Mark Fahmy

The applicant, Jack Densmore, facing sexual assault and voyeurism charges, sought disclosure of journalistic records from The Hamilton Spectator related to the complainant and other witnesses.

The Spectator, supported by the Crown, objected, claiming journalistic privilege under the Journalistic Sources Protection Act (JSPA) and the Canada Evidence Act (CEA), and arguing the Mills regime applied.

The court analyzed the applicability of the JSPA (CEA branch), Mills, and O'Connor regimes, and the Vice Media framework.

The court found that the journalistic records were privileged under the JSPA (CEA branch) as the sources were promised anonymity, and the applicant failed to demonstrate reasonable necessity or that the public interest in disclosure outweighed the public interest in preserving confidentiality.

Alternatively, the court found the Mills regime applied, and the applicant failed to establish the records were likely relevant or necessary in the interests of justice.

Consequently, the application for disclosure was dismissed.

The applicant, convicted of sexual assault and sexual interference, sought a panel review of a bail judge's decision denying bail pending appeal.

The bail judge had denied bail on the tertiary ground, finding that detention was necessary in the public interest.

The applicant argued that the bail judge erred in assessing alleged misapprehensions of evidence, in treating the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and in requiring evidence from trial counsel for the ineffective assistance claim.

The court found no arguable material errors of fact or law by the bail judge, affirming that the bail judge's assessment of the strength of the appeal grounds was appropriate and that a credible evidentiary foundation is required for ineffective assistance claims, even at the bail stage.

The application for review was dismissed.

The appellant, convicted of sexual assault and sexual interference against a child, applied for bail pending appeal.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the application, finding that while the appeal was not frivolous, the appellant failed to demonstrate that his detention was not necessary in the public interest.

The court weighed the high enforceability interest due to the seriousness of the crime against the weak reviewability interest, concluding that a reasonable member of the public would lose confidence in the administration of justice if the appellant were released.

The appeal was ordered to be expedited.

The plaintiff, Can Duc Diep, advanced $500,000 to the defendant, Hien Cong Pham.

Diep claimed this was a loan, while Pham asserted it was an investment in a magnetic generator venture that ultimately failed.

Diep brought a cross-motion for summary judgment to recover the funds, and Pham brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the action against him.

The court found that the advance was a loan, supported by a written loan agreement, a "loan" notation on the cheque, and Pham's conduct, including a partial repayment and a statement about selling his house to repay the debt.

The court rejected Pham's arguments for rectification of the agreement and his claim that the advance was an investment, noting that Pham never personally owned the shares he purported to sell.

The court also determined that granting summary judgment on the loan issue was appropriate, despite a pending fraudulent conveyance claim against Pham and his wife, Huong Thi Duong, as the issues were distinct and already bifurcated.

The Applicants sought a direction for funds from a property sale and costs.

Respondent Amrita Randhawa Gill moved to strike portions of affidavits based on settlement privilege.

The court dismissed the motion to strike, finding no settlement privilege for the emails in question regarding the Applicants' claims for monies owed or ownership interest.

The court also converted the entire Application into an Action due to material facts in dispute and credibility issues that could not be resolved in an application.

The plaintiffs and defendants brought cross-motions for summary judgment in an action concerning advances totalling $792,154 made by the plaintiffs to the defendants.

The plaintiffs argued the advances were personal loans, while the defendants argued they were payments made on behalf of a corporation as interim bridge financing.

The court found that the conflicting evidence, particularly regarding credibility and the characterization of the advances, created a genuine issue requiring a trial.

Both motions for summary judgment were dismissed, and the motion judge remained seized of the action for trial.

The accused, Wayne Isaacs and Azhar Hussain, brought an application under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, seeking a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay in their criminal fraud trial.

The court applied the framework established in R. v. Jordan, considering total delay, defence delay, exceptional circumstances (discrete events and case complexity), and transitional provisions.

The court found significant defence-caused delay due to issues with retaining counsel and bringing necessary applications.

While the total delay exceeded the presumptive ceiling, the case was deemed particularly complex, and the Crown had taken reasonable steps to expedite the matter under the pre-Jordan legal framework.

The court found no evidence of actual prejudice related to the delay.

Consequently, the motions to stay proceedings were denied for both accused.

The accused, Wayne Isaacs and Azhar Hussain, applied to adjourn their jury trial, citing insufficient time for counsel preparation, lack of retainer, and funding issues, despite a previously agreed-upon trial date.

The Crown initially opposed the adjournment but conceded its necessity.

The court granted the adjournment, acknowledging the practical difficulties and the accused's s. 11(b) Charter concerns, and set new dates for pre-trial motions and the trial.

The plaintiff successfully defended two summary judgment motions brought by the defendants, The City of Mississauga and Peel Condominium Corporation #89.

The plaintiff sought costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The defendants argued against the costs, citing a last-minute change in the plaintiff's discovery evidence and excessive hours billed by plaintiff's counsel.

The court found the plaintiff fully successful and entitled to costs, dismissing the defendants' arguments regarding the plaintiff's testimony.

While acknowledging the complexity, the court found the total hours billed by two counsel to be excessive.

The court fixed costs at $8,000 all-inclusive against each defendant, applying Rule 57.01(1) and principles of fairness and reasonableness in costs awards.

The defendants, the City of Mississauga and Peel Condominium Corporation #89 (PCC89), brought motions for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action for injuries sustained in a trip and fall on a municipal boulevard.

The City argued the boulevard was in reasonable repair or that it lacked knowledge of the non-repair and took reasonable steps.

PCC89 argued it was not an occupier of the municipal property and had no liability.

The plaintiff contended both defendants owed a duty of care and that genuine issues for trial existed regarding the hole's size, the defendants' occupier status, and the reasonableness of their inspection policies.

The court dismissed both summary judgment motions, finding that there were genuine issues requiring a trial, including the actual size of the hole, the extent of PCC89's maintenance and control over the boulevard, and the reasonableness of the City's inspection policy.

The appellant appealed a Master's partial summary judgment decision that declined to award the balance of the appellant's claim for financing and legal fees related to an HST dispute on a commercial property sale.

The Master had found that a trial was necessary to determine whether the appellant acted reasonably in refusing to provide an invoice dated as requested by the CRA, which led to the additional costs.

The Superior Court of Justice applied the standard of review from Hryniak v. Mauldin, finding no palpable and overriding error in the Master's decision, and dismissed the appeal.