D. Derstine

The offender was convicted by a jury of two counts of second-degree murder, one count of aggravated assault, and one count of discharging a firearm with intent, arising from a shooting outside a Toronto nightclub.

The Crown sought 20 years of parole ineligibility, while the defence sought 15 years.

The court considered the devastating impact on the victims' families and the community, the aggravating factor of using a loaded handgun in a crowded public place, and the mitigating factors of the offender's youth and lack of a prior criminal record.

The court sentenced the offender to life imprisonment with parole ineligibility set at 20 years for the murders, and concurrent seven-year sentences for the other offences.

The offender was convicted of manslaughter following a jury trial for his role in a fatal shooting.

The court found that the offender was aware of the presence of a firearm and was a party to the offence under s. 21(2) of the Criminal Code.

After weighing aggravating factors, including the use of a firearm, against mitigating factors, such as harsh pre-sentence custody conditions and rehabilitative potential, the court determined an appropriate sentence of 113.5 months.

After applying credit for pre-sentence custody, the offender was sentenced to 58 months' imprisonment.

The defendant brought a motion for directions on where and before whom he could bring a bail application.

The Court of Appeal had previously upheld his convictions but overturned his dangerous offender designation, directing a new sentencing hearing before a different judge.

Because no judge had yet been assigned to the new sentencing hearing, the defendant sought clarity on bail jurisdiction.

The Superior Court held that under section 523(2)(a) of the Criminal Code, since the defendant was currently being tried before 'a court' but no specific judge was conducting the trial, jurisdiction for the bail application rested with the Superior Court of Justice generally until a specific judge was assigned.

During a trial for first degree murder, the accused applied for directed verdicts of acquittal at the close of the Crown's case.

The Crown's case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence, including cell tower data and security video, to place the accused at the scene of the shooting or assisting the shooters.

The court dismissed the directed verdict applications, finding sufficient evidence for a properly instructed jury to convict.

The court also ruled on several jury charge issues, declining to instruct the jury on co-principal liability, abetting, or the common unlawful purpose doctrine for second degree murder, and opting to provide an expanded instruction on circumstantial evidence.

The accused, charged with first degree murder, brought a motion to sit at counsel table rather than in the prisoner's dock during their trial.

The Crown opposed the motion, arguing for the traditional placement in the dock due to security concerns and to allow the jury a better view for identification purposes.

The court reviewed the conflicting jurisprudence on the issue and concluded that there is no presumption regarding an accused's placement.

Applying a case-by-case analysis based on fair trial interests and courtroom security, the court found that sitting at counsel table enhances communication with counsel and avoids the risk of prejudice associated with the dock.

Given the accused's good behaviour during prior court appearances and the lack of specific security risks, the motion was granted.

The applicants, charged with first-degree murder, applied to sever their trial from a co-accused who had recently been extradited to Canada and was unready for the scheduled trial.

The applicants had been awaiting trial for nearly 30 months and had caused no delay.

The Crown opposed severance, citing the societal interest in a joint trial.

The court granted the application, finding that the applicants' right to a trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter outweighed the public interest in a joint trial, especially given the Crown's duty to mitigate delay caused by discrete events like extradition.

The offender was convicted of second-degree murder for shooting the victim and subsequently dismembering and destroying the body.

The Crown sought a 23-year period of parole ineligibility, while the defence sought 14 years with a further reduction for Charter breaches related to prolonged administrative segregation.

The court found the egregious post-offence conduct and the offender's extensive criminal record warranted a 20-year parole ineligibility period.

The court also found that the offender's prolonged administrative segregation violated ss. 7 and 12 of the Charter, granting a 3-year reduction.

The final period of parole ineligibility was fixed at 17 years.

During a retrial for first-degree murder, the accused applied to reopen the evidentiary portion of the trial to cross-examine the Crown's principal witness, a Vetrovec witness, about new second-degree murder charges laid against him after he testified.

The court applied the Hayward test and dismissed the application, finding the proposed fresh evidence was not sufficiently relevant to material issues, would cause undue delay, and was unnecessary given the witness's character had already been thoroughly impeached at trial.

The applicant, on trial for first-degree murder, sought disclosure of police records relating to recent murder charges against a key Crown witness.

The records were held by a different police force and Crown office than those prosecuting the applicant.

The court determined that the third-party records regime under O'Connor applied, rather than the first-party Stinchcombe regime, because the prosecuting Crown did not have possession of the records and they were not 'obviously relevant' to the applicant's case.

Applying the O'Connor test, the court found the records were likely relevant to the witness's credibility and ordered their production to the defence.

The Crown brought a pre-trial motion seeking to admit circumstantial evidence to challenge the accused's narrative of how he came into possession of the handgun used in the Eaton Centre shooting.

The Crown sought to introduce evidence linking a third party to a prior shooting where the same gun was used, and letters suggesting the accused knew the third party.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the suggested links were too speculative and that admitting the evidence to challenge the accused's credibility on a critical issue would be unfair and unreasonable.

The accused, charged with murder and other offences arising from a shooting at the Toronto Eaton Centre, brought a Corbett application to exclude reference to a prior sexual assault conviction and the fact he was on bail at the time of the shooting.

The Crown argued the full record was relevant to the accused's diagnosis of Antisocial Personality Disorder and his credibility.

The court granted the application, finding that the accused's extensive admitted criminal history provided sufficient information for the jury to assess credibility and malingering, and that the sexual assault conviction and bail status would be unnecessarily prejudicial.

The Crown brought an application for certiorari to set aside a preliminary inquiry judge's decision discharging the respondent on a charge of first degree murder.

The respondent was present during an armed robbery and shooting at a restaurant but did not directly participate in the robbery or the killing, though he did briefly assault one of the victims.

The reviewing court found that the preliminary inquiry judge did not commit jurisdictional error in concluding there was insufficient evidence to commit the respondent for murder under either party liability or constructive murder provisions.

The application was dismissed.

The accused, a Black man charged with first-degree murder, sought to challenge prospective jurors for cause regarding racial bias.

The accused requested that the challenge be decided by rotating triers and that the unsworn jury panel be excluded from the courtroom during the process.

The accused explicitly declined to apply under s. 640(2.1) of the Criminal Code, relying instead on the court's inherent common law jurisdiction.

The court reviewed the 2008 amendments to the Criminal Code and conflicting jurisprudence on whether trial judges retain inherent jurisdiction to exclude unsworn jurors when rotating triers are used.

The court concluded that applications to exclude jurors to preserve impartiality fall under s. 640(2.1), which mandates static triers if granted.

However, the court declined to make an order under s. 640(2.1) and further declined to exercise any residual common law discretion to exclude the panel, finding the grounds advanced did not warrant exclusion.

The challenge for cause was ordered to proceed with rotating triers and without excluding unsworn jurors.

The accused brought a constitutional application challenging the exclusion of common-law spouses from the spousal incompetency rule in s. 4 of the Canada Evidence Act and the related common law.

The court considered whether the distinction between married spouses and common-law partners violated s. 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Applying evolving equality jurisprudence following Quebec (Attorney General) v. A., the court held that denying common-law partners the protections afforded to married spouses constituted discrimination based on marital status.

The court further concluded that the infringement was not justified under s. 1 of the Charter because excluding common-law spouses was not rationally connected to the objective of protecting conjugal confidences and marital harmony.

The appropriate remedy was to read common-law spouses into s. 4 of the Canada Evidence Act and the common law spousal incompetence rule.

The Crown brought a motion seeking to introduce evidence from several witnesses that would disclose prior criminal conduct and other discreditable acts by the accused in a murder prosecution.

The Crown argued the evidence was relevant to motive, the relationship between the accused and witnesses, and consciousness of guilt, including allegations that the accused plotted to eliminate a key witness.

The court applied the established rule that evidence of disreputable conduct is presumptively inadmissible unless its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect.

The court held that most of the proposed evidence formed part of the narrative explaining the motive and relationships surrounding the alleged homicide and was therefore admissible with limiting instructions.

Certain evidence, including alleged assaults on a spouse, buried firearms, and an ante‑mortem statement attributed to the deceased, was excluded as marginally relevant and of questionable probative value.