Trenton Dempsey Johnson

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs Appeal Tribunal upholding the respondent Commission's Cost of Production Formula for chicken pricing.

The Divisional Court found that the Tribunal failed to adequately explain its preference for certain expert evidence over others, rendering its reasons conclusory and inadequate.

The application was allowed, the Tribunal's decision was quashed, and the matter was remitted for a fresh hearing.

The applicants sought judgment to enforce the terms of a settlement reached at a judicial pre-trial regarding a disputed strip of land used as a farm access road.

The dispute centered on the precise location of a fence to be constructed as part of the settlement.

The court found that a binding settlement had been reached, memorialized in a written document, and that the parties' subsequent conduct confirmed their agreement.

The court rejected the respondents' arguments of misunderstanding or mistake, holding that there was no evidence of a lack of authority or misapprehension by counsel.

The court granted the motion, enforcing the settlement.

The developer and the municipality brought a motion to quash an application for judicial review of a Draft Plan of Subdivision Approval.

They argued the court lacked jurisdiction due to the statutory appeal scheme and that the applicant lacked public interest standing.

The court dismissed the motion to quash, finding it was not plain and obvious that jurisdiction was ousted or that standing should be denied.

The court also partially granted a motion to strike portions of the applicant's affidavit, striking two expert reports but allowing correspondence and video evidence to proceed to the panel.

The plaintiff developer brought an action against the City of Guelph seeking reimbursement for local service charges paid for road improvements as a condition of subdivision approval.

The City moved to strike the claim, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction and the action was an abuse of process because the developer failed to appeal the conditions to the Local Planning Appeal Tribunal under the Planning Act.

The Superior Court granted the motion, finding that the developer was improperly attempting to circumvent the statutory appeal scheme and collaterally attack municipal by-laws, making it plain and obvious the claim could not succeed.

The applicants, members of the Carpenters Union, brought an application alleging that a municipal councillor breached the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act by voting on a resolution supporting provincial labour law amendments.

The councillor's wife was employed by a rival union, CLAC.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicants failed to prove they brought the application within the six-week limitation period.

Furthermore, the court held that the councillor did not have a deemed indirect pecuniary interest because the resolution was merely a symbolic show of support over which the municipality had no jurisdiction, and any potential interest was too remote, hypothetical, and insignificant to influence his vote.

The appellants owned property adjacent to the respondents' property in Fergus, Ontario.

The respondents held an easement over part of the appellants' property providing interior access to the upper floors and roof of their own building.

The respondents sought to renovate their property for commercial and residential use, which included widening a third-floor door frame to create a fire exit and replacing doors to comply with building and fire regulations.

The appellants interfered with the easement and the respondents applied for declaratory and injunctive relief.

The application judge declared the easement valid and ordered the appellants not to interfere with the respondents' rights.

The appellants appealed, arguing the renovations impermissibly changed the use of the easement and that ancillary rights were void under the rule against perpetuities.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

The plaintiff brought an unsuccessful summary judgment motion in a wrongful dismissal action.

The parties made written submissions on costs.

The defendant sought costs of $88,332.37 payable immediately, while the plaintiff argued costs should be reserved to the trial judge.

The court held that because the plaintiff was unemployed and the motion materials would be useful at trial, ordering immediate payment of significant costs would impede access to justice.

Costs of the motion were reserved to the trial judge.

This was a costs decision following a successful commercial lease application requiring the respondent tenant to execute the applicant landlord’s standard form lease as a condition of renewal.

The applicant sought partial indemnity costs of $18,302.53 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The court held the applicant had been completely successful, had made significant settlement efforts, and that the amount claimed was fair and reasonable, particularly because it closely matched the respondent’s own draft bill of costs.

Costs were fixed in the amount sought and made payable forthwith.

The applicant landlord brought an application seeking an order requiring the respondent commercial tenant to execute the landlord's current standard form lease, which included a new demolition clause, as a condition of exercising its option to renew.

The original lease stated that any renewal would be on the same terms except that the landlord could require the execution of its then-current standard form lease.

The court applied principles of commercial contract interpretation and found that the clear wording of the lease permitted the landlord to require the tenant to sign the new standard form lease, even if it contained material changes such as a demolition clause.

The application was granted.

Following a successful application regarding the scope of a right of way and removal of obstructions interfering with vehicular ingress and egress, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The responding parties argued that the successful parties should receive a reduced costs award because they failed to pursue meaningful pre‑litigation discussions and adopted an unnecessarily adversarial approach.

The court reviewed the factors under Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and rejected the argument that the successful parties’ conduct disentitled them to costs.

Finding partial indemnity appropriate, the court fixed costs at a reduced but substantial amount.

The responding parties were ordered to pay a lump‑sum costs award.

The court determined costs following the dismissal of a motion seeking to add additional defendants under Rules 5.04 and 26.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Proposed defendants sought recovery of their legal costs incurred responding to the unsuccessful motion.

The court assessed the reasonable costs expected for a half‑day motion involving complex issues of privity of contract but reduced the amounts claimed due to unnecessary costs arising from arguments raised or abandoned during earlier proceedings.

The court also considered the absence of responding evidence and the reasonableness of counsel’s hourly rates.

Costs were awarded to the proposed defendants in reduced amounts.

The plaintiff moved to amend its statement of claim to add several limited partners of a limited partnership as defendants in an action concerning repayment obligations connected to a promissory note and related agreements.

The proposed amendment alleged that the limited partners were liable through assumption agreements tied to the limited partnership’s debt obligations.

The court considered whether the plaintiff had a tenable cause of action based on privity of contract or under Rule 8 of the Rules of Civil Procedure permitting claims against limited partners.

The court held that the plaintiff lacked privity of contract with the limited partners and that Rule 8 is procedural and does not create substantive liability for limited partners.

As the proposed claims were clearly impossible of success, the motion to amend was dismissed.

Following a property dispute between rural neighbours concerning the scope of a registered right-of-way, the successful applicants sought partial indemnity costs after obtaining a declaration confirming they could access their lands at any point along the right-of-way.

The respondents argued there was divided success because the applicants failed to prove a prescriptive right and contended the case was close.

The court rejected the respondents’ characterization of the dispute and found that both parties, particularly the respondents, had taken intransigent positions that prolonged the litigation.

Although the applicants were entitled to costs, the court found the time spent by counsel excessive given the narrow issues and limited attendances.

Costs were reduced and fixed at a lower amount.

The applicant property owners brought an application seeking a declaration that a 1911 right-of-way over the respondents' land permitted them vehicular access to the rear of their property.

The respondents had barricaded the access point, arguing the right-of-way was strictly for accessing the abutting railway lands.

The court found that the reference to the railway lands in the deeds was merely a boundary descriptor, not a limitation on the easement's purpose.

Furthermore, the court held that the applicants' use of the right-of-way to access their property was a reasonably necessary ancillary right to the easement.

A declaration was issued permitting the applicants' vehicular ingress and egress.