Jeremy Syrtash

This ruling addresses a dispute between the plaintiffs and defendants regarding the wording of causation questions to be put to the jury in a medical negligence trial.

The plaintiffs sought "caused or contributed to" language and no particulars, arguing complexity and potential undermining of the verdict.

The defendants advocated for "but for" language and required particulars, citing clarity and the need for evidentiary foundation.

The court found that "but for" language should be used for causation questions, given the discrete nature of the alleged negligence of each defendant doctor.

Furthermore, the court ruled that the jury must provide particulars of their causation findings to ensure understanding of instructions and proper evidentiary basis, consistent with practices for standard of care particulars.

The appellants, a family, sued a hospital and medical professionals for medical malpractice after their son suffered a severe brain injury at birth.

The trial judge discharged the jury mid-trial and then dismissed the action.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal for Ontario found that the trial judge failed to provide adequate reasons for discharging the jury, which is a fundamental right.

The reasons were conclusory, did not explain which comments were prejudicial, or why corrective instructions would be insufficient.

The appellate court could not meaningfully review the decision.

Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered.

The plaintiffs brought a medical negligence action against several physicians, nurses, and a hospital, alleging that their negligence during the plaintiff mother's labour and delivery caused the infant plaintiff to suffer a severe hypoxic-ischemic brain injury resulting in cerebral palsy.

The plaintiffs alleged that an artificial rupture of membranes was negligently performed when the fetal head was high, causing a cord prolapse.

The court found that the defendant physicians and nurses met the standard of care, with the exception of one resident physician's failure to document the events, which was not causative.

The court also concluded that the plaintiffs failed to prove factual causation, as the clinical evidence at birth was inconsistent with the infant being completely deprived of oxygen for the 18 minutes following the cord prolapse.

The action was dismissed.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims arising from the birth of a child with spina bifida.

The defendants argued the mother's wrongful birth claim was statute-barred and the child's wrongful life claim disclosed no cause of action.

The court dismissed the motion regarding the wrongful birth claim, finding a genuine issue for trial regarding whether the limitation period was tolled due to the mother's reliance on the doctor's alleged misrepresentation that the ultrasound was clear.

The court granted the motion to dismiss the wrongful life claim, confirming settled law that a physician does not owe a duty of care to a future child for a lack of informed consent to the mother.

The plaintiff was successful on an unopposed motion to amend the statement of claim to substitute the names of previously unidentified defendants.

The defendant Torrecampo opposed the motion without evidence of prejudice, leading to unnecessary cross-examinations and wasted time.

The court awarded the plaintiff partial indemnity costs of $9,000 plus HST and disbursements, finding the amount reasonable and proportionate under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

During a medical malpractice trial, the defendants moved to strike the jury following the plaintiff's closing address.

The court found that plaintiff's counsel crossed the line many times, making numerous misstatements that rendered correction by an appropriate charge impossible.

Concluding that the plaintiff's closing address undermined the fairness of the trial process, the court discharged the jury and determined it would decide the issues of liability and damages itself.

The applicant sought an urgent case conference to establish supervised access to her children and to obtain a section 30 CLRA assessment.

The court denied the urgent motion, finding that the applicant failed to meet the urgency test, particularly given the long period of no contact with the children and the lack of evidence regarding available supervisory services or assessors during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court emphasized that the issues were not urgent as defined by the Notices to the Profession and lacked practical feasibility.

The applicant requested a reconsideration of a previous order denying an adjournment of a scheduled hearing.

The applicant's counsel provided compelling personal reasons for being unable to attend on short notice, and the respondent consented to the adjournment.

The Associate Chair granted the reconsideration and adjourned the hearing to mutually agreeable dates.

Following a successful medical malpractice trial resulting in a $5.3 million judgment for the plaintiffs, the court assessed costs.

The plaintiffs had beaten their $4.5 million offer to settle, entitling them to substantial indemnity costs from the date of the offer.

The court considered the complexity of the case, the extensive expert evidence required, and the proportionality of the costs to the recovery, ultimately fixing costs at $2,201,259 inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST.

Following a trial judgment in a medical malpractice action, the court issued supplementary reasons to address pre-judgment interest and adjustments to future pecuniary losses.

The parties reached an agreement on these issues, excluding costs.

The court issued an order revising the total judgment granted in favour of the plaintiffs to $5,568,393.00, inclusive of pre-judgment interest and adjusted future pecuniary losses.

The minor plaintiff suffered a severe hypoxic-ischemic brain injury at birth due to the admitted negligence of the defendant hospital's nurses in artificially rupturing the membranes.

The defendant conceded the breach of the standard of care and that it caused the plaintiff's ataxic hypotonic cerebral palsy, but argued her cognitive and behavioural issues were caused by genetically inherited ADHD.

The court rejected the genetic ADHD theory, finding the birth injury was the sole cause of all the plaintiff's physical, cognitive, and behavioural deficits.

The court awarded over $5.2 million in damages, including $250,000 for general damages, $1.88 million for future loss of income, and extensive future care costs for therapies, supported independent living, and home modifications.

This costs endorsement followed two motions heard on August 29, 2016.

The defendant solicitors were successful in their motion for disclosure of a litigation file and in opposing the plaintiffs' cross-motion to strike a limitation period defence.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs to the defendant solicitors for both motions, totaling $12,607 for their motion and $2,700.12 plus HST for the plaintiffs' cross-motion.

The decision included deductions and offsets for costs related to the cross-examination of an affiant, as per Rule 39.02(4).

The plaintiffs brought an action for solicitor negligence against their former lawyers.

Two motions were heard: the defendants' motion for a further and better affidavit of documents, and the plaintiffs' cross-motion to strike paragraphs from the statement of defence pleading a limitation period defence.

The court dismissed the plaintiffs' motion to strike, finding the limitation defence was not plain and obvious to fail.

The court granted the defendants' motion for disclosure, ordering the plaintiffs to produce the complete litigation file from their subsequent lawyers, subject to privilege claims for non-parties.

The parties, former cohabitants, brought cross-motions following their separation.

The respondent sought spousal support, return of personal property, and interim disbursements for legal fees.

The applicant sought the sale of a jointly held condominium.

The court ordered the applicant to pay interim spousal support of $2,350 monthly, with the respondent responsible for condominium common expenses and insurance.

The applicant was also ordered to return all condominium contents she had unilaterally removed.

The condominium was ordered to be sold, with proceeds held in trust.

The respondent's request for interim disbursements was dismissed.

The court also provided directions for financial disclosure and questioning.