Lori Anne Thomas

The offender, a 31-year-old first-time offender, was found guilty of sexual assault after forcing the complainant to have vaginal intercourse twice.

The Crown sought 28 months' custody, while the defence sought 14 to 18 months followed by probation.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, noting the highly aggravating circumstances of the major sexual assault and the offender's lack of remorse, while acknowledging his lack of prior record.

The offender was sentenced to two years in the penitentiary along with ancillary orders.

The accused was charged with being an accessory after the fact to attempted murder, obstructing justice, and breaching a recognizance.

The Crown's case relied heavily on statements made by the accused to Detective Constable Pyke immediately following his arrest.

The trial judge found that the accused's Charter rights under s. 10(b) were violated when the officer elicited statements from him after he had invoked his right to counsel but before he had an opportunity to speak with counsel.

The statements were excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

Additionally, the trial judge found insufficient evidence of the accused's knowledge of the specific offence for which the other person was wanted.

On the breach of recognizance charge, the trial judge found that the pellet gun found in the accused's residence did not meet the definition of a firearm or weapon as defined in the Criminal Code, and therefore did not constitute a breach of the recognizance as worded.

The accused was acquitted on all counts.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching following a judge-alone trial.

The complainant was the appellant's stepdaughter, and the alleged abuse occurred over a ten-year period.

The appellant's primary defence was that he was never alone with the complainant and therefore had no opportunity to commit the offences.

The trial judge rejected this defence after the complainant's mother admitted the appellant had been alone with the complainant on occasion.

The appellant also argued the complainant had a motive to fabricate the allegations based on conflicts over chores and living arrangements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence or credibility findings.

The appellant was convicted of assault and appealed the conviction.

The appeal focused on whether the trial judge applied different standards of scrutiny to the evidence of the appellant and the complainant, and whether the trial judge misapprehended material evidence.

The appellate court found that the trial judge did apply different standards of scrutiny, rejecting the appellant's evidence for tenuous reasons while glossing over weaknesses in the complainant's account and engaging in speculation to find corroboration.

This resulted in an unfair and unsafe conviction.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed a conviction for impaired care or control of a motor vehicle, arguing that the trial judge erred by refusing an adjournment, failing to advise him of the availability of a Rowbotham application for state-funded counsel, and inadequately assisting him as a self-represented accused.

The court held that the refusal of an adjournment was reasonable given the lengthy delay, the prior peremptory trial date, and the absence of a realistic prospect of retaining counsel.

It further found that the circumstances did not support a likely successful Rowbotham application because the case was straightforward, short, and carried no probability of imprisonment.

Reviewing the full trial transcript, the court concluded that the trial judge provided extensive and appropriate assistance to the self‑represented accused while maintaining judicial neutrality.

The appellant therefore received a fair trial and no miscarriage of justice occurred.

The respondent was arrested for impaired driving and placed in a police cell under video surveillance.

She was videotaped using the toilet, which she argued violated her s. 8 Charter right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure.

The trial judge agreed and granted a stay of proceedings.

The Crown appealed.

The Superior Court of Justice upheld the finding of a s. 8 breach, concluding that the respondent had a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding the use of the toilet.

However, the court allowed the appeal regarding the remedy, finding that a stay of proceedings was not warranted as this was a case of first instance and the breach was not egregious enough to justify the ultimate remedy.

The stay was set aside.

The three accused, former senior executives of Nortel Networks Corporation, were charged with two counts of fraud over $5,000.

The Crown alleged that they deliberately misrepresented Nortel's financial results by manipulating accrued liability balances to meet earnings targets and trigger bonus payments.

The court conducted a detailed review of Nortel's accounting practices, the use of accrued liabilities, and the restatements of its financial results.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused deliberately misrepresented the financial results or that the financial statements were materially misstated.

The accused were found not guilty on both counts.

The Court addressed whether Crown-requested police background checks of prospective jurors were permissible and what disclosure duties followed from that practice.

It held that limited criminal-record checks to assess juror eligibility are permissible, and that relevant information obtained for jury selection must be disclosed to the defence.

Applying the appellate non-disclosure framework, the Court found no reasonable possibility that disclosure failures changed jury composition.

The Court also held the impugned conduct did not meet the threshold for miscarriage of justice based on appearance of unfairness.

The appeals from conviction were dismissed.