Laura M. Day

The plaintiffs brought a motion to approve a settlement for a minor plaintiff's personal injury claim.

The court dismissed the motion, citing two primary concerns: the minor's litigation guardian (his father) was also acting as counsel for the plaintiffs, violating Rules 7.05(3) and 15.01, which require a litigation guardian to be represented by a lawyer.

Additionally, the litigation guardian was also an FLA claimant, creating a potential conflict of interest as he had a personal stake in the settlement allocation, which was not adequately explained.

The court emphasized the necessity of independent legal representation and a dispassionate assessment to protect the minor's best interests.

The moving party, a corporate defendant, brought a motion for a complex protective order before producing an affidavit of documents or reviewing its own relevant documents.

The plaintiff consented, but the self-represented co-defendant did not respond.

The court dismissed the motion, finding it premature and the proposed order over-broad.

The court noted that the moving party failed to identify specific harm associated with the disclosure of particular documents and relied on sweeping generalizations instead of the existing protections under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The appellants appealed orders of the Superior Court dismissing their motions to set aside a settlement order approving a settlement of their son George Lochner's claim for damages arising from a police altercation in which he was tasered.

The appellants lacked standing to challenge the settlement order as they were not parties or persons affected by it within the meaning of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Their second motion was an abuse of process as it attempted to re-litigate the same standing issue.

The appellants' proposed fresh evidence regarding George Lochner's taser injuries was inadmissible as it could not have affected the outcome of the motions.

The appeals were dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents and the Public Guardian and Trustee.

The Public Guardian and Trustee (PGT) and the defendant police officers brought a motion seeking a declaration that Lina and Paul Lochner lacked standing to challenge a court-approved settlement concerning George Lochner, a party under disability.

The court found that Lina and Paul had received courtesy notice of the settlement approval motion but were not legally entitled to notice, nor were they "affected persons" under Rule 37.14(1) as their proprietary or economic rights were not impacted.

The court granted the PGT's motion, declaring Lina and Paul had no standing, and awarded costs against them due to their unmeritorious arguments and disruptive courtroom behaviour.

The court also initiated a process under Rule 2.1.02 to summarily dismiss Lina and Paul's own motion to set aside the settlement judgment as an abuse of process.

The defendants, the City of Mississauga and Peel Condominium Corporation #89 (PCC89), brought motions for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action for injuries sustained in a trip and fall on a municipal boulevard.

The City argued the boulevard was in reasonable repair or that it lacked knowledge of the non-repair and took reasonable steps.

PCC89 argued it was not an occupier of the municipal property and had no liability.

The plaintiff contended both defendants owed a duty of care and that genuine issues for trial existed regarding the hole's size, the defendants' occupier status, and the reasonableness of their inspection policies.

The court dismissed both summary judgment motions, finding that there were genuine issues requiring a trial, including the actual size of the hole, the extent of PCC89's maintenance and control over the boulevard, and the reasonableness of the City's inspection policy.

The plaintiff brought an unsuccessful summary judgment motion in a wrongful dismissal action.

The parties made written submissions on costs.

The defendant sought costs of $88,332.37 payable immediately, while the plaintiff argued costs should be reserved to the trial judge.

The court held that because the plaintiff was unemployed and the motion materials would be useful at trial, ordering immediate payment of significant costs would impede access to justice.

Costs of the motion were reserved to the trial judge.

The applicant, a self-represented individual, sought a declaration that a one-year trespass notice barring him from attending municipal council meetings violated his Charter rights.

The municipality issued the notice following an incident where the applicant questioned a councillor and refused to stop videotaping.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the trespass notice infringed the applicant's freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter.

The court held that the complete ban was not minimally impairing and could not be justified under s. 1, as there were less intrusive means to maintain order, such as expelling him from specific meetings if he became disruptive.

The application was allowed and the trespass notice was declared invalid.

Following an 18‑day personal injury trial and subsequent judgment, the court issued supplementary reasons addressing calculation of net past income loss damages and the costs award.

The court interpreted ss. 267.3, 267.5, and 267.8 of the Insurance Act together with s. 3 of the Negligence Act and held that statutory accident benefits deductions must be applied after apportionment of liability and contributory negligence.

After accounting for accident benefit credits and the plaintiff’s 10% contributory negligence, the municipal defendants’ liability for past income loss was fixed at $50,292.50 plus prejudgment interest.

The court also determined the scope of recoverable costs following a prior appeal that set aside the first trial, permitting recovery of preparation costs for the first trial but excluding the trial costs themselves.

Substantial indemnity costs were awarded from the date following a Rule 49 offer to settle.