David M. Porter

La demanderesse, un organisme de bienfaisance enregistré, a contesté l'interprétation et l'application par l'Agence du revenu du Canada (ARC) du paragraphe 149.1(6.2) de la Loi de l'impôt sur le revenu.

L'ARC limitait à 10 % les ressources qu'un organisme pouvait consacrer à des activités politiques non partisanes.

La Cour a conclu que cette restriction portait atteinte à la liberté d'expression garantie par l'alinéa 2b) de la Charte, car elle empêchait la demanderesse de poursuivre ses fins de bienfaisance par la défense d'intérêts publics.

L'atteinte n'était pas justifiée au regard de l'article premier de la Charte.

La Cour a déclaré que les activités politiques non partisanes contribuant aux fins de bienfaisance doivent être considérées comme des activités de bienfaisance sans restriction de pourcentage.

The applicant, a registered charity focused on poverty relief through public advocacy, challenged the Canada Revenue Agency's (CRA) interpretation and enforcement of section 149.1(6.2) of the Income Tax Act.

This section limits non-partisan political activities to "substantially all" of a charity's resources, which the CRA interpreted as 90% or more, effectively capping political activities at 10%.

The applicant argued this restriction infringed its freedom of expression under section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that the CRA's 10% rule and the distinction between charitable and non-partisan political activities were unconstitutional, as they burdened the applicant's effective pursuit of its charitable purpose through advocacy.

The Court of Appeal reversed the Divisional Court's decision that had overturned a Discipline Committee penalty decision.

The Discipline Committee found that a physician sexually abused four female patients by unnecessarily touching their breasts and nipples during stethoscope examinations, and engaged in inappropriate conduct with a fifth patient.

The Committee imposed a six-month suspension with practice restrictions, supervision requirements, and mandatory training.

The Divisional Court found the penalty manifestly unfit and remitted it for reconsideration.

The Court of Appeal held that the Divisional Court failed to properly apply the deferential reasonableness standard of review, instead substituting its own view of the appropriate penalty.

The Court of Appeal restored the Discipline Committee's penalty, finding no inconsistent findings of fact and that the penalty fell within the range of reasonable outcomes.

The College of Physicians and Surgeons appealed a penalty imposed by its Discipline Committee on a physician found to have sexually abused four female patients and committed unprofessional conduct toward a fifth.

The Committee had imposed a six-month suspension and practice restrictions.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the penalty clearly unfit and unreasonable given the gravity of the misconduct, the inconsistent factual findings regarding the physician's intent, and the need for general deterrence to eradicate sexual abuse in the profession.

The penalty was quashed and remitted to the Committee.

The appellant physician appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario finding him guilty of professional misconduct for sexually abusing an adolescent patient in 1979.

The appellant argued the Committee erred in assessing the credibility and reliability of the complainant's evidence, applied a more stringent standard to his evidence, and provided inadequate reasons regarding similar fact evidence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Committee's credibility assessments were reasonable, there was no unequal scrutiny of evidence, and the Committee clearly explained it did not rely on the similar fact evidence to reach its conclusions.

The moving parties sought an order restraining a private investigator from disclosing or assisting others in disclosing documents and information obtained through the discovery process in related civil litigation.

The investigator, who was not a party to the action, had obtained thousands of documents produced on discovery and had disseminated some of them to third parties, including media outlets, and moved the documents outside the jurisdiction.

The court considered the scope and purpose of the deemed undertaking rule under Rule 30.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and authorities recognizing that the rule protects discovery material from collateral use.

It held that the court has jurisdiction to restrain third parties who knowingly obtain and use discovery documents contrary to the rule.

Given the investigator’s deliberate conduct in soliciting and disseminating the documents and attempting to evade court authority, a restraining order was warranted.

The three accused, former senior executives of Nortel Networks Corporation, were charged with two counts of fraud over $5,000.

The Crown alleged that they deliberately misrepresented Nortel's financial results by manipulating accrued liability balances to meet earnings targets and trigger bonus payments.

The court conducted a detailed review of Nortel's accounting practices, the use of accrued liabilities, and the restatements of its financial results.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused deliberately misrepresented the financial results or that the financial statements were materially misstated.

The accused were found not guilty on both counts.

The accused brought a pre‑trial motion seeking particulars requiring the Crown to specify the alleged misrepresentations, fraudulent conduct, and false accounting entries underlying charges relating to financial reporting of a public corporation.

The motion relied on s. 587 of the Criminal Code, arguing that the indictment lacked sufficient detail for the preparation of a defence.

The court reviewed the extensive investigations, disclosure, and related regulatory proceedings already known to the accused and concluded that they were aware of the case they had to meet.

The court held that the areas of dispute were sufficiently delineated and that further particulars were unnecessary for trial fairness or evidentiary rulings.

The application for particulars was dismissed.

The respondent operated a direct mail business in Ontario that sold lottery tickets and merchandise to persons outside Canada.

He was acquitted of making false or misleading representations 'to the public' under s. 52(1) of the Competition Act because the trial judge held the phrase only applied to the Canadian public.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal held that 'to the public' is not restricted to the Canadian public where there is a real and substantial link to Canada.

However, the Court ordered a new trial because the trial judge's excessive interventions and cross-examination of the respondent compromised the appearance of trial fairness.

The Court also clarified that reliance on legal advice is a mistake of law, not fact, and that the post-1999 mens rea requirement for s. 52 requires proof of knowledge or recklessness regarding the misleading nature of the representations.

The appellant, a medical doctor, appealed his conviction for sexual assault against a patient during a breast examination.

The appeal was based on two grounds: inadequate jury instructions regarding the appellant's defence, and improper instructions to the triers during the challenge for cause based on racial bias.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge failed to properly instruct the triers on their task and procedure.

The Court also noted significant deficiencies in the trial judge's failure to review the evidence supporting the appellant's defence that the examination was conducted for a medical purpose.

The appellant physician was convicted of sexually abusing a patient by the Discipline Committee.

At the hearing, the appellant sought production of the treating psychologist's notes, which were illegible.

The Panel dismissed the motion, stating it lacked jurisdiction and that the first stage of the O'Connor test was not met, but provided no further reasons.

On appeal, the Divisional Court held that the Panel breached the duty of fairness by failing to provide adequate reasons for its decision, which was both incorrect on jurisdiction and inexplicable on the O'Connor test.

The appeal was allowed and a new hearing ordered.

The appellant physician appealed a penalty decision of the Discipline Committee of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, which prohibited him from submitting accounts to OHIP for three years after he defrauded the public.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the College had jurisdiction to impose the billing prohibition under s. 51(2)(3) of the Health Professions Procedural Code.

The Court held that the penalty was reasonable and entitled to deference, and rejected the argument that the prohibition was equivalent to an additional three-year suspension.

The appellant pleaded guilty to defrauding OHIP of $155,675 and made full restitution prior to sentencing.

The trial judge imposed an eighteen-month conditional sentence, two years' probation, community service, and a $100,000 fine.

On appeal, the Crown conceded that attaching both a probation order and a fine to a sentence of imprisonment rendered the sentence illegal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal to the extent of deleting the fine, finding it unnecessary given the full restitution and the fact that the conditional sentence and probation order adequately addressed all sentencing principles.