Sahar Cadili

The court considered a motion by the JDH Defendants for production and disclosure of documents over which the plaintiffs claimed privilege in an oppression and breach of fiduciary duty action.

The court found that the plaintiffs met their initial onus to establish litigation privilege over communications from and after December 16, 2019, and denied the defendants’ request for the court to review the 282 documents.

The court ordered both sides to produce redacted versions of privileged documents (excluding those with current litigation counsel and post-litigation communications) and to meet and confer regarding any non-privileged questions.

No costs were awarded to either side.

The court considered a motion by the plaintiffs for interim and interlocutory relief restraining the use of corporate funds by J.D.H. Holdings Limited to pay the defendants' legal and professional fees in an oppression action.

The plaintiffs also sought an accounting and repayment of such funds, or, in the alternative, a partial reimbursement to Jonshal Enterprises Inc. The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiffs had not established irreparable harm or overwhelming fairness concerns to justify the relief sought, and that any damages could be addressed at trial.

The applicant, a first mortgagee, sought the appointment of a receiver over a property due to mortgage default and unpaid realty taxes.

The registered owner consented, but a respondent claiming fraudulent transfer of title opposed the application and sought an adjournment to investigate.

The court dismissed the adjournment request, finding that the applicant's mortgage was valid under the Land Titles Act, as the mortgagor was the registered owner at the time, and the applicant was an innocent party entitled to rely on the register.

The court granted the application, finding it just and convenient to appoint a receiver given the ongoing default, the Mareva injunction on the mortgagor's assets, and the potential insufficiency of property value to cover debts.

The defendants Valiollah Onsori-Saisan and Skymark Capital Corporation brought a motion to set aside a Mareva injunction, originally obtained ex parte by the plaintiff Maxol Wealth Investments Inc., which arose from a syndicated mortgage fraud.

The moving parties argued the plaintiff failed to make full and frank disclosure, the injunction was overly broad in capturing a non-party business account (Pomanar Dessert Inc.), and the plaintiff's undertaking for damages was insufficient.

The court dismissed the motion to set aside the injunction, finding that the moving parties' own evidence strengthened their connection to the fraudulent scheme.

However, the court granted, on consent, a further release of funds from the Pomanar account for the moving parties' legal defence, subject to the plaintiff's costs being paid first.

Costs were awarded to the plaintiff on a substantial indemnity basis.

The tenant brought an urgent, last-minute motion seeking an extension of time to review or vary a previous order that lifted the automatic stay of his eviction.

The tenant claimed his adult son's medical condition prevented them from moving, but provided no medical evidence supporting this claim or explaining the delay in bringing the motion.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding it to be an abuse of process designed to obstruct the landlord from retaking lawful possession of the premises.

The stay of eviction was lifted immediately, and costs were awarded to the landlord.

The moving parties (defendants) sought an order to approve a loan and dispense with the consent of the responding parties (plaintiffs) for the loan and future financing.

The moving parties argued that the responding parties' refusal to consent was oppressive and intended to leverage a buyout.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the moving parties had not made a claim for oppression and that the court could not use its inherent jurisdiction to rewrite a commercial agreement negotiated at arm's length by sophisticated parties.

Despite the responding parties' success, the court declined to award costs due to their inequitable conduct.

Mohammad Akram, an incapable person with substantial property, had The Bank of Nova Scotia Trust Company appointed as interim guardian.

Due to persistent family disputes and non-cooperation, the interim guardian moved for its removal, the appointment of the Public Guardian and Trustee (PGT), and approval of its compensation and indemnification for legal fees.

The court determined it lacked authority to appoint the PGT as guardian without the PGT's consent and a formal application, especially since other family members expressed willingness to act.

The court denied the immediate removal of the interim guardian but varied the existing Order Giving Directions to establish a structured timetable for the appointment of a permanent guardian and mandatory mediation.

The court granted the interim guardian permission to pre-take compensation and indemnify itself for legal fees, and appointed the PGT as litigation guardian for the purpose of passing accounts.

The appellant, Turtle Creek Landscape Inc., appealed the dismissal of its action on summary judgment.

The appellant had sued the respondents for damages alleging defects in a truck it claimed to have purchased.

The motion judge found that the actual purchaser of the vehicle was Roberto Imbiscuso, not Turtle Creek, as evidenced by the vehicle purchase agreement, warranty documentation, and title registration.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no error in the motion judge's application of summary judgment principles and no evidence supporting the appellant's claims regarding required repairs, payment for repairs, or odometer tampering.

The plaintiff, Turtle Creek Landscape Inc., sought summary judgment for $98,587.90 plus costs, alleging financial losses from purchasing a vehicle from the defendants, Summit Auto Brokers Inc. and Shane Baghaee.

The defendants brought a cross-motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's motion and action, asserting that the vehicle was purchased by Roberto Imbiscuso personally, not Turtle Creek, and that Shane Baghaee acted only as a representative of Summit.

The court found that Imbiscuso was the true purchaser, Shane Baghaee was improperly named in his personal capacity, and Turtle Creek failed to provide sufficient evidence to substantiate its claims for vehicle problems, repairs, or damages, including allegations of odometer tampering.

The plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was dismissed, and the defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment was granted, dismissing the plaintiff's motion and entire action.

The plaintiff's representative refused to proceed with an examination for discovery because the defendant brought two corporate representatives, including the president's wife, which the plaintiff found intimidating.

The plaintiff moved for an order limiting the defendant to one representative at the examination.

The court granted the motion, holding that the onus is on the party seeking to have multiple representatives present to establish necessity, which the defendant failed to do.

The applicant sought removal of a notice of interest registered on title under s. 71 of the Land Titles Act.

The respondent, the applicant’s sister, had registered the notice to protect a 15% entitlement to net sale proceeds arising from an agreement creating a trust over those proceeds.

The court held that the agreement created a trust in the net proceeds of sale rather than an interest in land.

Because s. 62(1) of the Land Titles Act prohibits the registration of trusts on title, the notice was unauthorized and had to be removed.

The court confirmed the parties’ agreement that upon sale the net proceeds would be distributed 85% to the applicant and 15% to the respondent.

A law firm brought a motion to set aside an Order of Assessment issued in favour of its former client, arguing the client requisitioned the order outside the 30‑day period under the Solicitors Act.

The client opposed the motion and cross‑moved for production of time dockets and trust and client ledgers, and alternatively sought a finding of special circumstances under s. 11 of the Solicitors Act.

The court found the client had not received the final invoice until April 2014 and therefore requisitioned the assessment within the statutory period.

The court also held that the absence of time allocations, the potential premium in the bill, and the law firm’s reluctance to disclose dockets constituted special circumstances warranting assessment even though the account had been paid.

The motion to set aside was dismissed, production was ordered, and the matter was directed to proceed to assessment.

Following a successful application concerning governance of a religious society, the applicants sought full indemnity costs of $280,000 against numerous respondents.

They argued that the respondents engaged in reprehensible conduct by refusing to comply with the society’s constitution, attempting to undermine election results, and advancing questionable evidence during litigation.

The court held that elevated costs require either a Rule 49 offer or reprehensible conduct in the litigation itself, and that most of the criticized behaviour occurred outside the conduct of the litigation.

Applying the reasonableness principles under s.131 of the Courts of Justice Act and r.57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court determined that partial indemnity costs were appropriate.

Costs of $160,000 inclusive of fees, disbursements, and taxes were awarded.

The plaintiff, a not-for-profit corporation operating Sikh temples, sought summary judgment declaring it had 38 members and an interlocutory injunction restraining the defendants from seizing control of the temples.

The defendants claimed the membership was 1087 and sought the appointment of a monitor and auditor, alleging financial mismanagement.

The court granted summary judgment finding there were only 38 members, as the defendants' claims regarding additional members were factually unfounded, barred by delay, and precluded by estoppel.

The court continued the interlocutory injunction against the defendants, finding they had unlawfully seized control of the plaintiff, and dismissed their request for a monitor and auditor.