Dr. Morris

The applicant sought a determination that he sustained a catastrophic impairment under Criterion 8 of the Schedule and claimed entitlement to a post-104 income replacement benefit (IRB) following a motor vehicle accident.

The Tribunal found that the applicant did not meet the threshold for catastrophic impairment, as he did not demonstrate a marked impairment in at least two of the four functional domains, specifically finding his social functioning was compatible with some useful functioning.

However, the Tribunal granted the applicant's claim for a post-104 IRB, finding that the combination of his physical, psychological, cognitive, and visual impairments resulted in a complete inability to engage in any employment for which he was reasonably suited by education, training, or experience.

Interest was awarded on the overdue IRB payments.

The applicants sought statutory accident benefits following an alleged motor vehicle collision in a parking lot.

The respondent insurer denied the claims on the basis that the accident was staged.

Relying on forensic and biomechanical engineering evidence, as well as significant inconsistencies in the applicants' testimonies and lack of corroborating evidence, the Tribunal found that the collision did not occur as alleged.

The Tribunal concluded the incident was a staged accident and therefore did not meet the definition of an 'accident' under section 3(1) of the Schedule.

The applications were dismissed, and the respondent's request for costs was denied.

In a medical malpractice action arising from catastrophic injuries inflicted on a newborn by his biological mother, the plaintiffs alleged that a family physician and a pediatrician negligently failed to report child protection concerns under s. 72 of the Child and Family Services Act.

The court found that the family physician conducted adequate mental health and coping assessments, and that neither physician had reasonable grounds to suspect the infant was a child in need of protection.

Although the family physician breached the standard of care by not providing the pediatrician with a fuller mental health history, that breach had no causal consequence.

The court further held that, even if a report had been made, the Children's Aid Society would likely have treated the matter as low risk and would not have intervened in time to prevent the assault.

The action was dismissed, with damages nonetheless fixed by agreement at $13,250,000 under Rule 7.08.

The plaintiffs brought a medical negligence action following the death of their family member from a delayed splenic rupture two weeks after a fall.

The deceased had been treated by the defendant surgeon at the hospital and subsequently cleared to return to work by the defendant family doctor.

The court found that neither doctor breached the standard of care, as objective evidence at the time did not indicate a splenic injury.

The court also concluded that the plaintiffs failed to prove causation, finding it likely that an intervening trauma caused the fatal rupture.

The action was dismissed.

The plaintiff, a diabetic patient, brought a medical malpractice action against her family physician after requiring a below-knee amputation due to an undiagnosed neuropathic fracture (Charcot foot).

The plaintiff alleged the physician breached the standard of care by failing to order timely imaging or refer her to an orthopedic specialist.

The court found that the physician's treatment did not fall below the standard of care, noting that the condition was rare and not detected by other specialists who examined the plaintiff during the same period.

Although the court concluded that timely imaging would likely have saved the leg, the action was dismissed because the standard of care was not breached.

The worker appealed decisions granting a 20% Non-Economic Loss (NEL) award for Chronic Pain Disability (CPD) and reducing his Loss of Earning (LOE) benefits based on a finding that he was uncooperative in a Work-Transition assessment.

The Appeals Resolution Officer found that the worker's presentation, which had been interpreted by some assessors as malingering, was culturally based and consistent with his CPD and lack of education.

The Officer increased the NEL award to 35% to reflect a mid-range Class 3 impairment and concluded that the worker was unemployable, restoring full LOE benefits to age 65.

The father (respondent in the main proceeding) was successful on a motion to expand his access to the parties' child.

He sought costs of approximately $25,000 on a substantial indemnity basis or $19,000 on a partial indemnity basis.

The mother opposed the quantum, arguing it was excessive for a short access motion.

The court found the mother's behaviour unreasonable and not child-focused, as she attempted to prioritize financial issues over the child's best interests.

The court fixed costs at $10,000 all-inclusive, to be set-off against costs the father owed to the mother from previous orders.

The applicant sought an urgent order to dispense with the respondent's consent to travel to Portugal with their four-year-old child, Gabriel, for one month to visit her ill grandfather.

The respondent opposed the motion.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the proposed trip was not in Gabriel's best interest, particularly given a recent order by Ferguson J. to expand the child's time with the father and a section 30 report recommending limiting vacations to one week.

The court criticized the applicant's unilateral actions, including booking non-refundable tickets without prior negotiation or disclosure of plans to the court.

Costs were awarded against the applicant.

Following a 12-day family law trial primarily focused on the children's estrangement from the applicant father and the respondent mother's mobility claim to Arizona, both parties sought costs.

The court found that success on the parenting issues was divided, as the father did not achieve a custody reversal and the mother was not permitted to move.

Neither party was found to have acted in bad faith or to be markedly more reasonable on the parenting issues, resulting in no costs awarded for that portion.

However, the mother was more successful and reasonable regarding the financial issues, particularly the valuation of the father's professional building.

The court awarded the mother $20,000 in costs inclusive of disbursements and HST for the financial issues.

Following a trial where the self-represented applicant was successful in obtaining access to his biological child, he sought costs.

The court awarded the applicant costs on a partial indemnity basis, including compensation for lost wages due to trial preparation and attendance, as well as disbursements for a paternity test and a parenting assessment.

The respondents were ordered to pay $18,392.90.

The parents appealed a trial judge's order making their child a Crown ward without access.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence to support the trial judge's conclusion that the child would be at physical risk in the parents' care and that Crown wardship without access was in the child's best interests.

The court also upheld the trial judge's finding that access would impair the child's future opportunities for a permanent and stable placement through adoption.

The appellant mother appealed a trial judgment that ordered joint custody and unsupervised access to the respondent father.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge made several material errors, including excluding evidence predating a prior consent order, ordering joint custody despite finding a change in custody would traumatize the children and the parents could not communicate, and ignoring the evidence of the court-appointed therapist who recommended no access for two years.

The appeal was allowed, the custody and access orders were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The insurer appealed an arbitrator's decision awarding the insured his full arbitration expenses.

The insurer had been largely successful at the arbitration and had made a qualifying offer to settle prior to the hearing.

The Director's Delegate found that the arbitrator erred in law by misapprehending the terms of the settlement offer, mistakenly believing it required the insured to give up all future benefits.

In reassessing the expenses, the Director's Delegate noted that while the insurer's offer was serious and the insurer was mostly successful, the insured's case had some merit based on the medical evidence.

The appeal was allowed in part, and the expenses award was varied to entitle the insured to two-thirds of his reasonable arbitration expenses.