Joseph Lin

The Minister of Public and Business Service Delivery, operating the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund, sought to recover pre-arbitration expenses from two insurers who had accepted priority for Statutory Accident Benefits claims without proceeding to arbitration.

The insurers argued that the Fund was required to arbitrate the dispute and that pre-arbitration expenses were not recoverable.

The Superior Court of Justice held that the 'proper case' exception allowed the Fund to seek restitution in court because there was no dispute over the payment of benefits to arbitrate.

The court found that the insurers were unjustly enriched by the Fund's investigative work and ordered them to reimburse the Fund for its pre-arbitration expenses.

The appellant appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision denying her claim for catastrophic impairment and income replacement benefits following a 2015 motor vehicle accident.

The Tribunal had found that the accident was not a necessary cause of her psychological impairment and that a subsequent 2018 volleyball injury was an intervening event.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no extricable errors of law in the Tribunal's assessment of causation, pre-existing injuries, or the intervening event.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following its August 15, 2024 decision.

The parties resolved the costs of the appeal and underlying prejudgment interest motions by consent.

The respondent agreed to pay the appellants an all-inclusive amount of $60,000 for appeal and motion costs.

The appellants appealed a trial judge's prejudgment interest order, arguing errors in applying statutory rates and discretion under the Courts of Justice Act.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred by misapplying the presumptive 5% rate for non-pecuniary damages, misconstruing the purpose of non-pecuniary damages, and misinterpreting "market interest rates" by equating them with statutory prejudgment rates.

The trial judge also improperly rejected evidence of the insurer's and appellants' actual investment returns.

The appeal was allowed, and the prejudgment interest rate for both non-pecuniary and past pecuniary damages was increased to 8.46%.

The Estate of the insured brought a summary judgment motion to determine whether an Excluded Driver Endorsement (OPCF 28A) was valid, thereby excluding coverage for the insured's daughter under her parents' Intact insurance policy.

The daughter was driving her father's vehicle when she was involved in a collision with the plaintiff.

The plaintiff's insurer, Commonwell, argued the endorsement was invalid because it was not proven that the daughter signed it or had notice of it.

The court held that the endorsement was valid, finding that the insured parents understood and agreed to the exclusion, and that notice to or signature by the excluded driver is not a legal requirement under the Insurance Act.

Certas Home and Auto Insurance Company appealed an arbitration decision regarding loss transfer indemnification from Intact Insurance Company for statutory accident benefits paid to an insured.

The arbitrator found Certas had grossly mishandled the claim by failing to follow its own adjusting plan and continuing benefits despite medical opinions and the insured's completion of vocational training.

The Superior Court of Justice upheld the arbitrator's decision, finding no palpable and overriding error in the arbitrator's conclusion that Certas grossly mismanaged the claim, thereby limiting Intact's indemnification obligation.

In a dental malpractice action, the plaintiffs sought to have two experts accompany their counsel at the examination for discovery of the defendant dentist, and requested a ruling that these experts could still testify at trial.

The court permitted the plaintiffs' counsel to be accompanied by a specialist expert, but not a general dentist, to assist with highly technical subject matter.

However, the court declined to rule that the specialist could still testify at trial, warning that acting as part of the advocacy team at discovery would likely compromise the expert's objectivity and non-partisanship required for trial testimony.

The appellant insurer denied third-party liability coverage to the owner of an ATV after his son, who held only a G1 licence, was involved in a serious accident while driving the ATV on a highway.

The motion judge found that the owner had only permitted his son to drive on a specific lane he mistakenly believed was not a highway, and did not permit him to drive on the highway where the accident occurred.

The motion judge concluded the owner was not in breach of Statutory Condition 4(1) at the time of the incident, and alternatively granted relief from forfeiture.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's factual findings regarding the scope of permission granted, and dismissed the appeal.

This appeal arose from a priority dispute between insurance companies concerning accident benefits coverage following a motor vehicle accident.

The appellant, Trafalgar Insurance Company, appealed an arbitration decision that found the injured party was not insured by Economical Insurance Company and not entitled to Statutory Accident Benefits from them.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the arbitrator's findings that the vehicle in question was not an 'owned automobile' under Economical's standard Ontario Garage Policy (OAP 4) because its use (leased to a rental company) was outside the scope of the insured's business and was specifically excluded by the policy.

The court also affirmed that section 233(2) of the Insurance Act did not apply as the issue was the vehicle's insured status, not a breach of contract or misrepresentation.

The appellants, Trafalgar Insurance and Economical Insurance, appealed an arbitrator's decision in a priority dispute regarding statutory accident benefits.

The arbitrator had found that Arch Insurance was not the insurer of the vehicle involved in the accident because the vehicle was not owned or leased by Arch's named insured, despite being mistakenly listed on a fleet schedule.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error or error of law in the arbitrator's conclusion that the vehicle did not qualify as a 'described vehicle' under the OPCF 21A endorsement.

A related costs appeal was also dismissed as premature.

The applicant insurer appealed an arbitrator's decision in a loss transfer dispute regarding priority for statutory accident benefits.

The claimant was injured while driving a rental vehicle provided by the respondent insurer as a temporary substitute vehicle for more than 30 days.

The court held that the 30-day limit for rental vehicles under section 2.2.4 of the Ontario Automobile Policy (O.A.P.1) does not apply to temporary substitute vehicles under section 2.2.2.

The court also upheld the arbitrator's finding that the claimant's submission of an OCF-1 form to the respondent constituted a valid choice of insurer under section 268(4) of the Insurance Act.

The appeal was dismissed.

Intact Insurance Company appealed an arbitrator's decision that found a motorcycle passenger and driver were spouses under the Insurance Act, obliging Intact to pay accident benefits.

The passenger was in a committed five-year relationship with the driver but maintained a separate residence and was still married to another individual.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding the arbitrator committed an extricable error of law by applying family law principles to the definition of 'spouse' for insurance purposes and by failing to adhere to the bright-line test requiring parties to have lived together in the same residence for three years to be considered spouses under the Insurance Act.

The court applied a correctness standard of review.

Northbridge General Insurance Corporation appealed an arbitrator's decision that designated it as the priority insurer for accident benefits following a motor vehicle accident.

Northbridge contended that Co-Operators General Insurance Company failed to provide proper notice under section 3(1) of Ontario Regulation 283/95, thereby precluding Co-Operators from asserting Northbridge's priority.

The Superior Court of Justice applied a reasonableness standard of review to the arbitrator's decision, consistent with The Dominion of Canada General Insurance Company v. Unifund Assurance Company.

The court upheld the arbitrator's finding that Co-Operators' initial failure to notify Northbridge directly under section 3(1) was not fatal, as Intact Insurance Company subsequently provided notice to Northbridge under section 10(1) of the Regulation.

The court emphasized the practical realities of priority investigations and the public policy of ensuring timely benefit payments.

The appeal was dismissed, and Northbridge was ordered to pay costs to both respondents.

The plaintiff sued an imaging clinic and a radiologist for medical negligence, alleging a failure to diagnose breast cancer from mammograms and ultrasounds conducted in 2008 and 2009.

The court found no evidence that the clinic's imaging fell below the standard of care, noting that the plaintiff's dense breast tissue made imaging difficult but diagnostic.

The court also dismissed the claim against the radiologist, finding that his interpretation of the imaging was a reasonable exercise of clinical judgment and that he could not be judged retrospectively with the benefit of hindsight.

The action was dismissed.

Belair Insurance Company appealed an arbitrator's decision that found it 100% at fault for indemnifying State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company for statutory accident benefits under a loss transfer dispute.

The Superior Court of Justice reviewed the arbitrator's interpretation of the Fault Determination Rules, specifically rules 12(5) and 13(2), under a reasonableness standard.

The arbitrator had concluded that Rule 13(2) did not apply to incidents involving vehicles travelling in opposite directions in adjacent lanes at an uncontrolled intersection, as such scenarios were covered by Rule 12(5).

The court upheld the arbitrator's interpretation, finding it reasonable and consistent with the legislative scheme's purpose of providing an expedient method for fault determination among insurers.

The appeal was dismissed.

An appeal concerning whether the abuse of process doctrine prevented Federated from leading evidence that a driver was insured at the time of an accident, despite a prior conviction for driving without insurance.

The driver's vehicle had been insured by Intact, which claimed it had cancelled the policy before the accident.

A priority dispute between the insurers proceeded to arbitration.

The arbitrator permitted Federated to lead evidence that Intact had not followed required cancellation procedures, meaning the driver was in fact insured.

The application judge reversed this decision, but the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and restored the arbitrator's order, holding that the abuse of process doctrine did not prevent relitigation in these circumstances.

The plaintiff successfully defended two summary judgment motions brought by the defendants, The City of Mississauga and Peel Condominium Corporation #89.

The plaintiff sought costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The defendants argued against the costs, citing a last-minute change in the plaintiff's discovery evidence and excessive hours billed by plaintiff's counsel.

The court found the plaintiff fully successful and entitled to costs, dismissing the defendants' arguments regarding the plaintiff's testimony.

While acknowledging the complexity, the court found the total hours billed by two counsel to be excessive.

The court fixed costs at $8,000 all-inclusive against each defendant, applying Rule 57.01(1) and principles of fairness and reasonableness in costs awards.

The defendants, the City of Mississauga and Peel Condominium Corporation #89 (PCC89), brought motions for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action for injuries sustained in a trip and fall on a municipal boulevard.

The City argued the boulevard was in reasonable repair or that it lacked knowledge of the non-repair and took reasonable steps.

PCC89 argued it was not an occupier of the municipal property and had no liability.

The plaintiff contended both defendants owed a duty of care and that genuine issues for trial existed regarding the hole's size, the defendants' occupier status, and the reasonableness of their inspection policies.

The court dismissed both summary judgment motions, finding that there were genuine issues requiring a trial, including the actual size of the hole, the extent of PCC89's maintenance and control over the boulevard, and the reasonableness of the City's inspection policy.

This case involves an appeal from an arbitrator's decision in an insurance priority dispute.

The arbitrator found that an employer (insured by Old Republic) made a vehicle available for an employee's regular use at the time of an accident, requiring Old Republic to pay statutory accident benefits.

The employee, a short-haul truck driver, was injured while driving his mother-in-law's car to work, but had permission to sleep in a company truck the night before a haul.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed Old Republic's appeal, affirming the arbitrator's decision.

The court also clarified that correctness is the appropriate standard of review for such priority decisions where there is no significant factual issue to be decided.

The plaintiff was bitten by the defendant's dog, losing part of her thumb, after the dog suffered a seizure and fell into a ditch while the plaintiff was walking it.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the action, arguing the plaintiff was in 'possession' of the dog and thus an 'owner' precluded from claiming compensation under the Dog Owners' Liability Act.

The plaintiff brought a cross-motion for summary judgment on liability.

The court held that novel questions of law can be decided on summary judgment.

The court found the plaintiff was not in 'possession' of the dog as she did not exercise dominion and control similar to an owner.

The court found the defendant strictly liable under the Act, dismissed the negligence claim as the injuries were not reasonably foreseeable, and found no contributory negligence by the plaintiff.

The defendant's motion was dismissed and the plaintiff's cross-motion was granted, with the action to proceed to trial on damages only.