Carly Moore

The appellants, a family, sued a hospital and medical professionals for medical malpractice after their son suffered a severe brain injury at birth.

The trial judge discharged the jury mid-trial and then dismissed the action.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal for Ontario found that the trial judge failed to provide adequate reasons for discharging the jury, which is a fundamental right.

The reasons were conclusory, did not explain which comments were prejudicial, or why corrective instructions would be insufficient.

The appellate court could not meaningfully review the decision.

Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered.

The plaintiffs brought a medical negligence action against several physicians, nurses, and a hospital, alleging that their negligence during the plaintiff mother's labour and delivery caused the infant plaintiff to suffer a severe hypoxic-ischemic brain injury resulting in cerebral palsy.

The plaintiffs alleged that an artificial rupture of membranes was negligently performed when the fetal head was high, causing a cord prolapse.

The court found that the defendant physicians and nurses met the standard of care, with the exception of one resident physician's failure to document the events, which was not causative.

The court also concluded that the plaintiffs failed to prove factual causation, as the clinical evidence at birth was inconsistent with the infant being completely deprived of oxygen for the 18 minutes following the cord prolapse.

The action was dismissed.

During a medical malpractice trial, the defendants moved to strike the jury following the plaintiff's closing address.

The court found that plaintiff's counsel crossed the line many times, making numerous misstatements that rendered correction by an appropriate charge impossible.

Concluding that the plaintiff's closing address undermined the fairness of the trial process, the court discharged the jury and determined it would decide the issues of liability and damages itself.

The defendant Archdiocese moved to strike two paragraphs of the plaintiff's statement of claim, arguing they improperly pleaded evidence and similar facts regarding the abuser's conduct toward another victim.

The court found that pleading the history of charges and convictions was not pleading evidence, but rather material facts relevant to the institutional defendant's alleged failure to prevent abuse.

The court also held that pleading similar facts did not add undue complexity.

The motion was dismissed, save for a few words in one paragraph that improperly pleaded argument.