Harry Korosis

The plaintiff sued the defendants for unpaid invoices and a promissory note.

The parties reached a settlement agreement, but the defendants failed to comply with its terms.

The plaintiff then obtained default judgment in the action, which was later set aside because a waiver of defence was still in place.

The plaintiff subsequently sought to enforce the settlement agreement.

The Court of Appeal held that by electing to pursue default judgment, the plaintiff made a binding election at common law to treat the settlement agreement as repudiated and to proceed with the litigation.

Consequently, the plaintiff was precluded from later seeking to enforce the settlement.

The appellants appealed a decision granting priority to the respondent's equitable mortgage over their registered mortgage.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the appellants had actual notice of the intended priority of the respondent's mortgage, meaning s. 93(3) of the Land Titles Act did not preclude the equitable mortgage from having priority.

The appeal was dismissed, with minor amendments to the formal order regarding subsequent encumbrancers and notice for power of sale.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding a breach of contract for machining steel pieces.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in failing to award damages for a scrapped forging and in apportioning liability for extra honing based on the contract price between the parties rather than the reduced price negotiated with the customer.

The Divisional Court dismissed the first ground, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that the damages evidence was insufficient.

However, the court allowed the appeal in part on the second ground, holding that the trial judge misapplied the law by not basing the apportionment on the appellant's loss of profits from its customer.

The respondent's cross-appeal on factual findings and costs was dismissed.

The parties were neighbours involved in a dispute over a shared well and water system located on the respondent's property.

The applications judge declared the appellants had an easement by grant for the use of the well, but no easement to repair, upgrade, or replace it.

On appeal, the appellants argued the judge erred in determining the scope of the easement.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence showing the well had been decommissioned and the appellants had installed alternate water systems.

The court dismissed the appeal and cross-appeal, finding insufficient evidence that the original grant contemplated the actual replacement of the well.