Sam B. Rogers

The decision addresses motions regarding the appointment of representative counsel for current and former employees and retirees of Hudson’s Bay Company ULC and related entities in ongoing Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) proceedings.

The Court declined to appoint any of the nominated law firms as representative counsel at this stage, instead appointing the Honourable Herman Wilton-Siegel as an independent third party to evaluate proposals and make a recommendation.

The Court also approved amendments to the Sale and Investment Solicitation Process (SISP) to remove the company’s art and artifact collection from the SISP and to appoint Heffel Gallery Limited to conduct a separate auction for the collection, subject to further court approval of procedures.

The reasons review the legal framework for appointing representative counsel and the importance of balancing stakeholder interests in complex insolvency proceedings.

The court considered whether a dispute over the calculation of an earn-out under a Purchase and Sale Agreement (PSA) should be referred to an independent accountant, as provided in the PSA, or determined by the court.

The applicants argued that the dispute, which concerned whether certain partnership units received by the respondents should be included in the earn-out calculation, fell within the accountant’s jurisdiction.

The respondents argued the issue was a legal one for the court.

The court held that the PSA’s language and commercial context indicated the parties intended all unresolved disputed items regarding the earn-out to be determined by an independent accountant, not just calculation disputes.

The court directed the parties to submit their dispute to an independent chartered accountant in accordance with the PSA.

The defendant, Hydro One Networks Inc., moved for a temporary stay of an action brought by Nyon Oil Inc. and 1170367 Ontario Inc. regarding land ownership and rights to operate electricity transmission infrastructure.

The court considered the overlap and differences between the Superior Court action and a parallel Ontario Energy Board proceeding, ultimately granting a one-year stay to allow the Board to determine expropriation and related issues first.

The court found that the Board had exclusive jurisdiction over the ongoing operation of the transmission system and that a stay would avoid inconsistent findings and protect the public interest.

This endorsement grants a brief adjournment in the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) proceedings involving Hudson’s Bay Company ULC and related entities, following ongoing discussions between the applicants and stakeholders.

The court extends the stay of proceedings, increases the Directors’ Charge, amends the relative priorities of charges, and approves the engagement of Reflect Advisors, LLC as financial advisor.

The court finds the requested relief appropriate, unopposed, and supported by the Monitor, and orders the requested amendments to the Initial Order.

This decision addresses a Rule 2.1.01 motion concerning multiple proceedings commenced by the plaintiff, Aynoush Biniaz-Sarabi, arising from a motor vehicle accident and subsequent denial of accident benefits.

The court reviews the history of related litigation, including prior decisions by the Licence Appeal Tribunal and Divisional Court, and considers whether the current and related actions are frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

Several actions are dismissed under Rule 2.1.01, and the court declines to declare the plaintiff a vexatious litigant without a formal motion.

The plaintiffs, Vincent and Rosemary Tookenay, brought a motion to extend the time for service of their statement of claim in a medical malpractice action against the Estate of Dr. Michael O’Mahony and others, and to validate irregular service.

The statement of claim was issued in April 2021 but not properly served until January 2023, well beyond the six-month deadline.

The plaintiffs attributed the delay to a "miscommunication" within their lawyers' office.

The defendant Estate opposed the motion, arguing significant and uncompensable prejudice due to the unavailability of two key witnesses: Dr. O’Mahony, who suffered severe cognitive decline and later passed away, and nurse practitioner Melissa Georgiou, who died of cancer.

The court dismissed the plaintiffs' motion, finding an unexplained one-month delay after the plaintiffs' lawyers realized the claim had not been served, and actual prejudice to the defendant Estate due to the loss of crucial witness testimony.

In a class action seeking certification against the Crown and two psychiatrists (Defendant Doctors) regarding treatment in a psychiatric hospital program, the plaintiffs moved for a partial discontinuance of the action against the Defendant Doctors.

The court granted the discontinuance, finding it to be in the best interests of the putative Class Members.

The decision was based on the lack of additional recovery from the doctors, the streamlining of the claim, the doctors' later involvement in the program, and their agreement to provide de bene esse examinations to preserve evidence.

The court confirmed that the discontinuance was not for an improper purpose and did not prejudice the class members or the co-defendant Crown, as the doctors' evidence remained available.

The Estate of Helen Martindale brought a medical malpractice action against two emergency room physicians, Dr. Lee and Dr. Chiu, alleging negligence in their diagnosis and treatment of Helen Martindale's perianal pain, which was later diagnosed as anal cancer requiring an ileostomy.

The plaintiff contended that the doctors breached the standard of care by failing to properly diagnose, investigate, and provide adequate follow-up.

The court found that both Dr. Lee and Dr. Chiu met the applicable standard of care, concluding that their assessments and treatment plans were reasonable given the patient's presentation and the circumstances at a community hospital.

The court also found the plaintiff's evidence unreliable regarding follow-up instructions and determined that no imaging was medically necessary at the time of the initial emergency room visits.

As no breach of the standard of care was found, the issue of causation was not determined, but the court noted that the plaintiff failed to prove that any alleged breach caused the need for an ileostomy.

The action was dismissed.

The plaintiffs' counsel, Rochon Genova LLP, sought an order to retain costs awarded by various courts, including post-judgment interest, as part of their contingency fee agreement.

The total amount of costs sought was over $5.6 million, bringing their total compensation to over $7.4 million.

The defendants took no position as the costs had already been paid.

The court approved the request, finding the contingency fee agreements fair and reasonable given the exceptional circumstances, high risk, complexity, and two-decade duration of the litigation, which involved novel claims and a protracted procedural history.

The court confirmed the request complied with section 28.1(8) of the Solicitors Act, noting no excessive fees or 'double-dipping.'

Metrolinx brought a motion to quash an appeal by the Haudenosaunee Development Institute (HDI) from an order dismissing its motion for an interlocutory injunction, and also sought to set aside an interim injunction granted by a single judge of the Court of Appeal.

Metrolinx further raised a preliminary allegation of reasonable apprehension of institutional bias against the court.

HDI, in turn, sought an extension of the interim injunction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed Metrolinx's bias challenge, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court then granted Metrolinx's motion to quash the appeal, concluding that the lower court's order was interlocutory, not final, and therefore the appeal lay with the Divisional Court with leave, not the Court of Appeal.

The Haudenosaunee Development Institute (HDI) sought an interim injunction from the Court of Appeal for Ontario to prevent Metrolinx from removing trees near Osgoode Hall.

This motion was brought pending HDI's motion for leave to appeal the Divisional Court's denial of leave to appeal an earlier injunction denial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the interim injunction, finding that HDI failed to demonstrate a serious issue to be tried.

The court reiterated that appeals from an intermediate court's refusal of leave to appeal are generally not available unless the lower court mistakenly declined jurisdiction, an exception not met by HDI's arguments regarding constitutional rights or consultation.

This is a costs endorsement following complex grouped appeals and a cross-appeal concerning claims by 28 former residents of the Oak Ridge Division of the Mental Health Centre against His Majesty the King in Right of Ontario and two physicians.

The Court of Appeal had largely upheld the trial judge's findings on liability for breach of fiduciary duty and battery, with minor reductions in damages.

The appellants sought a significant reduction in the respondents' costs for the appeal and a reduction in the trial costs.

The court awarded the respondents the full amount of their claimed appeal costs, finding that despite mixed success, the trial judgment remained largely intact and the costs claimed were reasonable given the complexity.

The court also declined to vary the trial costs, deeming the overturned $1,000 judgment a minor part of the overall proceedings.

The appellant, Patricia Ann Smith, appealed the dismissal of her medical malpractice action against Dr. Brenda Kane.

The trial judge found no breach of the standard of care by Dr. Kane in her treatment of the appellant's foot complaints.

The appeal raised three main issues: misapprehension of expert evidence, failure to apply the "ordinary knowledge and common sense" exception to expert evidence, and error in failing to find a breach of the duty to diagnose.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of expert evidence, rejecting the application of the "common sense" exception as it was not raised at trial and the issues were complex, and clarifying that there was no freestanding duty to diagnose in this context given the specific concessions and causation findings.

This endorsement addresses the entitlement to costs following a medical malpractice action where the plaintiff's claim was dismissed.

The parties had agreed on a quantum of $300,000 for costs.

The court found that the defendant, as the successful party, was ordinarily entitled to costs.

The plaintiff's arguments for denying costs, including the defendant's failure to make a settlement offer, alleged divided success on causation and contributory negligence, and the plaintiff's impecuniosity and tragic circumstances, were rejected.

The court emphasized that the defendant's explicit undertaking not to demand costs alleviated concerns regarding hardship, allowing the ordinary rule that costs follow the event to apply.

The court reserved the right to revisit the disposition if the defendant were to seek enforcement of the costs order.

The defendants brought a mid-trial motion to exclude the expert testimony of Professor Bernard Dickens, an ethicist, regarding the ethical standards of psychiatric care and research applicable in the 1960s and 1970s at the Oak Ridge Division of the Penetanguishine Mental Health Centre.

The defendants argued that Prof. Dickens, not being a physician, was unqualified to speak on psychiatric standards of care and that his reports primarily constituted legal analysis.

The court dismissed the motion, finding Prof. Dickens highly qualified as an expert in medical ethics, distinguishing ethical standards from medical standards of care and legal analysis.

The defendants brought a mid-trial motion to determine the admissibility of two reply expert reports (Prof. Shane O’Mara and Dr. Stephen Xenakis) served by the plaintiffs just before trial.

The defendants argued the reports were late and constituted impermissible case splitting.

The plaintiffs contended the lateness was due to unforeseen circumstances and that the evidence would assist the court.

The court found that the issues addressed by the reply reports were foreseeable and had already been covered by the plaintiffs' initial experts, thus constituting new evidence rather than proper reply.

The court dismissed the motion, ruling the reports inadmissible to avoid prejudice to the defendants and further trial delays, emphasizing the importance of adhering to trial schedules in a long-standing action.

The plaintiffs brought a mid-trial motion to amend their statement of claim to include reliance on section 16(1)(h.2) of the Limitations Act, 2002, and the common law doctrine of discoverability.

The claims arose from their treatment as involuntary patients at a mental health facility between 1966 and 1983, alleging assault through abusive experimentation and physical abuse.

The defendants opposed the amendment, arguing prejudice due to lack of particularity and insufficient discovery on discoverability.

The court granted the motion, finding no prejudice to the defendants as the allegations of assault and dependency were already pleaded, and the defendants had prior notice of the plaintiffs' intent to rely on section 16(1)(h.2) and had extensively explored issues related to discoverability (laches) during previous discovery examinations.

Former patients of the Oak Ridge Division of the Mental Health Centre in Penetanguishene brought a multi-party action against two physicians and the Crown for breach of fiduciary duty, battery, negligence, and violations of international law norms relating to torture and cruel treatment.

The patients alleged they were subjected to intensive therapy programmes involving psychological and physical torture between 1966 and 1983.

The motions judge granted partial summary judgment for breach of fiduciary duty and dismissed the defendants' motions to dismiss the action as statute-barred or barred by laches.

The appellants appealed, arguing procedural fairness violations and that the action was time-barred.

The Court of Appeal found the motions judge erred in granting partial summary judgment without proper notice and opportunity for the defendants to respond, and set aside those paragraphs.

The court remitted the matter for trial, finding genuine issues requiring trial on limitation and laches issues.

The Plaintiffs sought costs following their successful partial summary judgment motion, where the Defendants' motion to dismiss claims as statute-barred was dismissed, and the Plaintiffs' cross-motion for partial summary judgment on breach of fiduciary duty was granted.

The Plaintiffs requested $821,580.08 in costs and disbursements on a partial indemnity basis.

The Defendants argued for a significantly lower award of $50,655, alleging over-lawyering and inclusion of costs unrelated to the specific summary judgment motion.

The court awarded the Plaintiffs $282,504.34, disallowing costs for an unsuccessful productions motion and reserving discovery costs for the final adjudication, while finding the Plaintiffs' remaining claims for the summary judgment motion reasonable despite the Defendants' "over-lawyering" argument.