Robert B. Reid

Media applicants sought termination or variation of a sealing order over an Information to Obtain connected to a homicide and trans-national drug trafficking investigation.

Applying the open court principle and the Dagenais/Mentuck framework as restated in Sherman Estate, the court held that the Crown bore the burden of justifying the continued sealing after execution of the warrant.

The Crown's concerns about witness safety and investigative prejudice were found too generalized and insufficiently supported in the circumstances, particularly given the arrests already made and the age and partial public availability of the information.

The application was granted and the sealing order was terminated.

The defendant utility company brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff commercial bakery's claim for damages arising from a power outage.

The plaintiff initially pleaded breach of contract and warranty, but later raised negligence in its reply.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the defendant failed to put its best foot forward by not disclosing incident reports or evidence regarding the alleged negligence, thereby leaving a genuine issue requiring a trial.

The plaintiff brought a motion for procedural relief regarding the location and order of examinations for discovery, and for leave to amend the statement of claim.

The defendants brought a cross-motion for a discovery plan.

The court ordered the defendant, who resides in Russia, to be examined first via videoconference.

The court partially granted leave to amend the statement of claim, allowing procedural updates and an expanded ownership claim, but denying a scandalous allegation and a new debt claim that was statute-barred.

The applicants sought a declaration of a prescriptive easement over a pathway on the respondent's adjacent cottage property to access an elevated portion of their land.

The court found that the applicants established the four elements of a prescriptive easement by lost modern grant for the period prior to the properties' conversion to the Land Titles system in 2007.

However, the court limited the easement to its historical dimensions and uses, ordering the applicants to remove unauthorized alterations and chattels.

In an application over beneficial ownership of residential land, the applicant alleged an oral trust arrangement under which the respondent held legal title for the applicant's benefit.

The court found on the evidence that both periods of title holding reflected the same trust-based understanding, and rejected the respondent's position that the later arrangement was a true landlord-tenant relationship.

Although a bare trust in land failed for lack of writing under the Statute of Frauds, the court held a constructive trust could be imposed to prevent inequitable reliance on statutory formalities.

Declarations were granted confirming beneficial ownership and entitlement to conveyance on demand, subject to payment of specified ownership-related obligations including the down payment and interest.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer sought dismissal of a civil claim under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure on the basis that it was frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The self-represented plaintiff had commenced a second action alleging negligence by the OCL arising from a prior family law proceeding, after a substantially identical claim had already been dismissed under the same rule.

The court found the negligence claim untenable because the OCL owed no duty of care to the plaintiff and, even if it did, the Divisional Court had already found no breach of the standard of care.

The claim was dismissed as an abuse of process and as duplicative of matters previously decided.

On a family law motion, the moving party sought to set aside temporary orders that had restricted him to supervised parenting time and had shifted decision-making authority and primary residence to the responding party.

The court held that the temporary safety concerns underlying those orders had materially changed, relying in particular on child protection communications indicating no ongoing involvement regarding the parties’ children and permitting unsupervised caregiving in the moving party’s household.

The court found the temporary orders did not establish a new status quo deserving deference where the original rationale had dissipated.

The motion was granted, the temporary orders were vacated, and the prior equal parenting regime was reinstated with a short transition period of interim unsupervised parenting time.

The applicant children's aid society moved to terminate a supervision order placing two children in the care of a family friend.

The children's lawyer opposed termination, arguing the children's anxiety about potentially returning to their father constituted a new protection concern, and alternatively sought a custodial order under s. 102 of the CYFSA.

The court found the original protection concerns had been resolved, that the children were no longer in need of protection, and that the society was not required to proceed by summary judgment.

The court declined to make a s. 102 custody order, noting it would be inequitable where the father had not filed materials and the proposed custodian was a non-party.

The supervision order was terminated and the cross-motion dismissed.

The respondent sought costs following the dismissal of the applicant's motion to set aside a purported settlement and the respondent's cross-motion for summary judgment to enforce the settlement.

The respondent claimed costs on a full recovery basis or alternatively on a partial indemnity basis up to May 15, 2025, and thereafter on a full indemnity basis, citing the applicant's bad faith conduct.

The court awarded costs to the respondent on a partial indemnity basis prior to May 16, 2025, and on a full indemnity basis thereafter, but reduced the amount to account for proportionality and excluded costs related to the respondent's cross-motion and attendance by a second counsel.

The final costs award was fixed at $19,000.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Discipline Committee's decision dismissing his motion to stay a professional discipline charge on the basis of delay.

The applicant argued that the eight-year delay in the proceedings amounted to an abuse of process.

The Divisional Court applied the framework for inordinate delay and found that while the delay was lengthy, it was not inordinate when viewed contextually.

Significant portions of the delay were caused by the applicant's own motions or were inherent to ensuring a fair process.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The University of Waterloo sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision ordering it to implement a Prior Learning Assessment and Recognition (PLAR) pilot project as a systemic remedy for discriminating against an applicant with learning disabilities.

The University argued the Tribunal improperly relied on inadmissible expert evidence and that the remedy violated its institutional autonomy over admissions.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Tribunal's decision reasonable.

The Court held that the Tribunal did not improperly rely on inadmissible expert opinion and that the PLAR pilot project was a tailored, proportional remedy that respected the University's academic standards while addressing the specific discrimination suffered by the respondent.

This decision concerns a judicial screening on a "faint hope" application under section 745.6 of the Criminal Code, in which Ronald Cyr seeks a reduction in his parole ineligibility period following a first-degree murder conviction.

The court reviews the statutory criteria, the facts of the offence, the applicant’s conduct and character, and the positions of the parties.

The judge finds that there is a reasonable prospect a jury could reduce the parole ineligibility period and orders that a jury be empaneled to hear the application.

This decision concerns the costs of a motion regarding a construction lien.

The Honsbergers sought to discharge or reduce a lien registered by Homes by Hendriks Inc. The court previously reduced the lien but did not vacate it.

The parties could not agree on costs, so submissions were made.

The court awarded the Honsbergers $51,313.32 in costs, finding their offer to settle was reasonable and that their costs were not disproportionate.

The court declined to order costs against the principal of the plaintiff personally.

The applicant moved to set aside a settlement agreement reached via an accepted offer to settle, arguing the respondent failed to carry out its terms by paying the settlement funds two days after the negotiated deadline.

The respondent cross-moved to enforce the settlement.

The court dismissed the applicant's motion, finding that time was not explicitly made of the essence in the offer to settle and the brief delay did not demonstrate an intention not to be bound by the contract.

The settlement remained binding and the matter was directed to proceed to trial solely on the remaining issue of support.

The appellant father appealed an interim order allowing the respondent mother to relocate with their two children from Toronto to Winnipeg.

The mother sought the move after obtaining a higher-paying job in Winnipeg, where she also had extended family support.

The father argued the motion judge erred in finding a material change in circumstances, applying a summary judgment test, and failing to assess the impact on his relationship with the children.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law or palpable and overriding error of fact in the motion judge's application of the Gordon v. Goertz and Barendregt frameworks, and noting the motion judge had appropriately considered the children's best interests under the Divorce Act.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal a February 2025 decision and a motion to extend the time to seek leave to appeal two 2023 decisions.

The Divisional Court dismissed both motions.

The court found the moving party failed to establish an intention to appeal within the required time, provided no satisfactory explanation for the delay, and failed to demonstrate the proposed appeal had merit.

Costs of $9,000 were awarded to the responding party.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an order dated January 18, 2024.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

As the responding parties did not provide a cost outline, the court made no order as to costs.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal a prior decision of Brownstone J. The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

As the responding parties did not provide costs outlines, the court made no order as to costs.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal the decision of the lower court judge.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

No costs were ordered as the responding party failed to provide a cost outline.

This decision concerns the costs of several disclosure motions in a family law proceeding.

The applicant, Johnny Vinken, sought full indemnity costs for three motions arising from the respondent’s, Heather Anne Earle’s, failure to provide complete financial disclosure.

The court found that while the applicant did not succeed on every request, he was successful in the substance of the motions, which was to secure proper disclosure.

The court awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis, totaling $16,401.51, to be paid at the end of the litigation, regardless of the ultimate outcome.