Jacqueline A. Horvat

The moving party brought a motion under Rule 34.10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to compel the responding parties to produce documents in advance of cross-examinations on affidavits sworn in support of the responding parties' summary judgment motions.

The responding parties argued the motion was prohibited under Rule 48.04(1) because the action had been set down for trial, and that the requests were disproportionate.

The court held that Rule 48.04(1) did not bar the motion and the moving party had not waived the right to documentary discovery.

However, because the responding parties had never served affidavits of documents, the court dismissed the motion without prejudice, directing the responding parties to first serve affidavits of documents so that relevance and proportionality could be properly assessed.

The defendant, APP Capital Inc., brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claims for breach of an employment contract and unjust enrichment.

The plaintiff, the former CFO of the co-defendant corporation, claimed entitlement to compensation under a 2008 employment agreement following the sale of the corporation.

The court applied the framework from Hryniak v. Mauldin and found that a genuine issue requiring a trial existed regarding whether the moving party was bound by the 2008 agreement.

The court declined to use its fact-finding powers due to incomplete documentary discovery and the potential for inconsistent verdicts, dismissing the motion.

Minority shareholders sought relief under the oppression remedy and dissent and appraisal provisions of the Business Corporations Act after a majority shareholder attempted to restructure the corporation by reducing common shares and issuing scrip certificates that would effectively eliminate the minority’s interests.

The court determined the fair value of the dissenting shareholders’ shares as of the valuation date and rejected a proposed defence of laches, holding that the Limitations Act, 2002 applies to oppression claims and that laches does not apply where the claim is brought within the statutory limitation period.

While some alleged acts of misconduct, including removal of a director and management fees, were not oppressive, the proposed share restructuring scheme was found to be oppressive because its real purpose was to squeeze out the minority shareholders without fair compensation.

The court fixed the fair value of the shares based on a hotel valuation and awarded limited damages for oppression given that the dissent remedy already compensated the shareholders.

The plaintiffs sought damages arising from the termination of a memorandum of understanding and a subsequent agreement relating to the proposed development of an 80 MW wind energy project on the defendant's industrial lands.

The court held that both documents were largely agreements to agree and therefore unenforceable with respect to the broader development and lease arrangements.

However, the documents imposed limited binding obligations, including a requirement to provide 60 days’ notice before termination of the memorandum and an obligation to allow access for wind measurement under the second agreement.

The defendant breached those obligations by terminating immediately and preventing continued wind testing.

Claims for fiduciary duty, breach of confidence, unjust enrichment, partnership, and loss of chance damages were rejected.

Following a successful application concerning governance of a religious society, the applicants sought full indemnity costs of $280,000 against numerous respondents.

They argued that the respondents engaged in reprehensible conduct by refusing to comply with the society’s constitution, attempting to undermine election results, and advancing questionable evidence during litigation.

The court held that elevated costs require either a Rule 49 offer or reprehensible conduct in the litigation itself, and that most of the criticized behaviour occurred outside the conduct of the litigation.

Applying the reasonableness principles under s.131 of the Courts of Justice Act and r.57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court determined that partial indemnity costs were appropriate.

Costs of $160,000 inclusive of fees, disbursements, and taxes were awarded.

The applicants invested in a Ponzi scheme through their companies.

They received payments that were reported as income and paid taxes on them.

After discovering the fraud, they applied for an order rectifying their corporate and tax records to show the payments as a return of capital, and for a declaration to that effect.

The court dismissed the claim for rectification because the documents accurately reflected the applicants' intentions at the time they were prepared.

However, the court granted a declaration that the moneys were a return of capital, without prejudice to how the payments should be treated for tax purposes by the tax authorities.

The defendant moved for additional security for costs in complex commercial litigation involving a proposed wind energy project.

The corporate plaintiffs admitted they had no material assets in Ontario and argued that they were impecunious and unable to raise funds.

The court held that impecuniosity requires full financial disclosure showing that the corporation, its shareholders, creditors, and other potential beneficiaries cannot raise funds to post security.

The evidence showed significant undisclosed financial resources and potential funding sources among shareholders and related parties, and the plaintiffs failed to meet their evidentiary burden.

Exercising its discretion under Rule 56.01(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court ordered additional security for costs in the amount of $350,000.