Vanessa L. Ford

Costs decision following the landlord's successful motion to stay the tenant's application for injunctive relief and relief from forfeiture pending arbitration.

The landlord sought partial indemnity costs of $20,183.47.

The tenant argued the costs were excessive, disproportionate, and should be reserved to the arbitrator.

The court declined to reserve costs, finding it controls costs of proceedings before it and the arbitration clause might not empower the arbitrator to award such costs.

The court reduced the hours claimed due to duplicative work by three lawyers and disallowed the articling student's attendance costs, awarding $13,500.00 inclusive of HST and disbursements.

A commercial tenant operating a bar and nightclub sought an urgent application for an interim and permanent injunction to prevent termination of its tenancy and to obtain relief from forfeiture.

The landlord moved to stay the application, arguing that the parties had agreed to resolve disputes through mediation and arbitration.

The court found that the dispute fell squarely within the scope of the arbitration agreement in the lease and granted the landlord's motion to stay the application.

The court declined to grant interim injunctive relief or relief from forfeiture, finding that the alleged breaches—permitting armed individuals to enter the premises leading to a shooting incident and operating an unlicensed adult entertainment facility—were very serious in nature and that the landlord's interests could not be fully vindicated without resort to forfeiture.

This addendum to the judgment in McKenzie-Barnswell v. Xpert Credit Control Solutions Inc., 2025 ONCA 253, clarifies issues regarding post-judgment interest, costs, and the status of the mortgage at issue.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario confirms that post-judgment interest is to be calculated at the statutory rate under the Courts of Justice Act, not the rate in the mortgage, due to findings of unconscionability and wrongful conduct.

The court upholds the trial judge’s substantial indemnity costs award, orders a set-off of costs against the respondent’s indebtedness, and confirms that the unconscionable mortgage shall not be re-registered.

Monies paid into court as security for costs are to be paid out to the appellants’ lawyers in trust.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered an appeal from a trial decision setting aside a mortgage and construction contract on the basis of fraudulent misrepresentation and unconscionability.

The appellants, including Xpert Credit Control Solutions Inc. and its director Sam Joshi, challenged the trial judge’s findings and the scope of the remedy.

The Court upheld the findings of liability but found the trial judge erred in setting aside the entire mortgage and awarding speculative damages.

The Court reduced the enforceable mortgage amount to $319,000, reflecting only the legitimate debt, and upheld $153,000 in damages for negligent construction, setting aside the requirement to pay $250,000 into trust.

The Court-Appointed Receiver sought an administration order, approval of its First Report, a vesting order for the sale of the Debtor's property, and sealing relief for confidential appendices.

The Debtor, through its principal, initially indicated opposition and sought an adjournment to obtain legal advice and present evidence of purported second mortgages.

The court denied the adjournment, finding no evidence of other registered mortgages or a basis to compromise the first mortgage.

The court approved the sale, administration, and sealing orders, concluding the property was widely exposed and the sale was in the best interest of the estate.

The defendants Valiollah Onsori-Saisan and Skymark Capital Corporation brought a motion to set aside a Mareva injunction, originally obtained ex parte by the plaintiff Maxol Wealth Investments Inc., which arose from a syndicated mortgage fraud.

The moving parties argued the plaintiff failed to make full and frank disclosure, the injunction was overly broad in capturing a non-party business account (Pomanar Dessert Inc.), and the plaintiff's undertaking for damages was insufficient.

The court dismissed the motion to set aside the injunction, finding that the moving parties' own evidence strengthened their connection to the fraudulent scheme.

However, the court granted, on consent, a further release of funds from the Pomanar account for the moving parties' legal defence, subject to the plaintiff's costs being paid first.

Costs were awarded to the plaintiff on a substantial indemnity basis.

This is an appeal from a trial judgment that awarded the respondent $600,000 in damages and set aside the transfer of the appellants’ matrimonial home as a fraudulent conveyance.

The trial judge found that one appellant failed to return funds obtained from the respondent for a joint venture that never materialized and subsequently fraudulently conveyed the matrimonial home to his wife for nominal consideration to avoid a breach of trust claim.

The appellants challenged the trial judge's findings of fact regarding the amount owed, fraudulent intent, and the wife's payment of good consideration.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's findings, including the presence of multiple badges of fraud.

This appeal concerned the interpretation of a parking agreement's rate calculation clause and the determination of new parking rates.

The Court of Appeal found that the application judge erred by deeming the clause unambiguous despite fundamental undefined terms, and by improperly relying on inadmissible hearsay evidence while rejecting expert evidence.

The appeal was allowed, the lower order set aside, and the Court re-interpreted the clause, establishing the monthly parking rates based on the appellants' expert evidence.

The moving parties (defendants) sought to re-open their appeal, which was previously dismissed as abandoned due to their former counsel's failure to appear and communicate.

The court granted the motion, finding it was in the interests of justice as the moving parties were unaware of the hearing date through no fault of their own, and their former counsel was later suspended by the Law Society.

The appeal was not heard on its merits, and the responding party consented to the re-opening.