Scott G. Lemke

The defendant, Hydro One Networks Inc., moved for a temporary stay of an action brought by Nyon Oil Inc. and 1170367 Ontario Inc. regarding land ownership and rights to operate electricity transmission infrastructure.

The court considered the overlap and differences between the Superior Court action and a parallel Ontario Energy Board proceeding, ultimately granting a one-year stay to allow the Board to determine expropriation and related issues first.

The court found that the Board had exclusive jurisdiction over the ongoing operation of the transmission system and that a stay would avoid inconsistent findings and protect the public interest.

The Ontario Court of Justice granted an application for a recount of votes in the electoral district of Mississauga–Erin Mills following Ontario’s 44th General Election held on February 27, 2025.

The applicants, including the Chief Electoral Officer and Returning Officer, sought the recount pursuant to sections 67, 69, and 71 of the Election Act due to the narrow margin of 20 votes between the two leading candidates, Sheref Sabawy and Qasir Dar.

The court emphasized the discretionary nature of ordering recounts even when the statutory threshold for a recount is met, balancing finality, reviewability, and public confidence in electoral outcomes.

The recount was ordered to ensure the accuracy and integrity of the democratic process despite no specific evidence of error.

The Ontario Court of Justice dismissed Andrea Grebenc’s application for a judicial recount in the electoral district of Burlington, finding she failed to establish a prima facie case that a recount would change the election outcome.

The court emphasized the strict statutory timelines under section 71(1) of the Elections Act requiring recount applications to be brought and heard within four days of official tabulation.

Despite credible evidence from a scrutineer regarding improperly rejected ballots, the net difference in votes was only one, insufficient to justify a recount.

The decision underscores the importance of judicial discretion in balancing public confidence in election finality with the need for accuracy.

This case involved a shareholder dispute where OneMove Capital Corporation sought to affirm the validity of its proposal under s. 99 of the Ontario Business Corporations Act (OBCA) to remove and replace a director, and to compel Dye & Durham Limited to include this proposal in its information circular.

Dye & Durham brought a counter-application to omit the proposal and sought a declaration that OneMove and Tyler Proud breached a 2020 Investor Rights Agreement (IRA).

The court ruled that a shareholder cannot use the s. 99 proposal mechanism to remove a director, as director removal requires a special meeting requisitioned under s. 105 of the OBCA.

However, the court also found that OneMove's proposal, if permissible, would not fall under the "personal grievance" exception of s. 99(5)(b) or (b.1), as it related significantly to the company's business affairs.

Furthermore, the court determined that the IRA did not prohibit OneMove from seeking to remove its nominee director through proper OBCA channels, and dismissed Dye & Durham's other alleged breaches of the IRA as theoretical.

The applicant appealed the Town of Caledon's failure to make a decision on an Official Plan Amendment to permit a gravel pit.

At a Case Management Conference, the Tribunal considered requests to schedule a hearing and for an order for discovery.

The Tribunal declined to schedule a hearing or order discovery, noting that Indigenous consultation with Six Nations of the Grand River was ongoing and peer reviews were not yet complete.

A further Case Management Conference was scheduled to allow time for these processes to advance.

The appellant, a condominium unit holder, appealed the dismissal of his application against the condominium corporation regarding noise complaints from an adjacent unit.

The original application sought relief under the Condominium Act, primarily an oppression remedy (s. 135), and damages.

The application judge found the corporation's response to the complaints reasonable and dismissed the application, noting that the unit owner causing the noise was not a party, precluding certain remedies.

On appeal, the appellant's new counsel attempted to re-frame the argument to focus on a compliance order under s. 134 (nuisance).

The Court of Appeal refused to entertain this new argument, emphasizing that it was not properly raised below and would require fact-finding.

The Court affirmed the application judge's finding that the corporation's conduct was not oppressive, as it had taken reasonable steps to address the complaints, and that the requested remedy of unit renovation could not be ordered without the affected unit owner being a party.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicants, members of the Carpenters Union, brought an application alleging that a municipal councillor breached the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act by voting on a resolution supporting provincial labour law amendments.

The councillor's wife was employed by a rival union, CLAC.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicants failed to prove they brought the application within the six-week limitation period.

Furthermore, the court held that the councillor did not have a deemed indirect pecuniary interest because the resolution was merely a symbolic show of support over which the municipality had no jurisdiction, and any potential interest was too remote, hypothetical, and insignificant to influence his vote.

The applicants sought a declaration that a right-of-way across their property, benefiting the respondents' adjacent properties, had been abandoned and extinguished.

The applicants argued that historical non-use, the disappearance of original sheds, and various obstructions demonstrated an intention to abandon the easement.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the respondents and their contractors had recently used the right-of-way for property renovations and that the applicants failed to prove an express or implied intention to abandon the property right.

The applicant sought a judicial recount of votes cast in the Electoral District of Brampton Centre in the June 7, 2018 Ontario provincial election.

The applicant, who received 12,803 votes, lost to Sara Singh of the Ontario New Democratic Party, who received 12,892 votes—a margin of 89 votes.

The applicant raised five grounds for a recount: non-citizens voting, discrepancies between tabulation forms, irregularities in "Bingo Sheets" unreliable witness testimony regarding missing votes, and disparities in ballot rejection rates between manual and electronic counting methods.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant failed to establish a prima facie case under section 71(1) of the Election Act.

The court held that while the threshold for establishing grounds for a recount is modest, the applicant must still present credible evidence that could affect the election outcome.

The applicant sought leave to appeal under section 131 of the Provincial Offences Act from a judgment of the Ontario Court of Justice that dismissed her appeal from a conviction for operating a rental unit without a valid licence.

The applicant contended that she had entered an uninformed guilty plea at trial, arguing this raised a question of law essential to the public interest.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the applicant's complaint was fact-based rather than a question of law, and that she had failed to meet the very high threshold for granting leave to appeal under section 131 of the POA.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Health Services Appeal and Review Board confirming the revocation of its licence to operate a long-term care home.

The appellant argued that the revocation order was issued without notice, breaching procedural fairness.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the hearing before the Board was a hearing de novo, which cured any prior procedural defects regarding notice.

The court also noted that any prejudice suffered by the appellant stemmed from the appointment of an interim manager, an order the appellant chose not to appeal.

The applicants sought a declaration that residential property registered in their adult son's name was beneficially theirs, relying primarily on resulting trust and alternatively on express trust, unjust enrichment, and adverse possession.

The court held that the presumption of resulting trust arising from the gratuitous 1990 transfer was rebutted on the evidence, finding that a gift to the son was more plausible than a bare trustee arrangement and rejecting the current denials of gifting intention as unreliable.

However, the court found that the son's 2014 affidavits and consent created an express trust in favour of the applicants from August 20, 2014 onward.

Title was vested in the applicants subject to enforcement of the former spouse's registered family law judgment to the extent outstanding as of that date, with no costs awarded.

The applicant, a Liberal candidate in the 2014 Ontario provincial election for the electoral district of Thornhill, sought a recount of ballots pursuant to Section 71 of the Election Act.

On election night, unofficial results showed the applicant winning by 85 votes.

However, the official tabulation conducted the following day showed the respondent, a Progressive Conservative candidate, winning by the same 85-vote margin.

The applicant alleged improper rejection of ballots and improper tabulation by the returning officer.

The court ordered a recount, finding that the discrepancy between the unofficial and official tallies, combined with the extremely narrow margin of victory and concerns about voter confidence in the democratic process, established a prima facie case for relief under Section 71(1)(b) of the Election Act.