Charles E. Beall

The applicant Trustee in Bankruptcy and Receiver sought approval of its reports and a declaration that a 2009 transfer of a half-interest in a residential property by the bankrupt to his spouse was a transfer at undervalue under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and a fraudulent conveyance under the Fraudulent Conveyances Act.

The court approved the Receiver's reports but dismissed the application regarding the property transfer.

The court held that the 'transfer' under s. 96 of the BIA occurred when the transfer documents were executed, not when they were registered, placing it outside the five-year lookback period.

Furthermore, the transfer was made for valid consideration as part of a matrimonial settlement, and there was no intent to defeat creditors.

The appellant sought to appeal an interim spousal support order made under the Divorce Act as of right, arguing that section 21(1) of the Divorce Act provides a direct right of appeal that is paramount over the leave requirement in section 19(1)(b) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The Court of Appeal held that section 21(6) of the Divorce Act requires appeals to be asserted according to the ordinary procedure of the province, which in Ontario includes the leave requirement.

The court found no conflict between the federal and provincial legislation, concluding that the doctrine of paramountcy was not engaged and leave to appeal was required.

The respondent appealed a motion judge's ruling that leave was required to appeal a temporary spousal support order made under the Divorce Act.

The respondent argued that the Divorce Act provided an unfettered right of appeal that superseded the leave requirements of the Courts of Justice Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Divorce Act's appeal provisions must be read in conjunction with provincial procedural rules, meaning leave to appeal an interlocutory order is still required.

The applicant sought costs of $61,486.11 on a full indemnity basis following the respondent's unsuccessful motion for a stay.

The respondent argued for no costs due to divided success.

The court found the applicant was entitled to costs as the successful party under rule 24(1) of the Family Law Rules, but declined to award full indemnity costs.

Finding the amount sought excessive for a non-complex motion, the court awarded costs fixed at $7,500 inclusive.

The moving party husband sought leave to appeal an interim spousal support order made under the Divorce Act.

He argued that the Divorce Act provided an appeal as of right, rendering the provincial requirement for leave inoperative due to paramountcy.

The Divisional Court rejected this argument, finding that the Divorce Act itself incorporates provincial appellate procedures.

Applying the test for leave to appeal an interlocutory order, the court found no conflicting decisions and no good reason to doubt the correctness of the interim support order, which appropriately considered the parties' lavish lifestyle and the husband's high income.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed.

The moving party, Mr. Elgner, sought leave to appeal an interim spousal support order made under the Divorce Act.

He argued that the Divorce Act provided an appeal as of right, rendering the provincial requirement for leave inoperative under the doctrine of paramountcy.

The Divisional Court rejected this argument, finding that s. 21(6) of the Divorce Act incorporates ordinary provincial appellate procedures, meaning leave is required.

Applying the test for leave under Rule 62.02(4), the court found no conflicting decisions and no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's order, which appropriately considered the high income of the payor and the needs of the recipient.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing her action against her former husband for alleged material non-disclosure when entering into their separation agreement.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the appellant, having chosen not to pursue further disclosure with the benefit of independent legal advice, could not resile from the agreement without demonstrating the disclosure was false, inaccurate, or misleading.

The appellant failed to adduce sufficient evidence of non-disclosure, and her assertion that evidence might come to light on a pending refusals motion was speculative.

The appeal hearing was adjourned after partial argument because two members of the panel raised concerns about a potential conflict of interest involving a party to the proceedings, Philip Epstein, or his counsel.

The parties were directed to obtain another early date from the Court of Appeal Office, with costs of the day reserved to the panel hearing the motion.

The appellant, a medical doctor, appealed a decision of the disciplinary committee of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario.

The committee had revoked his licence and ordered him to pay $63,235 in costs after finding him guilty of professional misconduct and incompetence.

The Divisional Court found that the committee made an obvious error in its written reasons by stating the appellant had a disregard for the welfare of his patients, a finding it had explicitly rejected during the oral hearing.

The court intervened, setting aside the revocation and substituting a one-year suspension, and reduced the costs award to $10,000.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and unlawful confinement.

He argued that the trial judge erred in refusing to order disclosure of the complainant's psychiatric records, allowing the Crown to call the treating psychiatrist in reply, and assessing the complainant's credibility.

The appellant also argued the verdicts were inconsistent because he was acquitted of sexual assault with a weapon.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of the false memory defence or the complainant's evidence.

The Court also rejected the appellant's application to introduce fresh evidence, concluding it would not assist in preventing a miscarriage of justice.

The appellant physician appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, which found he had entered into an exploitive sexual relationship with a patient.

The appellant challenged the Committee's credibility findings based on a letter, body markings, and psychiatric evidence regarding the complainant.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no manifest error in the Committee's credibility assessments and holding that the penalty for such a profound breach of trust must stand.