John A. Dent

The Professional Conduct Committee alleged that the member failed to perform his professional services in accordance with generally accepted standards of practice of the profession, contrary to Rule 206.1 of the CPA Ontario Code of Professional Conduct.

The allegations related to multiple audit, review, and compilation engagements, including audits of reporting issuers, where significant deficiencies were identified.

The member admitted the allegations.

The Discipline Committee found that the allegations were established and constituted professional misconduct.

The Committee ordered that the member's assurance practice be restricted to permanently prohibit him from performing audits of reporting issuers, that he enter into an 18-month supervision agreement for all other assurance engagements, and that he pay a $25,000 fine and $42,000 in costs.

The Law Society brought a motion seeking an order deeming the respondent to have admitted the truth of facts in approximately 80 refusals to a request to admit.

The Law Society argued the respondent's categorical refusals failed to comply with Rule 11.3 of the Tribunal Rules.

The respondent argued the requests were improperly drafted and his refusals were compliant.

The Tribunal found that both parties failed to meaningfully engage in the request to admit process.

The motion was adjourned to allow the Law Society to provide an evidentiary foundation for certain requests and the respondent to provide precise reasons for his refusals.

The Law Society brought a motion for deemed admissions regarding the respondent's refusals in a request to admit.

Shortly before the motion hearing, the Law Society sought to amend its notice of motion to increase the number of refusals in issue from approximately 80 to 280, acknowledging it had made a drafting error.

The respondent opposed the amendment, arguing it materially altered the substance of the motion and increased his jeopardy.

The Tribunal granted leave to amend, finding that while the scale of the amendment was significant, it did not raise a new issue.

To preserve fairness, the Tribunal ordered a timetable for responding materials and vacated the scheduled hearing dates.

Following a finding of professional misconduct regarding syndicated mortgage transactions, the Law Society Tribunal considered the issue of costs.

The Law Society sought $60,000 in costs, while the respondent lawyer argued for $25,000.

The Tribunal reviewed the principles of costs awards in disciplinary proceedings, emphasizing that while the profession should not bear all costs, reductions are appropriate to recognize cooperative conduct that shortens proceedings.

Given the lawyer's extensive cooperation, including agreeing to a comprehensive agreed statement of facts, the Tribunal reduced the costs award to $25,000.

The Law Society brought a motion for interlocutory suspensions of two lawyers, Ms. Nejal and Ms. Laguisan, due to irregularities in their firm's mixed trust account, specifically the failure to pay out mortgages on closing.

Ms. Nejal, the firm owner, was found to have failed to maintain books and records and there was strong evidence suggesting a lack of integrity and possible complicity in the mishandling of funds.

The Tribunal ordered an interlocutory suspension of Ms. Nejal's licence.

Ms. Laguisan, a newly-called associate who was left in charge during Ms. Nejal's prior suspension, was found to have been unaware of the delayed payouts and there was no evidence of dishonesty.

The motion for an interlocutory suspension of Ms. Laguisan's licence was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision granting judgment in the amount of $55,555.55 in accordance with a Rule 49 offer to settle.

The appellants claimed the offer had been revoked before acceptance, arguing it was revoked orally at a pretrial conference and subsequently by a second written offer.

The respondent contended the first offer had not been effectively revoked and that acceptance occurred before service of the second offer.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that Rule 49 offers can only be revoked in writing, and that the respondent's acceptance of the first offer preceded service of the second offer based on credible evidence and the appellants' failure to provide an affidavit of service.

The three accused, former senior executives of Nortel Networks Corporation, were charged with two counts of fraud over $5,000.

The Crown alleged that they deliberately misrepresented Nortel's financial results by manipulating accrued liability balances to meet earnings targets and trigger bonus payments.

The court conducted a detailed review of Nortel's accounting practices, the use of accrued liabilities, and the restatements of its financial results.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused deliberately misrepresented the financial results or that the financial statements were materially misstated.

The accused were found not guilty on both counts.

The accused brought a pre‑trial motion seeking particulars requiring the Crown to specify the alleged misrepresentations, fraudulent conduct, and false accounting entries underlying charges relating to financial reporting of a public corporation.

The motion relied on s. 587 of the Criminal Code, arguing that the indictment lacked sufficient detail for the preparation of a defence.

The court reviewed the extensive investigations, disclosure, and related regulatory proceedings already known to the accused and concluded that they were aware of the case they had to meet.

The court held that the areas of dispute were sufficiently delineated and that further particulars were unnecessary for trial fairness or evidentiary rulings.

The application for particulars was dismissed.

The College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario moved for leave to appeal an order dismissing its motions to strike out applications brought by four physicians.

The physicians had applied to the Superior Court challenging the constitutionality of s. 76(1) of the Health Professions Procedural Code.

The College argued the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction and the matters should be heard by the administrative tribunal.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding the motions judge correctly applied the test for striking pleadings and properly concluded it was not plain and obvious the applications would fail, as the Superior Court retains residual jurisdiction over Charter challenges.

The appellant, suffering from liver cancer, was deemed ineligible for a liver transplant in Ontario.

He obtained a life-saving living-related liver transplant in England at a cost of $450,000 and sought reimbursement from OHIP.

The Health Services Appeal and Review Board denied the claim, finding the treatment was not an 'insured service' under s. 28.4(2) of Regulation 552 because it was not generally accepted in Ontario as appropriate for a person in his medical circumstances.

The Divisional Court upheld the decision.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the Board's decision was reasonable and that the regulation did not violate section 7 of the Charter, as it did not deprive the appellant of life or security of the person but merely limited a financial benefit.

The applicant physician sought judicial review to prohibit the respondent tribunal from proceeding with a patient's claim of sexual assault filed 10 years prior.

The applicant had been exonerated by both the police and his professional college shortly after the allegations were made.

The tribunal had closed its file for over four years before reopening it, and the applicant presented evidence that key witnesses' memories had faded.

The Divisional Court granted the application and stayed the proceedings, finding that the extraordinary delay compromised the fairness of the hearing and amounted to a gross abuse of process.

The appellant appealed his convictions for drug and firearms offences, arguing the trial judge erred in applying the reasonable doubt standard to circumstantial evidence.

The trial judge had rejected the appellant's competing inference on the basis that it was not 'equally plausible'.

The Court of Appeal held this was a clear legal error, as reasonable possibilities in favour of an accused may give rise to a reasonable doubt.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.