Joseph Lin

Intact Insurance Company appealed an arbitrator's decision in a priority dispute over statutory accident benefits.

The claimant was injured in a vehicle driven by his father, whose insurance policy with Intact had been cancelled for non-payment prior to the accident.

The father was subsequently convicted of operating a motor vehicle without insurance.

The arbitrator ruled that Federated Insurance Company could relitigate the father's uninsured status, finding the abuse of process doctrine did not apply.

On appeal, the Superior Court of Justice overturned the arbitrator's decision, holding that under s. 22.1 of the Evidence Act, the conviction was proof of the offence absent evidence to the contrary, which Federated failed to provide.

The court found the arbitrator erred in law by misapplying the abuse of process doctrine and its exceptions.

Two appeals were heard together regarding whether the equitable doctrine of laches can defeat a first party insurer's loss-transfer claim under s. 275 of the Insurance Act.

In both cases, the first party insurers delayed several years before requesting indemnification from the second party insurers.

The Court of Appeal held that the defence of laches cannot be invoked against a statutory loss-transfer claim, as it is a claim for legal relief subject to the Limitations Act, 2002, which no longer contains a laches-saving provision.

Furthermore, even if laches were available, the second party insurers failed to demonstrate acquiescence or actual prejudice.

Lombard's appeal was dismissed and TD's appeal was allowed.

The applicant insurer appealed an arbitrator’s decision barring its statutory loss transfer claim under s. 275 of the Insurance Act on the basis of the equitable doctrine of laches due to delayed notice.

The court held that loss transfer rights under s. 275 are purely statutory and do not attract equitable relief, making the doctrine of laches inapplicable.

Even if laches could apply, the arbitrator’s finding was unreasonable because mere delay without acquiescence or demonstrated prejudice cannot establish the defence.

The respondent failed to prove that the delay impaired its investigation or caused prejudice.

The appeal was allowed and the applicant insurer was permitted to pursue the loss transfer claim.

An insurer applied for a determination of priority between automobile insurers under s. 277 of the Insurance Act following a motor vehicle accident involving a rented vehicle driven by an employee on business travel.

The employee rented the vehicle personally using a corporate credit card issued by his employer and was later reimbursed.

The applicant insurer argued that the employer was the de facto lessee and therefore its insurer should respond first to the third‑party liability claim.

The court held that the plain meaning of "lessee" under s. 277 refers to the person who entered into the rental agreement with the car rental company.

Because privity of contract existed between the employee and the rental company, the employee was the lessee and his personal insurer ranked first in priority.

The plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident and sued the driver who rear-ended her, as well as the municipality and its bus driver.

Following discoveries, the rear-ending driver admitted liability and the parties agreed to dismiss the action against the municipality and its driver without costs.

Two years later, the municipality brought a motion seeking costs against the co-defendant and the plaintiff.

The court dismissed the municipality's motion, finding it was reasonable for the co-defendant to wait until after discoveries to admit full liability.

The court awarded costs to the plaintiff for having to respond to the unnecessary motion.

Two first party insurers paid statutory accident benefits to their insureds and made requests for loss transfer from second party insurers.

The second party insurers refused to pay, and the first party insurers initiated arbitration proceedings.

The second party insurers argued the claims were barred by the Limitations Act, 2002.

The Court of Appeal held that the two-year limitation period for loss transfer claims begins to run the day after the first party insurer makes a demand for loss transfer, not from the date the second party insurer definitively refuses to indemnify.

The appeals by the first party insurers were dismissed.

The plaintiff brought a post‑trial motion seeking to set aside a civil jury verdict arising from a rear‑end motor vehicle collision, arguing there was no evidence to support the jury’s apportionment of liability and damages.

The jury had found both parties negligent, assigning 90% fault to the plaintiff and 10% to the defendant, and awarded damages subject to that apportionment.

The court reviewed the limited circumstances in which a trial judge may refuse to accept a jury verdict, namely where the verdict is devoid of evidentiary support or legally incapable of supporting judgment.

The court held that the plaintiff’s Highway Traffic Act conviction and the evidence presented at trial constituted some evidence capable of supporting the jury’s findings.

The motion to set aside the verdict and order a new trial or substitute judgment was dismissed.

Following a decision dismissing the applicant's claim for statutory accident benefits for overseas airline tickets, the insurer sought its expenses for the arbitration proceeding.

The arbitrator applied the criteria under section 12(2) of Ontario Regulation 664 and found that the insurer was completely successful.

The arbitrator rejected the applicant's argument that her modest means should preclude a costs award, noting that only the prescribed criteria could be considered.

The insurer was awarded $1,875.29 in expenses.

The applicant, who was injured in a motor vehicle accident, sought a rehabilitation benefit under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule for the cost of two round-trip airline tickets to India for herself and her husband.

She argued the trip would provide a therapeutic environment.

The arbitrator dismissed the application, applying the ejusdem generis rule to find that airline tickets for visiting family and friends do not fall within the same class as the specific rehabilitation benefits contemplated by the Schedule.

The claims for interest and expenses were also dismissed or deferred.

The appellant brokerage firm suspended all activity in the respondents' accounts pursuant to a contractual refusal clause, citing concerns over the principal's criminal record and potential regulatory scrutiny.

The trial judge found the refusal clause ambiguous, implied a requirement for reasonable notice, and awarded damages to the respondents for disrupted transactions.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the refusal clause was unambiguous and permitted the broker to refuse instructions without notice when acting in good faith for its own protection.

The court found that implying a notice requirement contradicted the plain language of the agreement and the commercial reality of a broker's gatekeeper function.

The damages award was set aside.

The applicant, who sustained catastrophic impairments in a motor vehicle accident, sought interim attendant care benefits for a period of hospitalization and interest on overdue attendant care benefits.

The arbitrator dismissed the claim for interim benefits, finding that the applicant failed to establish a prima facie case, urgency, or a blatant disregard for the Insurance Act by the insurer.

However, the arbitrator ordered the insurer to pay interest on previously agreed attendant care benefits, as the payment was overdue.