Elaine Strosberg

The Lawyer unsuccessfully appealed a decision finding professional misconduct and revoking his licence to practise law.

The Law Society sought costs of $6,265 for the appeal.

The Lawyer did not file responding submissions.

The Tribunal found the requested amount was well below the general range for appeals and was appropriate given the unmeritorious issues raised by the Lawyer.

Costs of $6,265 were awarded to the Law Society.

The Lawyer appealed a Hearing Division decision permitting him to surrender his licence for professional misconduct involving the misappropriation of trust funds.

He argued the panel misapplied the exceptional circumstances test and should have imposed a suspension.

The Law Society cross-appealed, arguing the panel erred in not revoking the licence.

The Appeal Division dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal, finding no error in principle or palpable and overriding error.

The panel properly considered the Lawyer's experience of anti-Black racism and other mitigating factors, concluding they justified permission to resign but not a suspension.

The appellant, whose licence to practise law was revoked for serious misconduct, brought a motion for a stay of the revocation order and a publication ban pending his appeal.

The Tribunal dismissed the stay motion, finding that while the appeal was not frivolous, there was no irreparable harm since the appellant was already suspended on an interlocutory basis, and the balance of convenience and public interest favoured maintaining the revocation.

The Tribunal also dismissed the motion for a publication ban, applying the Sherman Estate test and concluding that the appellant's privacy interests did not outweigh the fundamental importance of openness in professional regulation.

The Law Society brought a motion for an interlocutory order suspending or restricting the respondent lawyer's licence pending a conduct application.

The underlying application alleged the lawyer failed to respect human rights laws regarding a former employee and engaged in abusive communications and inappropriate social media postings.

The Tribunal found no evidence of current harm or significant risk of harm to the public or the administration of justice, noting that the passage of time had addressed previous concerns.

The motion was dismissed for lack of statutory authority under section 49.27(2) of the Law Society Act.

The Law Society Tribunal found that the respondent lawyer engaged in professional misconduct, including money laundering, advance fee fraud, and misleading clients and the Law Society.

Following a finding of misconduct, a penalty hearing was held.

The Tribunal denied the lawyer's last-minute request for an adjournment.

Applying the Bolton principle, the Tribunal concluded that the lawyer's egregious dishonesty compelled the immediate revocation of his licence.

The lawyer was also ordered to pay $60,000 in costs to the Law Society and to reimburse the Compensation Fund for any related claims paid.

The Law Society Tribunal determined the penalty for a lawyer previously found to have engaged in professional misconduct, including acting in a conflict of interest by having a sexual relationship with a client, making discriminatory comments, participating in a fraudulent vehicle transfer using a false statutory declaration, and acting uncivilly toward police.

The Tribunal found that the fraudulent vehicle transfer attracted presumptive revocation under the Bolton principle, as it involved a client and a false statutory declaration, which compromised public confidence in the profession.

Finding no exceptional circumstances, and alternatively applying the ordinary penalty approach, the Tribunal revoked the lawyer's licence and ordered him to pay $35,000 in costs.

The appellant lawyer appealed a hearing panel decision revoking his licence to practise law for professional misconduct.

He brought a motion to adduce fresh evidence, which was quashed for failure to file a factum, though the panel noted the evidence was already in the record.

The appellant argued that his consent to an agreed statement of facts was invalid because LSO discipline counsel allegedly suppressed evidence and misrepresented facts.

The Appeal Division dismissed the appeal, finding that the evidence in question had been fully disclosed to the appellant's counsel well before the hearing, and that the allegations of prosecutorial misconduct and evidence tampering were entirely unfounded.

The Law Society alleged that the respondent lawyer engaged in professional misconduct by failing to be on guard against being the dupe of an unscrupulous client and by using his trust account for purposes unrelated to the provision of legal services.

The respondent fell victim to a fraud involving the fictitious sale of farm equipment and a fake cashier's cheque, resulting in a significant trust shortfall.

The Tribunal found both allegations established, noting that the respondent negligently ignored numerous red flags and that an honest but mistaken belief in the transaction's legitimacy is not a defence to the improper use of a trust account.

The appellant lawyer appealed a decision of the Law Society Tribunal Appeal Division upholding findings of professional misconduct, a five-month suspension, and costs.

The misconduct related to his representation of a vulnerable family law client, filing an affidavit containing personal attacks on a judge, and maintaining a website about a dismissed Canadian Judicial Council complaint.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the disciplinary actions reflected a proportionate balancing of the appellant's freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter and rejecting his s. 15(1) Charter and procedural arguments.

The moving party, a sole practitioner, sought a stay of a five-month suspension imposed by the Law Society Tribunal pending his appeal to the Divisional Court.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test and found that the moving party raised a serious issue regarding whether the Tribunal erred by failing to apply the Groia test for in-court behaviour in the context of his freedom of expression claim.

The court also found that the moving party would suffer irreparable harm if forced to serve the suspension before the appeal, as he would lose his clients and likely complete the suspension before the appeal was heard.

The balance of convenience favoured granting the stay.

The motion was granted, but costs were denied as the self-represented moving party failed to prove opportunity costs.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Appeals Management Tribunal of the Law Society of Upper Canada, which had dismissed his motion to extend the time to appeal a finding of professional misconduct.

The Divisional Court quashed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The court held that appeals from the Appeals Management Tribunal must first go to the Appeal Panel of the Law Society, and only subsequent appeals from the Appeal Panel lie to the Divisional Court under section 49.38 of the Law Society Act.