John M. Freeman

This endorsement addresses costs following the dismissal of a medical negligence claim.

The plaintiffs, who were unsuccessful at trial, argued against a costs award due to their elderly age, poor health, and lack of assets.

The defendants, Bolton Medical Imaging Centres and Dr. K. Schneider, sought partial indemnity costs.

The court affirmed the general rule that costs follow the event, finding no exceptional circumstances to depart from this principle.

While acknowledging the plaintiffs' right to pursue the action, the court held they must bear the adverse costs consequences.

The court fixed the defendants' costs on a partial indemnity basis, reducing the amounts claimed by both defendants due to excessive hours for certain steps, particularly for Dr. Schneider's counsel.

The appellant appealed from a trial judge's order declaring that the respondent Mikhail Malkov was the sole beneficial owner of a property in Thornhill and requiring the appellant and her former husband to transfer all their right, title and interest in the property to Mikhail.

The trial judge had found that the appellant and her former husband held title to the property on a resulting trust in favour of Mikhail.

The sole ground of appeal was that the trial judge conducted the proceedings unfairly by refusing to allow the appellant to call a lawyer as a witness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly exercised her discretion in refusing to allow the reopening of the case.

The respondent wife brought a motion to consolidate a family law proceeding with a civil action commenced by her father-in-law regarding ownership of the matrimonial home, and to remove the applicant husband's counsel.

The court granted the consolidation, finding that the common issue of property ownership and the risk of inconsistent findings favoured combining the cases.

The court also ordered the removal of the husband's counsel, who also represented the father-in-law, because she had met directly with the represented wife without her counsel present, creating an appearance of impropriety and breaching the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Following two attendances related to applications concerning a limitation issue under the Real Property Limitations Act, the court determined that the matters would require viva voce evidence and should be heard with a related action.

The parties were invited to make written submissions on costs for the attendances.

Applying the discretionary principles governing costs under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court considered the conduct of the parties and the proportionality principle.

As the applications did not proceed on their merits and all parties contributed to the adjournments, the court concluded that no party should recover costs.

Each party was ordered to bear its own costs for the two appearances.

Following a four‑day family law trial on a motion to change child and spousal support obligations, the court determined the issue of costs.

The respondent had sought retroactive rescission of support arrears but was largely unsuccessful, while the applicant obtained a result closer to her final settlement offer.

Applying Rules 18 and 24 of the Family Law Rules, the court considered the parties’ offers to settle and their conduct throughout the litigation.

The court found the respondent engaged in unreasonable conduct, including failure to provide disclosure, abandoning earlier proceedings, and making unreasonably low settlement offers.

The applicant was therefore entitled to costs, with substantial indemnity costs awarded for work following her final offer to settle and partial indemnity costs for earlier stages.

The moving party brought a motion to change a 2004 support order seeking retroactive reduction of child and spousal support and rescission of significant arrears.

The court considered whether there had been a material change in circumstances under s. 37 of the Family Law Act, including alleged reductions in the payor’s income and increased income of the recipient.

The court found the payor’s evidence regarding reduced income unreliable and concluded his income remained approximately $45,000 annually.

However, the recipient’s increased income and the children ceasing to be dependants constituted material changes.

Applying principles governing retroactive variation and rescission of arrears, the court declined to grant retroactive relief prior to the date notice of variation was given due to delay, non‑disclosure, and blameworthy conduct by the payor.