Sarit Esther Batner

The applicant sought relief in a motion before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Motion dismissed.

This decision concerns an appeal under section 45(2) of the Arbitration Act, 1991, from an arbitral award regarding four disputes arising out of a major public-private partnership infrastructure project (Highway 427 expansion).

The appellant, His Majesty the King in Right of Ontario (as represented by the Minister of Transportation and Ontario Infrastructure and Lands Corporation), challenged the arbitral tribunal’s interpretation of the Project Agreement on four issues: the Crossfall Dispute, the Zenway Boulevard Dispute, the 407 ETR Dispute, and the 2014-2016 Dispute.

The court held that the tribunal correctly identified and applied the principles of contractual interpretation, found no extricable errors of law, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant, Bank of Montreal, sought to appeal an order lifting a stay of proceedings in a receivership, which allowed the respondent to terminate a project agreement.

The appellant argued it had an automatic right of appeal under s. 193(c) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, or alternatively, sought leave to appeal under s. 193(e).

The Court of Appeal held that the order lifting the stay was procedural, did not directly bring into play the value of the debtor's property, and did not directly result in a loss, meaning there was no automatic right of appeal.

The court also denied leave to appeal, finding the proposed appeal was not prima facie meritorious, did not raise issues of general importance, and would unduly hinder the insolvency proceedings.

The case involved three interrelated motions within the receivership of ProjectCo, the entity responsible for the St. Michael’s Hospital redevelopment.

Unity Health Toronto sought to lift a stay of proceedings to terminate the Project Agreement due to ProjectCo's defaults.

The Bank of Montreal, as Administrative Agent for the Lenders, sought an order to assign ProjectCo's rights to enforce a Tower Interim Completion (TIC) payment and to dismiss Unity's motion.

Unity also sought to dismiss the Lenders' TIC application for lack of standing.

The court granted Unity's motion to lift the stay and to dismiss the Lenders' TIC application, and dismissed the Lenders' assignment motion.

The court found Unity would be materially prejudiced by the stay's continuation, while the Lenders' prejudice was contractually prescribed.

The Lenders lacked standing for the TIC application, and no legal or equitable assignment of ProjectCo's rights to enforce the TIC payment existed.

This is an appeal from a medical negligence action.

The appellants, the spouse and sons of the deceased, Brian Willick, sued Dr. Willard (emergency surgeon) and Dr. Csanadi (family doctor) for alleged negligence in treating Mr. Willick after a fall, which they claimed led to his death from a ruptured splenic hematoma.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding that the doctors met the standard of care and that there was no detectable splenic injury attributable to the initial fall.

The appellants challenged the trial judge's application of causation, sufficiency of reasons on standard of care, and credibility assessments.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's findings that the respondent doctors met their respective standards of care, deferring to the trial judge's credibility findings, and concluding that the causation analysis was not flawed given the absence of a breach of duty.

The court also noted that the trial judge's reasons, while terse, were adequate for appellate review.

The court addressed two pretrial motions: one seeking to stay a counterclaim based on abuse of process due to delayed disclosure of a cooperation agreement, and another seeking leave for third-party discovery.

The motion to stay was dismissed, as the immediate disclosure rule for settlement agreements was found not to apply to agreements with non-parties.

The motion for third-party discovery was granted, with the court finding the non-party's evidence critical and that the cooperation agreement constituted a constructive refusal to provide information, making a pretrial examination necessary for trial fairness.

The plaintiffs sought costs following a successful 25-day medical malpractice trial where they "beat" a Rule 49 offer.

The defendants proposed a lower costs amount.

The court awarded the plaintiffs $3 million in costs, finding their request consistent with similar complex medical malpractice cases and justified by the defendants' conduct, which unnecessarily lengthened the proceeding and increased the plaintiffs' legal work.

The court considered factors under Rule 57.01, including the complexity of the case, the plaintiffs' complete success, and the defendants' late disclosure and attempts to introduce contradictory evidence.

Metrolinx brought a motion to quash an appeal by the Haudenosaunee Development Institute (HDI) from an order dismissing its motion for an interlocutory injunction, and also sought to set aside an interim injunction granted by a single judge of the Court of Appeal.

Metrolinx further raised a preliminary allegation of reasonable apprehension of institutional bias against the court.

HDI, in turn, sought an extension of the interim injunction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed Metrolinx's bias challenge, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court then granted Metrolinx's motion to quash the appeal, concluding that the lower court's order was interlocutory, not final, and therefore the appeal lay with the Divisional Court with leave, not the Court of Appeal.

The Haudenosaunee Development Institute (HDI) sought an interim injunction from the Court of Appeal for Ontario to prevent Metrolinx from removing trees near Osgoode Hall.

This motion was brought pending HDI's motion for leave to appeal the Divisional Court's denial of leave to appeal an earlier injunction denial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the interim injunction, finding that HDI failed to demonstrate a serious issue to be tried.

The court reiterated that appeals from an intermediate court's refusal of leave to appeal are generally not available unless the lower court mistakenly declined jurisdiction, an exception not met by HDI's arguments regarding constitutional rights or consultation.

The applicant brought a motion for leave to appeal a prior decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered costs of $15,000 payable by the applicant to the respondent, to be netted against a prior costs award.

The court also extended the interim relief previously ordered until the end of the day.

The Law Society of Ontario (LSO) brought an application for an interlocutory injunction to prevent Metrolinx from removing mature trees and commencing construction of a subway station on the historic Osgoode Hall site.

The LSO argued that Metrolinx's actions required municipal approval under s. 33(1) of the Ontario Heritage Act.

The court dismissed the application, finding no serious issue to be tried because s. 33(1) does not apply to neighboring property owners or to prescribed public bodies like Metrolinx, which are governed by a separate statutory regime.

The court also found that the balance of convenience favoured allowing the critical public transit project to proceed.

The Haudenosaunee Development Institute (HDI) brought a motion for an interlocutory injunction to prevent Metrolinx from removing 11 trees on its property near Osgoode Hall, pending adequate engagement regarding the Ontario Line subway project.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that HDI would suffer no irreparable harm as the trees were not historically unique and would be replaced, and that monetary damages would suffice for any compensation claims.

Furthermore, the balance of convenience strongly favoured Metrolinx due to the severe financial and public interest consequences of delaying the transit project.

The plaintiffs brought a medical negligence action following the death of their family member from a delayed splenic rupture two weeks after a fall.

The deceased had been treated by the defendant surgeon at the hospital and subsequently cleared to return to work by the defendant family doctor.

The court found that neither doctor breached the standard of care, as objective evidence at the time did not indicate a splenic injury.

The court also concluded that the plaintiffs failed to prove causation, finding it likely that an intervening trauma caused the fatal rupture.

The action was dismissed.

This costs endorsement followed successful appeals by the Fram and Kerbel entities against Romandale Farms Limited.

Romandale had initially been awarded substantial indemnity costs for four intertwined actions tried together.

The Court of Appeal, applying the principle of overall success rather than issue-by-issue determination, found that Fram and Kerbel were entitled to partial indemnity costs for the original actions, having achieved overall success on appeal and having beaten a joint settlement offer.

The applicant underwriters sought a declaration that the respondent issuer, Aphria Inc., was required to pay their ongoing legal fees in defending a proposed securities class action.

The class action alleged that the underwriters engaged in market manipulation prior to a prospectus offering.

Aphria argued that the indemnity in the underwriting agreement did not cover intentional wrongdoing.

The court held that the plain language of the indemnity clause required Aphria to pay defence costs for any claims arising from the underwriters' professional services, subject only to an exclusion if a court makes a final, non-appealable determination of fraud or willful misconduct.

As no such determination had been made, the application was granted.

The plaintiffs moved for an interlocutory injunction to prohibit the Independent Electricity System Operator (IESO) from enforcing the deemed terminations of 34 Feed-In Tariff (FIT) contracts and discontinuing payments.

The court found that the motion was an impermissible collateral attack on prior court orders that had deemed the contracts terminated.

Furthermore, the plaintiffs sought a mandatory injunction but failed to establish a strong prima facie case, as the issues of termination had been decided in prior litigation.

The court also found the plaintiffs' evidence of irreparable harm to be speculative.

The motion for an interlocutory injunction was dismissed.

The appellants, Fram and Kerbel, appealed a trial judgment that declared a 2005 land sale agreement between Kerbel and Romandale at an end.

The trial judge had found that Kerbel repudiated the agreement by entering into a settlement agreement with Fram that delayed the closing of the land sale until after secondary plan approval.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeals, finding that Romandale was estopped by convention from asserting that the settlement agreement breached the 2005 agreement, as all parties had shared the assumption that the sale could only close after secondary plan approval.

The Court also held that the 2005 agreement was not frustrated or void for mistake, Kerbel's claim was not limitation-barred, and Kerbel was entitled to specific performance because the lands were unique.

The defendants sought to dismiss two actions brought by the self-represented plaintiff under Rule 2.1.01 as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The actions involved allegations of improper disclosure of medical information and forged consent, which had already been conclusively dismissed in a prior summary judgment motion.

The court found that the new actions were an attempt to relitigate the same issues, constituting an improper collateral attack and res judicata.

The actions were dismissed as an abuse of process.

The moving parties sought a stay of two orders of the Court of Appeal pending their application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The underlying dispute involved the respondent's termination of 36 standard-form Feed-in Tariff Contracts for solar power facilities.

Applying the three-part test for a stay, the motion judge found that the proposed appeal raised serious questions of law regarding contractual interpretation, that the moving parties would suffer irreparable harm if the contracts were terminated and their loans called, and that the balance of convenience favoured preserving the status quo.

The motion for a stay was granted.

The defendants brought a motion for a mandatory interim injunction to enforce indemnity agreements and require the plaintiffs to advance funding for their legal expenses.

The court found that the Cytrynbaum jurisprudence did not apply because the motion sought a mandatory injunction against an individual and a corporation, rather than a final determination under the CBCA.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that the defendants failed to establish a strong prima facie case due to concerns about conflicts of interest and lack of independent legal advice in the drafting of the indemnity agreements.

The court also found no irreparable harm, as any harm could be quantified in monetary terms.