Hannah Young

The appellant, a former real estate lawyer, appealed from a summary judgment dismissing his action against his bank.

He alleged that the bank committed repeated double withdrawals from his trust account in connection with certified cheques, causing failed real estate transactions, Law Society intervention, and criminal proceedings.

The motion judge found that although duplicate debits occurred, they were corrected and the appellant failed to establish that the bank's conduct caused the Law Society investigation or the losses claimed.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error and dismissed the appeal with costs of $5,000.

The applicant sought relief in a motion before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Motion dismissed.

The plaintiffs in a medical malpractice action sought to amend their Statement of Claim to add a proposed defendant, Dr. Sharon Koren, after the two-year limitation period under Section 38(3) of the Trustee Act had expired.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that neither the common law exception of fraudulent concealment nor special circumstances applied to extend the limitation period.

The court noted that Dr. Koren's error in sending an erroneous consult note was made in good faith and corrected promptly, and that the plaintiffs were aware of Dr. Koren's involvement well before the limitation period expired.

The court also gave little weight to the plaintiffs' counsel's affidavit due to issues of privilege waiver and hearsay.

This ruling addresses a dispute between the plaintiffs and defendants regarding the wording of causation questions to be put to the jury in a medical negligence trial.

The plaintiffs sought "caused or contributed to" language and no particulars, arguing complexity and potential undermining of the verdict.

The defendants advocated for "but for" language and required particulars, citing clarity and the need for evidentiary foundation.

The court found that "but for" language should be used for causation questions, given the discrete nature of the alleged negligence of each defendant doctor.

Furthermore, the court ruled that the jury must provide particulars of their causation findings to ensure understanding of instructions and proper evidentiary basis, consistent with practices for standard of care particulars.

This case involved a shareholder dispute where OneMove Capital Corporation sought to affirm the validity of its proposal under s. 99 of the Ontario Business Corporations Act (OBCA) to remove and replace a director, and to compel Dye & Durham Limited to include this proposal in its information circular.

Dye & Durham brought a counter-application to omit the proposal and sought a declaration that OneMove and Tyler Proud breached a 2020 Investor Rights Agreement (IRA).

The court ruled that a shareholder cannot use the s. 99 proposal mechanism to remove a director, as director removal requires a special meeting requisitioned under s. 105 of the OBCA.

However, the court also found that OneMove's proposal, if permissible, would not fall under the "personal grievance" exception of s. 99(5)(b) or (b.1), as it related significantly to the company's business affairs.

Furthermore, the court determined that the IRA did not prohibit OneMove from seeking to remove its nominee director through proper OBCA channels, and dismissed Dye & Durham's other alleged breaches of the IRA as theoretical.

The applicants, beneficiaries of the Fitzhenry (1994) Family Trust, sought a declaration that the respondent trustee, Linda Stevens, had already received appropriate compensation and was not entitled to additional fees.

Ms. Stevens sought over $300,000 in additional compensation.

The court found that Ms. Stevens and co-trustees breached the trust deed by failing to obtain beneficiary consent for fees and by delegating duties without proper oversight.

Applying the "five factors" for trustee compensation, the court determined that Ms. Stevens had been adequately compensated for her services, especially given the extensive delegation of management duties to other professionals and her failure to adhere to trust terms.

The court dismissed Ms. Stevens' claim for additional compensation and ordered her to pay the applicants' costs.

In a class action seeking certification against the Crown and two psychiatrists (Defendant Doctors) regarding treatment in a psychiatric hospital program, the plaintiffs moved for a partial discontinuance of the action against the Defendant Doctors.

The court granted the discontinuance, finding it to be in the best interests of the putative Class Members.

The decision was based on the lack of additional recovery from the doctors, the streamlining of the claim, the doctors' later involvement in the program, and their agreement to provide de bene esse examinations to preserve evidence.

The court confirmed that the discontinuance was not for an improper purpose and did not prejudice the class members or the co-defendant Crown, as the doctors' evidence remained available.

The Estate of Helen Martindale brought a medical malpractice action against two emergency room physicians, Dr. Lee and Dr. Chiu, alleging negligence in their diagnosis and treatment of Helen Martindale's perianal pain, which was later diagnosed as anal cancer requiring an ileostomy.

The plaintiff contended that the doctors breached the standard of care by failing to properly diagnose, investigate, and provide adequate follow-up.

The court found that both Dr. Lee and Dr. Chiu met the applicable standard of care, concluding that their assessments and treatment plans were reasonable given the patient's presentation and the circumstances at a community hospital.

The court also found the plaintiff's evidence unreliable regarding follow-up instructions and determined that no imaging was medically necessary at the time of the initial emergency room visits.

As no breach of the standard of care was found, the issue of causation was not determined, but the court noted that the plaintiff failed to prove that any alleged breach caused the need for an ileostomy.

The action was dismissed.