Ann Velez

This decision addresses two motions: a request for costs by A.V. against the Durham Children's Aid Society due to procedural missteps regarding police records, and a motion by the children's maternal great grandparents for party status.

The court dismissed A.V.'s costs claim, finding that the Society had taken ameliorative steps and that a costs order would transfer public funds without further achieving the objectives of costs.

The court also dismissed the great grandparents' motion for party status, concluding they were not statutory parents and did not meet the discretionary test under Rule 7(5) of the Family Law Rules, citing concerns about delay, lack of a clear plan, and potential for increased family conflict.

This decision provides an update on an ongoing child protection application, detailing the progress of the Durham Children's Aid Society and respondent father A.V. in implementing previous court orders regarding the child J.'s care, schooling, and counselling.

It notes less positive developments with respondent parents D.F. and C.S., including a new child's removal and potential file transfer from another jurisdiction.

The court addressed an informal request by the maternal great grandparents for party status, directing them to bring a formal motion with evidence and legal submissions.

The decision also sets out a schedule for costs submissions from A.V. against the Society and adjourns the matter for further attendance.

The children's aid society brought a motion for temporary care and custody of three children, seeking to place them with their great grandparents.

The parents opposed the placement, raising concerns about violence, drug use, and criminal activity in the proposed home.

The court found the society's evidence regarding the proposed placement to be incomplete and lacking transparency.

The court dismissed the society's motion to place the children with the great grandparents and ordered that the children remain in the temporary care and custody of the society.

The court also ruled that the society does not require a court order to use police occurrence reports already provided to it pursuant to the duty to report.

A child protection matter under Part III of the Child and Family Services Act involving a child (B-J) born in 2009 to a mother with a longstanding oxycontin addiction and a father with a history of incarceration.

The child was apprehended in September 2014 following allegations of domestic violence and placed with family friends (the F.).

A finding of need of protection was made in February 2015 based on domestic violence and drug use.

The mother was given multiple opportunities over nearly three years to comply with court-ordered conditions including drug treatment, counselling, and consistent access.

Despite these opportunities and various court orders, the mother repeatedly failed to maintain clean urine screens, attend counselling programs, and maintain consistent access with the child.

The mother also chose a new partner with a serious criminal record and active drug addiction.

The court found that the child's best interests required a Crown wardship order to provide permanency and stability, as the mother had demonstrated an inability to address the core risk factors of drug addiction and domestic violence exposure.

The parties reached a settlement prior to the hearing of the appeal.

The appellant's counsel advised the court of the settlement, and the appeal was dismissed as abandoned with each party bearing their own costs.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing her action against her former husband for alleged material non-disclosure when entering into their separation agreement.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the appellant, having chosen not to pursue further disclosure with the benefit of independent legal advice, could not resile from the agreement without demonstrating the disclosure was false, inaccurate, or misleading.

The appellant failed to adduce sufficient evidence of non-disclosure, and her assertion that evidence might come to light on a pending refusals motion was speculative.