Timothy B. Trembley

The defendants brought a motion to strike the plaintiffs' negligence claim for mental distress arising from the death of a family member in a helicopter crash.

The defendants argued that common law precludes recovery for mental distress resulting from the negligently caused death of a human being unless the plaintiffs witnessed the accident or its aftermath.

Applying the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Saadati v. Moorhead, the court found that geographic, temporal, and relational proximity restrictions are not absolute bars to recovery.

The court dismissed the motion, concluding it was not plain and obvious that the claim had no reasonable prospect of success.

A twin-engine aircraft lost power in its left engine during a flight from Ontario to Delaware and crashed in New York State, killing the two pilots and one passenger.

The pilots' estates sued the companies that inspected and maintained the engine and the engine manufacturer.

The manufacturer moved for summary judgment arguing that the United States General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 barred the claims because the aircraft was delivered more than 18 years prior to the accident.

The motion judge found that Ontario law applied because the crux of the claims involved negligent misrepresentation in repair instructions received and relied upon in Ontario.

The manufacturer appealed.

The defendants Teledyne Continental Motors Inc. and Teledyne Technologies Incorporated (CMI) moved for summary judgment to dismiss claims and cross-claims against them, arguing that a U.S. federal statute, the General Aviation Revitalization Act (GARA), imposed an 18-year limitation period that had expired.

The motion was opposed by other defendants, Aviation Technical Consultants (ATC) and Corporate Aircraft Restorations Inc. (CAR), who had cross-claimed against CMI for negligent misrepresentation.

The court, applying Ontario's choice of law rules, determined that the tort of negligent misrepresentation occurred in Ontario where CMI's allegedly faulty instructions were received and relied upon.

Consequently, U.S. law, including GARA, did not apply to bar the claims, and CMI's motion for summary judgment was dismissed.

Following a successful second trial in an insurance coverage dispute concerning aircraft damage, the court addressed costs and pre‑judgment interest.

The plaintiff sought increased pre‑judgment interest under s.130 of the Courts of Justice Act and substantial indemnity costs under Rule 49.10 based on an earlier offer to settle.

The court exercised its discretion to increase pre‑judgment interest to 1% due to changes in market rates and the lengthy litigation, fixing interest at $7,000.

However, the plaintiff was not entitled to substantial indemnity costs because the offer to settle equaled the eventual judgment and included substantial indemnity provisions that made the judgment less favourable than the offer.

Costs for the second trial were therefore fixed on a partial indemnity basis with a reduction for the use of two senior counsel.

The Attorney General of Canada sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order dismissing its motion to strike parts of the plaintiffs' statement of claim.

The underlying action involved an aircraft runway overrun, with the plaintiffs alleging Transport Canada was negligent in designing, constructing, and certifying the runway.

The court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions and no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision to leave the duty of care analysis for trial.

The insured sought recovery under an aircraft insurance policy after a twin‑engine aircraft crashed during an attempted takeoff using only one functioning engine.

The insurer denied coverage, arguing the occurrence was not an “accident” and alternatively that the insured breached a policy condition requiring protection of the aircraft from further loss.

Applying Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence defining an accident as an “unlooked‑for mishap or occurrence,” the court held that negligent conduct may still constitute an accident unless the insured deliberately assumed a known risk.

Although the pilot’s decision to attempt a single‑engine takeoff was negligent and ill‑advised, the evidence did not establish recklessness or deliberate risk assumption sufficient to remove the occurrence from coverage.

The court also found no breach of the policy’s aircraft protection condition.

Judgment was granted for the insured.

Following a motion in which the plaintiffs successfully opposed the Attorney General’s attempt to strike portions of a statement of claim under Rules 21.01 and 25.11, the court determined the appropriate quantum of costs.

The plaintiffs sought approximately $19,586 in fees on a partial indemnity basis, while the defendant argued for a reduced range of $10,000 to $12,000.

Applying the Rule 57.01(1) factors and relevant authorities on partial indemnity costs, the court assessed the complexity of the duty of care issue, the parties’ litigation conduct, and the reasonableness of counsel’s hourly rates and bill of costs.

The court concluded that a reduced but significant award was appropriate.

An appeal from a master's discovery order requiring a defendant manufacturer to produce documents concerning aircraft engine parts, counterweights, and related accidents beyond those directly at issue in the action.

The appellants argued the order was disproportionate under Rule 29.2 of the Rules of Civil Procedure because it required production spanning decades and numerous models.

The court held the master properly determined that the documents were relevant to pleaded product liability and duty to warn claims.

In the absence of evidence demonstrating the burden or cost of production, the proportionality argument failed.

The appeal was dismissed and costs awarded to the responding co‑defendant.

The defendant federal regulator brought a motion under Rule 25 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking determination of a question of law that it owed no private law duty of care to the plaintiff insurers in relation to regulatory oversight of an airport.

The action arose from an aircraft runway overrun where the plaintiffs alleged negligence in runway design and construction, ownership of the airport, and regulatory certification of the airport despite known safety deficiencies.

The court held that although existing jurisprudence suggests regulators generally do not owe private law duties of care for policy‑based regulatory decisions, it was not plain and obvious that special circumstances could not give rise to such a duty in the pleaded factual context.

Issues relating to the statutory framework, the characterization of certification decisions as policy or operational, and the factual circumstances required a full evidentiary record.

The motion to strike the regulatory negligence allegations and related pleadings was therefore dismissed.

The plaintiffs commenced a proposed class action alleging that the defendant airline improperly charged United States transportation taxes on ticket purchases.

The defendant moved to dismiss or stay the action for lack of jurisdiction and on the basis of forum non conveniens.

The court held that Ontario had presence‑based jurisdiction because the defendant carried on business in Ontario and there was a real and substantial connection to the dispute.

The revenue rule did not bar adjudication because the action did not seek to enforce foreign tax laws but rather challenged the defendant’s collection of charges from customers.

The motion was dismissed with respect to claims relating to tickets paid for in Canada but granted in relation to tickets paid for in the United States, which were stayed as U.S. courts were the clearly more appropriate forum.

The appellant, a non-settling defendant in a class action arising from an aviation accident, appealed an order approving partial settlements.

The appellant argued that the settlement's bar orders, which prohibited further discovery of the settling defendants, would prejudice its defence and prevent the trial court from properly allocating fault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the bar orders did not prevent the appellant from raising its liability arguments at trial.

The Court also upheld the motion judge's finding that the benefits of the settlement to the class outweighed any remote prejudice to the appellant's procedural rights.

The Air France defendants sought leave to appeal a motion judge's decision to re-open a jurisdiction motion to allow fresh evidence regarding the application of the Montreal Convention.

The underlying action arose from an Air France runway overrun at Toronto Pearson International Airport.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting case law and no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's discretionary decision to re-open the matter to determine the applicable international convention.

The plaintiffs' cross-motion for leave to appeal a costs award was also dismissed.

The appellants, Ontario residents, appealed a decision staying their action against a New Orleans restaurant owner for a slip and fall injury sustained while vacationing in Louisiana.

The motion judge found that the Ontario Superior Court lacked jurisdiction simpliciter.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, applying the real and substantial connection test and finding that requiring a foreign restaurant owner to defend in the customer's home jurisdiction would impose an unreasonable burden.

The appellants appealed a defamation judgment arising from a series of newspaper articles alleging that a municipal engineering commissioner arranged an improper land payment to a developer friend while withholding planning information from council.

The Court of Appeal upheld the rejection of justification, fair comment and qualified privilege, finding ample support for malice based on a sensationalized, one-sided reporting purpose undertaken without regard for the facts, although one branch of the trial judge’s malice reasoning was set aside because the journalist had been unfairly restricted from explaining his intended meaning.

The court also upheld special damages for loss of employment and substantial general damages, finding a sufficient causal link between the defamatory publication and the respondent’s dismissal.

Punitive damages were set aside because the compensatory award was already sufficient to punish and deter.

The cross-appeal seeking increased damages was dismissed.