Mary Thomson

The moving party defendant sought leave to appeal an order granting the plaintiffs leave to serve a Second Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim against foreign defendants in a proposed class proceeding.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no good reason to doubt the correctness of the order, as the motions judge was in the best position to interpret his own prior order regarding amendments for the purpose of certification.

Furthermore, the proposed appeal did not raise issues of general importance warranting appellate consideration.

Two related class actions arising from a tuberculosis exposure incident at a hospital sought court approval of a negotiated settlement and class counsel fees under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

The litigation followed exposure notices issued to thousands of individuals after two patients were diagnosed with tuberculosis, leading to claims of negligent failure to diagnose and prevent transmission.

After extensive discovery, expert evidence, and partial summary judgment dismissing claims of uninfected class members, the remaining infected class claims were scheduled for a common issues trial.

The parties reached a $1.7 million settlement establishing a compensation scheme based on varying likelihoods of causation.

The court held the settlement fell within a reasonable range and was in the best interests of the class, and it also approved a 30% contingency fee and honorariums for the representative plaintiffs.

The appellant physician appealed decisions of the Discipline Committee of the College of Physicians and Surgeons finding her guilty of professional misconduct and incompetence following the death of a patient who underwent high-volume liposuction.

The Committee found she breached standards of practice regarding extraction volumes, informed consent, and post-operative care, and that her website advertising violated regulations banning testimonials and superlatives.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the Committee's findings on the standard of practice, its evidentiary rulings, and its conclusion that the advertising ban was a justified limit on freedom of expression under s. 1 of the Charter.

The penalty restricting her practice to acting as a surgical assistant in a hospital was also upheld as reasonable.

The moving party, a physician whose certificate of registration was suspended for two years followed by indefinite restrictions after a discipline committee found her incompetent following a patient's death during liposuction, brought a motion to stay the penalty order pending her appeal.

She sought to perform non-surgical cosmetic procedures in the interim.

The Divisional Court applied the RJR MacDonald test and dismissed the motion.

While the appeal raised a serious issue, the moving party failed to establish irreparable harm, as financial loss alone is insufficient.

Furthermore, the balance of convenience favoured the respondent, as the court found that allowing the moving party to perform or supervise controlled acts would pose a risk to public safety and undermine public confidence in the medical profession's regulatory process.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued an endorsement regarding the costs of an appeal.

The court awarded the respondents costs in the total amount of $60,000, inclusive of disbursements and applicable taxes, to be divided $35,000 to the respondent corporation and $25,000 to the individual respondents.

The appellants were notified by public health authorities of potential exposure to tuberculosis at the respondent hospital.

Although none tested positive, they brought a class action claiming damages for psychological harm caused by the notification.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the claims because the appellants did not suffer a recognizable psychiatric illness.

On appeal, the appellants argued that the Supreme Court of Canada in Mustapha eliminated the recognizable psychiatric illness threshold.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that Mustapha did not change the law and that a recognizable psychiatric illness remains the threshold for compensable psychological injury in negligence.

The appellant surgeon mistakenly cut the respondent's common bile duct during laparoscopic gallbladder surgery.

At trial, the judge found that the surgeon used proper techniques but breached the standard of care by failing to adopt reasonable precautions based on 'common sense'.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial judge erred in relying on common sense to find standard medical practices inadequate in a complex medical negligence case where expert evidence conflicted.

The defendants appealed a motion judge's decision refusing to stay an Ontario multi-jurisdictional class action in favour of a similar Saskatchewan class action that had been certified earlier.

The defendants argued that the principles of comity and full faith and credit constitutionally required the Ontario court to defer to the Saskatchewan certification order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the motion judge was not bound to stay the proceeding, particularly given a prior Ontario carriage decision that found the plaintiffs' counsel in the Saskatchewan action unsuitable to represent a national class.

The court also found that permitting two overlapping multi-jurisdictional class actions to proceed did not constitute an abuse of process.

The appellant Medical Advisory Committee appealed a Superior Court decision setting aside an arbitral award that denied the respondent physician's application for reappointment to the hospital's medical staff.

The application judge had found the arbitrator exceeded his jurisdiction by considering matters beyond two specific issues listed in the arbitration agreement.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the arbitrator correctly interpreted his mandate to make a full and final determination of the reappointment application, and that his decision to deny reappointment based on the physician's disruptive behaviour was reasonable.

The appellant physician appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee finding him guilty of professional misconduct and incompetence, revoking his license, and imposing a $25,000 costs award.

The misconduct stemmed from his failure to supervise an EEG clinic where a technician infected numerous patients with Hepatitis B. The Divisional Court upheld the misconduct findings but found the penalty of license revocation unreasonable, as the appellant posed no risk practicing solely as a neurologist.

The court substituted a two-year suspension and a lifetime ban from acting as a medical director, while upholding the costs award.

The appellant appealed a decision finding no conflict between a municipal by-law imposing development charges on commercial/industrial developments and a prior financing agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the agreement's silence regarding non-residential development charges did not create a conflict with the by-law under section 14(4) of the Development Charges Act.

The court affirmed that the by-law and the agreement could stand together.

The plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of a medical malpractice action on summary judgment.

The respondents had relied on expert opinion evidence that the standard of care was met, while the plaintiffs had no expert evidence supporting negligence.

The court held that neither the alleged "high forceps" theory nor the "excessive force" theory raised a genuine issue for trial.

The appeal was dismissed and no costs were awarded.