plaintiff obtained only $423.20 for five minor breaches of contract, it had pursued extensive allegations of fraud, misconduct, and other wrongdoing, many of which the trial judge found were advanced through fabricated evidence and deliberate falsehoods.

Applying the costs factors under Rule 57.01(1), the court divided the case into issue-based components and awarded full indemnity costs for the fraudulent misrepresentation allegations, substantial indemnity costs for the professional misconduct-related allegations, and partial indemnity costs for most remaining contract issues.

The court also held that the directing mind behind the corporate plaintiff and its sole shareholder were jointly and severally liable for the full indemnity portion because they used the corporation to attempt to perpetrate a fraud upon the court.

Following a lengthy trial in which the defendants obtained a largely favourable judgment and anticipated a substantial costs award, the defendants brought a motion seeking the appointment of a receiver over the plaintiff corporation pending determination of trial costs.

The plaintiff argued that the motion was barred because it had filed a notice of appeal, triggering the automatic stay of money judgments under Rule 63.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court held that the requested receivership was not enforcement of a money judgment but a preservative measure intended to protect the corporation’s assets until costs were determined.

Accordingly, the automatic stay did not apply and the court retained jurisdiction to hear a motion for a receiver.

The defendants were permitted to return the motion for a full hearing on whether appointing a receiver would be just or convenient under s. 101 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The plaintiff purchased a hearing clinic from the defendants and later alleged numerous fraudulent misrepresentations relating to patient numbers, referrals, profitability, and other operational matters.

After a lengthy 72‑day trial spanning several years and extensive documentary evidence, the court found the plaintiff’s principal witness unreliable and rejected the majority of alleged misrepresentations.

While the defendants had knowledge that a former employee may have possessed a patient list, the court held that the plaintiff failed to prove reliance or damages arising from that nondisclosure.

Several minor breaches of the asset purchase agreement were established, including issues relating to keys, inventory removal, software discs, QuickBooks data, and Canada Post mail handling, but damages were minimal.

The plaintiff drywall contractor brought a construction lien action against the defendant owner/developer for the unpaid balance of a contract for a residential condominium project.

The defendant claimed set-off for allegedly incomplete and deficient work, and argued the lien was registered out of time.

The court interpreted the contract in favour of the plaintiff regarding the scope of work for corridor ceilings, balcony ceilings, and bathtub walls.

The court found only minor deficiencies, allowing a $3,000 set-off against the plaintiff's claim.

The court also held that the construction lien was registered within the 45-day statutory period and was valid.

Judgment was granted to the plaintiff for $140,946.44.

The tenant applied for a declaration that it had validly exercised an option to purchase commercial property under a lease agreement and sought specific performance compelling the landlord to sell the property at an appraised value.

The landlord opposed and brought a cross‑application alleging the tenant breached the lease by failing to reimburse property taxes and arguing the appraisal used to determine the purchase price was unfair and obtained without proper input.

The court held that the lease clearly required the purchase price to be determined by a specific named appraiser and that the resulting appraisal was valid and unbiased.

The court also interpreted the lease to place responsibility for realty taxes on the landlord, rejecting the landlord’s claim for reimbursement.

The tenant had properly exercised the option to purchase and was entitled to specific performance of the sale at the appraised value.

The respondents brought a motion to strike a paragraph of the notice of appeal.

The appellants sought to raise a new argument on appeal that a six-year limitation period applied under the transition provisions of the Limitations Act, 2002, despite conceding a two-year limitation period before the motion judge.

The Court of Appeal allowed the motion and struck the paragraph, finding that permitting the new ground of appeal would cause prejudice to the moving party, who would have developed a different evidentiary record had the argument been raised below.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment decision dismissing their action as statute-barred.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the appellants knew or ought to have known the basis of their claim by April 11, 2005, at the latest.

As the action was not commenced until October 31, 2007, more than two years after the claim was discovered, the appeal was dismissed.

During a civil trial arising from the purchase of a hearing clinic business, the plaintiff sought leave mid‑trial to adduce additional evidence from its first witness concerning alleged improper professional practices and billing irregularities by the defendants.

The defendants ultimately consented to the admission of the evidence on the condition that the trial be briefly adjourned and that they receive substantial indemnity costs.

The court granted the adjournment, finding the plaintiff’s late introduction of extensive new documentary evidence and allegations unjustified and disruptive to the defence.

Although the plaintiff succeeded in obtaining leave to present the additional evidence, the court held that the lateness of the motion constituted litigation misconduct warranting costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

Following the dismissal of an action alleging misrepresentations relating to the establishment of a Mitsubishi dealership, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The defendants sought partial indemnity costs exceeding $325,000 after successfully obtaining summary judgment dismissing the claim as statute-barred under the Limitations Act and lacking evidentiary merit.

The court considered the factors under Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the principle of reasonableness, including access to justice concerns discussed in appellate authority.

While the defendants’ legal work was substantial and effective, certain disbursements and the overall magnitude of the claim were considered excessive.

The court therefore reduced the claimed amount and fixed costs at $150,000 inclusive of taxes and disbursements.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' action for damages arising from an alleged franchise agreement and negligent misrepresentations regarding the viability of a Mitsubishi dealership.

The court found that the plaintiffs' action was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, as the plaintiff knew or ought to have known of the claim more than two years before commencing the action.

Furthermore, the court held that the alleged misrepresentations were forward-looking forecasts, which are not actionable, and that the entire agreement and release clauses in the dealer agreement provided a complete defence.

The action was dismissed, and the defendant's counterclaim for an unpaid debt was allowed.

The plaintiff sued the defendants for unpaid invoices and a promissory note.

The parties reached a settlement agreement, but the defendants failed to comply with its terms.

The plaintiff then obtained default judgment in the action, which was later set aside because a waiver of defence was still in place.

The plaintiff subsequently sought to enforce the settlement agreement.

The Court of Appeal held that by electing to pursue default judgment, the plaintiff made a binding election at common law to treat the settlement agreement as repudiated and to proceed with the litigation.

Consequently, the plaintiff was precluded from later seeking to enforce the settlement.

The appellants appealed a decision granting priority to the respondent's equitable mortgage over their registered mortgage.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the appellants had actual notice of the intended priority of the respondent's mortgage, meaning s. 93(3) of the Land Titles Act did not preclude the equitable mortgage from having priority.

The appeal was dismissed, with minor amendments to the formal order regarding subsequent encumbrancers and notice for power of sale.

The parties were neighbours involved in a dispute over a shared well and water system located on the respondent's property.

The applications judge declared the appellants had an easement by grant for the use of the well, but no easement to repair, upgrade, or replace it.

On appeal, the appellants argued the judge erred in determining the scope of the easement.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence showing the well had been decommissioned and the appellants had installed alternate water systems.

The court dismissed the appeal and cross-appeal, finding insufficient evidence that the original grant contemplated the actual replacement of the well.