Brooke MacKenzie

The Lawyer appealed a Hearing Division decision permitting him to surrender his licence for professional misconduct involving the misappropriation of trust funds.

He argued the panel misapplied the exceptional circumstances test and should have imposed a suspension.

The Law Society cross-appealed, arguing the panel erred in not revoking the licence.

The Appeal Division dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal, finding no error in principle or palpable and overriding error.

The panel properly considered the Lawyer's experience of anti-Black racism and other mitigating factors, concluding they justified permission to resign but not a suspension.

The Law Society sought costs of $16,000 following the dismissal of the lawyer's appeal against findings of professional misconduct and the dismissal of the Law Society's cross-appeal on penalty.

The lawyer argued the costs were unreasonable and sought a reduction to $10,000, contending the cross-appeal was unwarranted.

The Tribunal found the Law Society's costs claim reasonable, noting it had already discounted its actual costs to reflect the unsuccessful cross-appeal.

The Tribunal ordered the lawyer to pay $16,000 in costs within 90 days.

The Law Society brought a motion for interlocutory suspensions of two lawyers, Ms. Nejal and Ms. Laguisan, due to irregularities in their firm's mixed trust account, specifically the failure to pay out mortgages on closing.

Ms. Nejal, the firm owner, was found to have failed to maintain books and records and there was strong evidence suggesting a lack of integrity and possible complicity in the mishandling of funds.

The Tribunal ordered an interlocutory suspension of Ms. Nejal's licence.

Ms. Laguisan, a newly-called associate who was left in charge during Ms. Nejal's prior suspension, was found to have been unaware of the delayed payouts and there was no evidence of dishonesty.

The motion for an interlocutory suspension of Ms. Laguisan's licence was dismissed.

The Law Society alleged that the respondent lawyer engaged in professional misconduct by failing to respond promptly and completely to requests for information and documents during an investigation.

The lawyer acknowledged the failure and the parties presented a joint submission on penalty.

The Tribunal accepted the joint submission, finding that the proposed penalty was not contrary to the public interest.

The lawyer's licence was suspended immediately pending compliance, to be followed by a one-month fixed suspension, and she was ordered to pay $1,500 in costs.

The Lawyer appealed a finding of professional misconduct and a nine-month suspension for acting without instructions to prevent her client's family from removing him from life support, filing a misleading affidavit, and acting in a conflict of interest.

The Law Society cross-appealed, seeking revocation of the Lawyer's licence.

The Appeal Division dismissed both appeals, finding that the hearing panel did not err in its application of the Groia test or the CUPE abuse of process doctrine, and that the nine-month suspension was an appropriate penalty given the seriousness of the misconduct.

International medical graduates appealed the dismissal of their breach of contract action against the Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons of Canada.

The appellants sought a declaration that they had passed the Royal College's 2020 qualifying psychiatry exam and were entitled to certification for independent practice.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding that the Royal College's 6.5% downward adjustment of exam scores was psychometrically justified.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge's reasons were insufficient because she failed to meaningfully engage with contradictory expert evidence, did not address the breach of contract claim, and did not analyze whether the parties had entered into an enforceable contract or whether the Royal College breached its duty of good faith performance.

The appeal was granted and a new trial was ordered.

The appellants, a family, sued a hospital and medical professionals for medical malpractice after their son suffered a severe brain injury at birth.

The trial judge discharged the jury mid-trial and then dismissed the action.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal for Ontario found that the trial judge failed to provide adequate reasons for discharging the jury, which is a fundamental right.

The reasons were conclusory, did not explain which comments were prejudicial, or why corrective instructions would be insufficient.

The appellate court could not meaningfully review the decision.

Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered.

The applicant, an orthopedic surgeon, sought judicial review of a decision by the Health Services Appeal and Review Board upholding OHIP's denial of certain billing claims.

The applicant argued the Board erred by admitting opinion evidence from an OHIP medical advisor who was not an independent expert.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Board reasonably exercised its broad statutory discretion to admit the evidence.

The court noted the witness, while not a traditional independent expert or a 'participant expert' under the civil rules, possessed relevant expertise as an employee of a party and her evidence was largely factual and explanatory.

This addendum to an appeal decision addresses the issue of costs.

Due to a lack of agreement between the parties regarding the costs incurred below, the Court of Appeal reserved the determination of costs to the trial judge hearing the second trial.

The applicant, a municipal councillor, sought judicial review of a city council decision and an integrity commissioner's report finding he engaged in sexual misconduct and obstructed an investigation.

The integrity commissioner recommended, and the city council imposed, a 90-day suspension of pay, a formal reprimand, and other remedial actions.

The Divisional Court upheld the integrity commissioner's findings and process, finding no breach of procedural fairness and that the investigation was properly commenced.

The court upheld most of the remedial actions imposed by the city council but quashed one measure that restricted the councillor to communicating with the public solely via his city email address, finding it overly broad and unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed an appeal in a medical negligence action, ordering a new trial.

The plaintiffs alleged delayed diagnosis of hydrocephalus in their child, leading to brain damage.

The trial jury found no breach of standard of care.

The appellate court found that the defendants' expert witness exceeded his role by opining on the credibility and reliability of the parties, thereby breaching his duty of independence.

The trial judge erred by not specifically instructing the jury to disregard these improper opinions and by failing to exclude them.

Despite the appellants' counsel not objecting at trial, the errors constituted a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice, tainting the jury's verdict and warranting a new trial.

The plaintiffs brought a medical malpractice action against the defendant obstetricians, alleging that their negligence caused the infant plaintiff to suffer a severe brain injury.

Following a jury trial, the jury found that the defendants breached the standard of care and that the breaches caused the injuries.

However, the trial judge refused to enter judgment on the verdict, finding that the jury's answers explaining how the breaches caused the injuries were insufficient and non-responsive.

The trial judge ordered a new trial.

The plaintiffs appealed, arguing the trial judge exceeded her jurisdiction.

The defendants cross-appealed, arguing the action should have been dismissed for lack of evidence on causation.

The Divisional Court dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal.

The majority held that the trial judge correctly concluded the jury's answers on causation were insufficient, as they merely repeated the breaches of the standard of care and failed to explain the causal link, leaving the central issue in doubt.

The respondent's husband died during a follow-up angiogram as part of a clinical trial.

The respondent sued the principal investigator, Dr. Strauss, for negligence and breach of fiduciary duty.

The jury found breach of standard of care but no causation in negligence.

The trial judge found breach of an ad hoc fiduciary duty and awarded damages, stating causation was removed from the analysis in the fiduciary context.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred by not examining causation in the fiduciary context.

The Court found no causal link between the alleged fiduciary breach and the loss, relying on the jury's finding on causation in the negligence claim, as the claims were based on substantially the same conduct.

The action was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a partial summary judgment order finding them liable for breach of contractual warranty and/or negligent representation arising from an inaccurate tree inventory attached to an Asset Purchase Agreement for the sale of tree farm assets.

The respondents claimed a shortfall of 83,106 saleable trees from the represented inventory of 236,341 trees.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the liability finding, holding that the tree inventory was not a contractual representation or warranty but rather a description of purchased assets.

The court found that the respondents had expressly agreed through due diligence inspection provisions that they had satisfied themselves as to the quantity and quality of plant material, precluding subsequent claims of misrepresentation.

Dina Barrese brought a motion to disqualify Niman Gelgoot & Associates (NGA) from acting as counsel for Dominic Barrese, her former husband.

Dina had contacted NGA twice (in 2016 and 2019) with the intention of retaining them, disclosing sensitive personal and confidential information.

NGA subsequently accepted Dominic as a client.

The court applied the MacDonald Estate v. Martin test, finding that a previous solicitor-client relationship existed between Dina and NGA, leading to an inference that confidential information was imparted.

NGA failed to discharge the difficult burden of proving no relevant information was imparted.

The court emphasized the appearance of impropriety, especially in family law disputes, and granted the disqualification order.

The applicant sought a stay of execution of the Court of Appeal's order pending disposition of its application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Court of Appeal had reinstated an arbitrator's multi-million-dollar damages award against the applicant for breach of a purchasing and management agreement relating to solar energy projects.

The applicant argued that the arbitrator exceeded his jurisdiction by awarding damages for lost profits.

The motion judge dismissed the stay application, finding that while the applicant met the threshold for a serious issue to be tried, the balance of convenience strongly favoured denial of the stay given the respondent's severe liquidity problems and existential risks if the stay was granted, as opposed to the applicant's substantial financial resources.

The appellant appealed an application judge's decision setting aside an arbitrator's award of $12.3 million in damages for lost profits.

The arbitrator had found that the respondent unlawfully terminated a purchase and management agreement by delivering a "Defunct Project Notice" in bad faith, thereby depriving the appellant of the value of awarded contracts.

The application judge had set aside the award, finding the arbitrator exceeded jurisdiction by awarding damages for lost profits, which were allegedly precluded by the contract's indemnity provisions.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the arbitrator acted within jurisdiction by interpreting and applying the substantive provisions of the contract, and that section 46(1)3 of the Arbitration Act permits only limited review for jurisdictional error, not review of the merits of the arbitrator's decision.

The respondents appealed an order from the Superior Court of Justice directing a new trial on the basis that the jury's answers on causation were fatally flawed.

The moving parties brought a motion to quash the appeal, arguing that the order was interlocutory and therefore only appealable to the Divisional Court with leave.

The Court of Appeal held that an order directing a new trial is interlocutory in nature, as it does not finally determine the substantive rights of the parties but rather requires another trial for that purpose.

The appeal was quashed and transferred to the Divisional Court.

The appellant insurer appealed an arbitrator's preliminary decision finding that the definition of 'minor injury' and the requirement for documented pre-existing conditions in the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule (SABS) violated section 15 of the Charter.

The Director's Delegate allowed the appeal, holding that the arbitrator erred by deciding the constitutional questions in a factual vacuum before determining whether the claimant actually suffered from chronic pain or had an undocumented pre-existing condition.

The arbitrator's order was rescinded, and the matter was remitted to arbitration for a determination on the merits of the claim for a psychological assessment.

The defendants, Dr. L., Dr. S., and Hospital A, brought motions to strike portions of the plaintiffs' statement of claim, for partial summary judgment, and to bifurcate the trial in a medical malpractice action.

The plaintiffs alleged negligence and breach of fiduciary duty by Dr. L. for treating J.O. despite knowing or ought to have known of her incompetence, and for failing to disclose past medical errors and complaints.

The court partially granted the motion to strike, removing allegations of failing to disclose general information and past medical errors/complaints to the College of Physicians and Surgeons, but allowed claims of negligence and breach of fiduciary duty based on Dr. L.'s knowledge of her own deficiencies to proceed.

The motions for partial summary judgment and bifurcation were dismissed.

The court also ordered J.O. to provide consent for police records related to a Family Law Act claim.