Carolyn Silver

The applicant physician sought judicial review of a decision by the College of Physicians and Surgeons' Inquiries, Complaints and Reports Committee (ICRC) ordering him to undergo a second specified continuous education or remediation program (SCERP) for ongoing medical record-keeping deficiencies.

The applicant argued the decision was an abuse of process and unreasonable.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no abuse of process despite a minor procedural fairness breach, and held that the ICRC's decision to escalate remediation was a reasonable and proportionate response to the applicant's persistent record-keeping issues.

The moving party, a physician recently acquitted of criminal sexual assault charges, sought an interim stay of a scheduled disciplinary hearing before the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario pending his application for judicial review.

He argued the disciplinary proceedings were an abuse of process and res judicata given his acquittal.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding the application for judicial review premature as the Discipline Committee had not yet heard or decided the abuse of process arguments.

The court also found no evidence of irreparable harm and held that the balance of convenience favoured the public interest in allowing the self-regulating profession to proceed with its hearing.

The appellant physician appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, which found him incompetent, revoked his certificate of registration, and ordered him to pay costs.

The Committee found the appellant had failed to maintain the standard of practice, engaged in professional misconduct by falsifying patient charts, and lacked insight into his deficiencies.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Committee's findings on incompetence, the penalty of revocation, and the costs award were reasonable and supported by the evidentiary record.

Both the doctor and the College brought applications under s. 35(9) of the Mental Health Act for an order permitting the disclosure of a patient's psychiatric consultation notes in a discipline hearing.

The discipline proceedings involved allegations of sexual abuse and failure to maintain the standard of practice.

The patient refused to consent to the disclosure.

The court found that the notes were essential to the College's prosecution and to the doctor's ability to make full answer and defence.

The applications were granted, as disclosure was deemed essential in the interests of justice.

Both the doctor and the College brought applications under s. 35(9) of the Mental Health Act for an order permitting the disclosure of a patient's psychiatric consultation notes in a discipline hearing.

The discipline proceedings involved allegations of sexual abuse and failure to maintain the standard of practice.

The patient refused to consent to the disclosure.

The court found that the notes were essential to the College's prosecution and to the doctor's ability to make full answer and defence.

The applications were granted, as disclosure was deemed essential in the interests of justice.

The applicant, a paediatrician facing allegations of sexual abuse of a minor patient, applied for judicial review of an interim order by the College's Inquiries, Complaints and Reports Committee (ICRC).

The order imposed practice restrictions, including requiring a dedicated practice monitor and direct notification to patients of the restrictions.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the ICRC's decision was reasonable and based on some evidence of potential harm to patients, given the serious nature of the allegations and the committee's mandate to protect the public.

The appellant physician appealed a Discipline Committee decision finding her guilty of sexual abuse and revoking her license.

The finding of sexual abuse was based on a romantic kiss with a vulnerable patient.

The appellant argued the doctor-patient relationship had ended prior to the kiss and that the Committee breached procedural fairness by refusing to admit a letter from the patient after the close of evidence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no breach of procedural fairness, no reversal of the burden of proof, and that the penalty of revocation was reasonable given the extensive history of boundary violations and professional misconduct.

The applicant physician sought judicial review of an interim suspension order imposed by the College's Inquiries, Complaints and Reports Committee following allegations of sexual abuse and subsequent breaches of a prior monitoring order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the procedural fairness complaints were premature and should be raised before the Discipline Committee.

The Court also rejected the applicant's statutory interpretation argument that the entire 58-member committee was required to issue the order, and concluded that the suspension was reasonable given the applicant's demonstrated inability to comply with the monitoring order.

The appellant physician appealed decisions of the Discipline Committee of the College of Physicians and Surgeons finding her guilty of professional misconduct and incompetence following the death of a patient who underwent high-volume liposuction.

The Committee found she breached standards of practice regarding extraction volumes, informed consent, and post-operative care, and that her website advertising violated regulations banning testimonials and superlatives.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the Committee's findings on the standard of practice, its evidentiary rulings, and its conclusion that the advertising ban was a justified limit on freedom of expression under s. 1 of the Charter.

The penalty restricting her practice to acting as a surgical assistant in a hospital was also upheld as reasonable.

The appellant, a physician licensed in New Brunswick with a 'Defined Licence' subject to ongoing clinical activity in the province, appealed a decision denying him an independent practice certificate in Ontario.

The Health Professions Appeal and Review Board upheld the College's decision, finding that the New Brunswick licence was not 'equivalent' to an Ontario certificate under the interprovincial mobility provisions of the Health Professions Procedural Code.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Board's interpretation of 'equivalent' was reasonable given Ontario's standards-based approach compared to New Brunswick's needs-based discretionary licence.

The appellant physician appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, which revoked his certificate of registration for sexual abuse and professional misconduct.

The appellant argued for a 'spousal exemption' to the sexual abuse provisions and claimed the legislation was applied retroactively.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the concurrent doctor-patient and sexual relationships met the definition of sexual abuse, no spousal exemption existed, and the legislation was not applied retroactively.

The appellant physician appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario finding him guilty of professional misconduct and revoking his license.

The appellant had provided expensive, unproven alternative treatments to vulnerable, terminally ill cancer patients, misrepresenting the efficacy of the treatments and charging excessive fees.

The Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard of review and upheld the Committee's findings on credibility, misrepresentation, conflict of interest, and excessive fees.

The Court also upheld the penalty of revocation, finding it appropriate given the appellant's exploitation of vulnerable patients.

The College moved to schedule cross-examinations and a motion before a single judge to quash a physician's appeal of his license revocation, alleging he breached an order lifting a stay by continuing to practice.

The physician moved for an expedited appeal date.

The court declined to schedule the College's motion before a single judge, finding that lifting a stay does not constitute an order that can be breached under Rule 60.12, and directed that the motion to quash be heard by the full panel hearing the appeal.

The court scheduled the appeal and granted a sealing order for third-party medical records.

The moving party regulatory college sought to lift a stay of a Discipline Committee decision that revoked the responding party doctor's licence, or alternatively to dismiss his appeal.

The stay had been previously maintained on strict conditions, including cooperating with investigators and not selling drugs at a profit.

The court found that the doctor breached these conditions by making false statements to investigators, concealing his treatment of cancer patients, and failing to maintain proper charts.

Concluding that the balance of convenience favoured protecting the public interest, the court lifted the stay but declined to dismiss the appeal, allowing the doctor to argue it on the merits.

The appellant physician pleaded guilty to defrauding OHIP of $75,000 and received a criminal sentence.

Subsequently, the College's Discipline Committee ordered a 12-month licence revocation, suspended by six months upon payment of a fine and costs.

The appellant appealed the penalty, arguing the Committee overemphasized general deterrence and failed to consider proportionality.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the effective six-month suspension was a measured response to the escalating problem of health care fraud and was not unreasonable.

The appellant physician appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, which found he had entered into an exploitive sexual relationship with a patient.

The appellant challenged the Committee's credibility findings based on a letter, body markings, and psychiatric evidence regarding the complainant.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no manifest error in the Committee's credibility assessments and holding that the penalty for such a profound breach of trust must stand.

The appellant mortgagee sought to recover on a mortgage covenant from beneficial owners alleged to be undisclosed principals of a corporate titleholder that executed the mortgage under seal.

The Court held that the sealed contract rule remains part of Canadian common law and bars suit by or against undisclosed principals on contracts executed under seal.

It rejected the argument that the rule does not apply to corporate agents and held that Harmer v. Armstrong did not create a direct right of action against beneficiaries or principals.

Applying s. 13(1) of the Land Registration Reform Act, the Court held the mortgage was deemed under seal for all purposes, making the beneficial owners not liable on the covenant.

The request to abolish the sealed contract rule was refused because the proposed reform was not shown to be necessary and risked far-reaching commercial uncertainty.