Robert B. Reid

In an application over beneficial ownership of residential land, the applicant alleged an oral trust arrangement under which the respondent held legal title for the applicant's benefit.

The court found on the evidence that both periods of title holding reflected the same trust-based understanding, and rejected the respondent's position that the later arrangement was a true landlord-tenant relationship.

Although a bare trust in land failed for lack of writing under the Statute of Frauds, the court held a constructive trust could be imposed to prevent inequitable reliance on statutory formalities.

Declarations were granted confirming beneficial ownership and entitlement to conveyance on demand, subject to payment of specified ownership-related obligations including the down payment and interest.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer sought dismissal of a civil claim under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure on the basis that it was frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The self-represented plaintiff had commenced a second action alleging negligence by the OCL arising from a prior family law proceeding, after a substantially identical claim had already been dismissed under the same rule.

The court found the negligence claim untenable because the OCL owed no duty of care to the plaintiff and, even if it did, the Divisional Court had already found no breach of the standard of care.

The claim was dismissed as an abuse of process and as duplicative of matters previously decided.

On a family law motion, the moving party sought to set aside temporary orders that had restricted him to supervised parenting time and had shifted decision-making authority and primary residence to the responding party.

The court held that the temporary safety concerns underlying those orders had materially changed, relying in particular on child protection communications indicating no ongoing involvement regarding the parties’ children and permitting unsupervised caregiving in the moving party’s household.

The court found the temporary orders did not establish a new status quo deserving deference where the original rationale had dissipated.

The motion was granted, the temporary orders were vacated, and the prior equal parenting regime was reinstated with a short transition period of interim unsupervised parenting time.

The applicant children's aid society moved to terminate a supervision order placing two children in the care of a family friend.

The children's lawyer opposed termination, arguing the children's anxiety about potentially returning to their father constituted a new protection concern, and alternatively sought a custodial order under s. 102 of the CYFSA.

The court found the original protection concerns had been resolved, that the children were no longer in need of protection, and that the society was not required to proceed by summary judgment.

The court declined to make a s. 102 custody order, noting it would be inequitable where the father had not filed materials and the proposed custodian was a non-party.

The supervision order was terminated and the cross-motion dismissed.

The respondent sought costs following the dismissal of the applicant's motion to set aside a purported settlement and the respondent's cross-motion for summary judgment to enforce the settlement.

The respondent claimed costs on a full recovery basis or alternatively on a partial indemnity basis up to May 15, 2025, and thereafter on a full indemnity basis, citing the applicant's bad faith conduct.

The court awarded costs to the respondent on a partial indemnity basis prior to May 16, 2025, and on a full indemnity basis thereafter, but reduced the amount to account for proportionality and excluded costs related to the respondent's cross-motion and attendance by a second counsel.

The final costs award was fixed at $19,000.

This decision concerns a judicial screening on a "faint hope" application under section 745.6 of the Criminal Code, in which Ronald Cyr seeks a reduction in his parole ineligibility period following a first-degree murder conviction.

The court reviews the statutory criteria, the facts of the offence, the applicant’s conduct and character, and the positions of the parties.

The judge finds that there is a reasonable prospect a jury could reduce the parole ineligibility period and orders that a jury be empaneled to hear the application.

This decision concerns the costs of a motion regarding a construction lien.

The Honsbergers sought to discharge or reduce a lien registered by Homes by Hendriks Inc. The court previously reduced the lien but did not vacate it.

The parties could not agree on costs, so submissions were made.

The court awarded the Honsbergers $51,313.32 in costs, finding their offer to settle was reasonable and that their costs were not disproportionate.

The court declined to order costs against the principal of the plaintiff personally.

This decision concerns the costs of several disclosure motions in a family law proceeding.

The applicant, Johnny Vinken, sought full indemnity costs for three motions arising from the respondent’s, Heather Anne Earle’s, failure to provide complete financial disclosure.

The court found that while the applicant did not succeed on every request, he was successful in the substance of the motions, which was to secure proper disclosure.

The court awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis, totaling $16,401.51, to be paid at the end of the litigation, regardless of the ultimate outcome.

The Honsbergers moved to discharge or reduce a construction lien registered by Homes by Hendriks Inc. (HBH) against their property.

The court found that the date of last lienable work was a genuine issue requiring a trial and declined to discharge the lien.

However, the court reduced the lien amount by $145,121.47, finding that certain materials were not delivered and that a 20% management fee was not lienable.

The court clarified its jurisdiction to reduce a lien under section 35 of the Construction Act and provided guidance on the treatment of overhead and project management fees in lien claims.

The applicant, Johnny Vinken, brought a motion for relief due to the respondent, Heather Anne Earle, failing to provide required financial disclosure and answers to undertakings in the context of a motion to change child support and s. 7 expenses for their now-adult children.

The court reviewed the history of disclosure orders and compliance, and ordered the respondent to provide outstanding documents and information within 30 days.

The court declined to strike the respondent’s pleadings, preferring resolution on the merits, and extended the time to set the matter down for trial by nine months.

The parties were encouraged to resolve costs, with a timetable for written submissions if necessary.

The court considered the costs of a motion in which the respondent successfully set aside a final order and was permitted to file responding materials.

The respondent sought full recovery of costs, while the applicant argued for no costs or an offset for costs thrown away.

The court found the respondent presumptively entitled to costs but reduced the amount due to the respondent's initial failure to respond, which led to the uncontested trial.

The court ordered the applicant to pay $2,600 in costs, offset by $1,400 for costs thrown away, payable at the conclusion of the litigation.

This decision concerns the costs of a motion in which Sullivan Mahoney LLP, a law firm, successfully opposed Grace McDonald's attempt to set aside a Report and Certificate of Assessment regarding legal fees.

The court considered the appropriate amount of costs to award, particularly in the context of a law firm representing itself.

The court ultimately awarded $2,500 in costs to Sullivan Mahoney LLP, finding that while the firm was entitled to costs, there was insufficient evidence to support a higher award based on lost opportunity costs.

The decision addresses a motion regarding undertakings in a civil dispute between the West Niagara Baseball Association and its representatives, and several baseball associations and their representatives.

The plaintiffs sought orders compelling the defendants to provide further and unredacted answers to undertakings given on discovery, particularly regarding complaints made by parents that led to the plaintiffs’ suspension from operating a baseball league.

The court ordered the defendants to provide unredacted answers to certain undertakings and to make diligent efforts to contact a third party for information, but otherwise dismissed the motion.

The decision concerns an appeal by Grace McDonald, a former client, seeking to set aside a Report and Certificate of Assessment made by an assessment officer regarding legal fees charged by Sullivan Mahoney LLP.

The court reviews issues of procedural fairness, the assessment of paid and unpaid accounts, the enforcement of filing deadlines, and the process for objecting to an assessment officer’s decision.

The court finds no error in the assessment officer’s conduct or application of the law and dismisses the appeal.

The applicant sought a retroactive adjustment of child support, payment of arrears, and changes to section 7 expenses and life insurance coverage.

The court found a material change in circumstances due to the respondent’s increased income and determined that retroactive child support should be paid from April 1, 2018, based on the Child Support Guidelines.

The court also addressed the duration of child support, payment of arrears, section 7 expenses, and life insurance benefits, and provided directions for costs.

The respondent, Yitzhak Lewin, brought a motion to set aside a final order made in his absence in a family law proceeding.

The court considered whether there was proper service of the application, whether the motion was brought promptly, whether there was a plausible excuse for the default, whether there was an arguable defence, and the comparative prejudice to the parties.

The court found that service was proper, the motion was brought promptly, and the respondent had a plausible excuse and an arguable defence.

The prejudice to the respondent if the default judgment was maintained outweighed the prejudice to the applicant if it was set aside.

The order of Bordin J. was set aside, and the respondent was permitted to file responding materials.

The accused, Alex Beseiso, applied for a stay of proceedings on the basis of a breach of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Charter.

The court reviewed the timeline of the proceedings, including periods of delay and the reasons for them, and found that the majority of the delay was attributable to the defence, particularly due to the accused's absence from Canada and failure to attend his trial.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The plaintiff, a chargee, sought summary judgment for foreclosure, payment of debt, possession, and leave to issue a writ of possession against the mortgaged property owned by 2811230 Ontario Ltd. and guaranteed by Alisha Chaly.

The defendants raised several issues, including the validity of the mortgage commitment due to an unsigned letter, allegations of civil fraud/conspiracy, the presence of a tenant, the legality/peaceability of a prior lockout, and the plaintiff's alleged failure to act with due diligence regarding mortgage renewal.

The court dismissed all defendant arguments, finding no genuine issues requiring a trial, and granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, including foreclosure, payment, and leave to issue a writ of possession.

The defendants' cross-claim against the City of Niagara Falls was unaffected.

This decision addresses the costs arising from three related motions in a professional negligence action.

The plaintiff sought to strike a portion of the statement of defence, while the defendants sought production of an unredacted affidavit and removal of plaintiff's counsel.

The court previously ruled that the improvident settlement defence should not be struck and ordered affidavit production (defendants successful on these two), and dismissed the motion to remove counsel (plaintiff successful).

The court determined that the motions should be viewed discretely, not collectively, for costs purposes.

Ultimately, the defendants were awarded net costs of $3,356.19, reflecting their success on two of the three motions.

This decision addresses the costs of two motions brought by the applicant and respondent in a family law matter concerning the sale of matrimonial property and financial disclosure.

The court found that neither motion should have proceeded to a hearing, noting the applicant's initial frustration but also her failure to adjust her motion once issues resolved, and her non-compliance with financial disclosure rules.

The respondent was successful on the financial disclosure issue.

The court awarded costs of $3,000 to the respondent, payable by the applicant from her share of the matrimonial home sale proceeds.