Peter Alan Vinge Nostbakken

Following a motion in which the plaintiffs successfully opposed the Attorney General’s attempt to strike portions of a statement of claim under Rules 21.01 and 25.11, the court determined the appropriate quantum of costs.

The plaintiffs sought approximately $19,586 in fees on a partial indemnity basis, while the defendant argued for a reduced range of $10,000 to $12,000.

Applying the Rule 57.01(1) factors and relevant authorities on partial indemnity costs, the court assessed the complexity of the duty of care issue, the parties’ litigation conduct, and the reasonableness of counsel’s hourly rates and bill of costs.

The court concluded that a reduced but significant award was appropriate.

A corporate plaintiff brought a motion seeking extensive third‑party telephone records, additional documentary disclosure, leave to amend pleadings to add claims arising from additional procurement requests, and extensions to litigation timelines in an action relating to federal procurement contracts.

The court applied Rules 26.01 and 30.10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the Limitations Act, 2002.

Leave to amend was partially granted only in relation to claims concerning a later procurement process and to further particularize an existing Charter damages claim, while proposed amendments relating to another procurement and new causes of action were refused as statute‑barred or untenable.

Broad disclosure requests relating to other bidders were rejected as irrelevant and disproportionate, but limited disclosure relating to the termination and re‑issuance of the relevant contract and documents relating to the permitted amendment were ordered.

Third‑party telephone record production was permitted subject to service and a temporary stay allowing the service providers to challenge the order.

The defendant federal regulator brought a motion under Rule 25 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking determination of a question of law that it owed no private law duty of care to the plaintiff insurers in relation to regulatory oversight of an airport.

The action arose from an aircraft runway overrun where the plaintiffs alleged negligence in runway design and construction, ownership of the airport, and regulatory certification of the airport despite known safety deficiencies.

The court held that although existing jurisprudence suggests regulators generally do not owe private law duties of care for policy‑based regulatory decisions, it was not plain and obvious that special circumstances could not give rise to such a duty in the pleaded factual context.

Issues relating to the statutory framework, the characterization of certification decisions as policy or operational, and the factual circumstances required a full evidentiary record.

The motion to strike the regulatory negligence allegations and related pleadings was therefore dismissed.

A federal inmate serving a life sentence applied for habeas corpus with certiorari in aid, seeking to quash a decision that had reclassified him from medium to maximum security and to secure a transfer back to medium security.

By the time of the hearing, the applicant had already been reclassified and transferred back to a medium security institution.

The court held that habeas corpus requires a current deprivation of liberty, which was absent at the time of adjudication.

Applying the mootness framework from Borowski, the court declined to exercise discretion to decide the issue because the dispute was fact-specific, lacked public importance, and any ruling would have no practical effect.

The court also held it lacked jurisdiction to quash the prison authorities’ decision, as such relief falls within the Federal Court’s exclusive jurisdiction.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment seeking to dismiss portions of a civil action alleging damages arising from the disclosure of confidential taxpayer information by a government employee to police during an arson investigation.

The estate of the deceased plaintiff alleged reputational harm, loss of property, and Charter breaches.

The court held that the cause of action relating to damage to property arose before the deceased’s discharge from bankruptcy and therefore vested in the bankruptcy trustee under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

As a result, the estate lacked legal capacity to pursue claims relating to property loss.

The court dismissed those claims but allowed the personal claim for damage to reputation to proceed to trial, while striking Charter breach allegations that could not survive the claimant’s death.