Susan Magotiaux

Crown appeal of an acquittal in an impaired driving causing death case.

The trial judge excluded evidence of the accused's blood alcohol concentration under s. 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, finding that the accused's s. 8 Charter rights were violated when police obtained urine ethanol results without legal authority by asking hospital staff for the information.

The police then used these illegally obtained results to obtain search warrants for the accused's medical records and blood samples.

The trial judge found the officer asked the nurse for the results rather than merely overhearing them, and that without these results the warrant could not have been issued.

The Court of Appeal upheld the exclusion of evidence, finding the trial judge's reasons were sufficient and conducting a fresh s. 24(2) analysis that confirmed exclusion was appropriate.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and unlawful entry into a dwelling house following a seven-day trial.

He received a sentence of two years less a day imprisonment and two years of probation.

The appellant sought bail pending appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding serious deficiencies in the appellant's bail compliance history, material omissions in his affidavits regarding outstanding breach charges, and insufficient grounds of appeal to overcome public interest considerations.

The trial judge's findings regarding the victim's incapacity to consent due to extreme intoxication were well-grounded in evidence and revealed no obvious error.

An appellant appealed the Ontario Review Board's disposition continuing his conditional discharge on terms.

The appellant had been found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder in 2006 for assault causing bodily harm and mischief.

The Board found the appellant remained a significant threat to public safety based on his lack of insight into his mental illness, his unwillingness to take medication absent a Board order, his continued residual symptoms despite medication, his history of marijuana use leading to clinical worsening, and threatening statements made in 2015.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's decision, finding the conclusion that a foreseeable and substantial risk existed was reasonable on the evidence.

The appellants were convicted of first degree murder in the shooting death of Joel Waldron.

The Crown could not prove which appellant was the shooter but argued both were guilty as one was the shooter and the other aided or abetted the killing.

The appellants appealed on grounds that the trial judge's charge to the jury was deficient in relating evidence to the elements of aiding and abetting and planning and deliberation.

The Court of Appeal found the jury charge was factually unbalanced and failed to properly relate evidence to the necessary legal elements, particularly regarding aiding and abetting.

While the court did not find the verdict unreasonable, it quashed the convictions and ordered a new trial due to the deficiencies in the charge.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence on the ground that his trial counsel was ineffective for refusing to permit him to testify at trial.

The Court of Appeal found that the record did not support this submission.

The cross-examination on an affidavit prepared for the appeal demonstrated that while the appellant may have felt strongly about wanting to testify, he ultimately accepted his trial counsel's advice not to do so.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that detained him at the Secure Forensic Service of Ontario Shores Centre for Mental Health Sciences with restricted privileges.

The appellant advanced two grounds of appeal: that the Board's finding of significant threat to public safety was unreasonable, and that the Board erred in law by failing to apply section 14 of the Evidence Act regarding corroboration.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both grounds, finding ample evidence supported the significant threat threshold and that section 14 of the Evidence Act does not apply to Review Board proceedings as they fall under federal jurisdiction.

The appellant's collateral Charter application regarding medication was also dismissed as not cognizable on appeal.

The appellants were convicted of manslaughter following a trial by judge and jury.

Their convictions on break and enter to commit robbery were stayed pursuant to the Kienapple principle.

The appellants appealed their manslaughter convictions on various grounds and sought leave to appeal their sentences.

The Crown also sought leave to appeal the sentence imposed on one appellant.

The Court of Appeal found that the jury charge on the critical counts of manslaughter was insufficient to meet the functional requirements for an adequate jury charge, particularly in failing to adequately relate the evidence to the key issues and the parties' positions.

The conviction appeals were allowed and a new trial was ordered on all original charges.

The appellants were convicted of manslaughter following a trial by judge and jury.

Their convictions on break and enter to commit robbery were stayed pursuant to the Kienapple principle.

The appellants appealed their manslaughter convictions on various grounds and sought leave to appeal their sentences.

The Crown also sought leave to appeal the sentence imposed on one appellant.

The Court of Appeal found that the jury charge on the critical counts of manslaughter was insufficient to meet the functional requirements for an adequate jury charge, particularly in failing to adequately relate the evidence to the key issues and the parties' positions.

The conviction appeals were allowed and a new trial was ordered on all original charges.

This appeal addressed whether informer privilege can protect an anonymous Crime Stoppers tip made to obstruct a police investigation.

The Court held privilege does not apply where, on a balance of probabilities, the caller intended to further criminal activity or interfere with the administration of justice.

It confirmed judges should presume privilege exists and determine applicability through in camera proceedings, often ex parte, with fairness safeguards for the defence.

The Court also confirmed judges may review the tip record and may require a preliminary exclusion or probity showing before full litigation.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his sentence of two years less a day imposed for defrauding three victims.

Duty counsel raised two main grounds: that the trial judge failed to give effect to evidence of remorse, and that the trial judge imposed a sentence exceeding the Crown's position without affording defence counsel an opportunity to make further submissions.

The appellate court found that while the trial judge should have provided the defence an opportunity to address the proposed sentence, the imposed sentence was fit and perhaps even lenient given the serious nature of the frauds, the consequences to the victims, the appellant's guilty plea only after victims testified at the preliminary inquiry, and the appellant's prior probation for previous frauds.

The appellant appealed a sentence imposed by the trial judge for aggravated sexual assault, sexual interference, assault with a weapon, assault, and uttering a death threat.

The central issue was whether the trial judge had jurisdiction to issue a new Warrant of Committal four months after sentencing to correct a mathematical error in converting the sentence from years to months.

The trial judge had imposed a global sentence of 6.5 years but the Warrant of Committal incorrectly stated 66 months.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's authority to correct the error, finding that the judge's intention was manifest and that no reconsideration of the sentence was required.

An applicant convicted of two counts of first degree murder sought reconsideration of a prior decision denying his application for appointed counsel under s. 684(1) of the Criminal Code.

The applicant argued material changes in circumstances had occurred since the initial denial.

The court found that the applicant had demonstrated material changes, including: the inmate duty counsel program's refusal to assist; provision of previously missing financial documents to Legal Aid; and evidence addressing concerns about a property foreclosure proceeding.

The court determined both criteria under s. 684(1) were satisfied: it was desirable in the interests of justice to appoint counsel given the complexity and arguability of the appeal, and the applicant lacked sufficient financial means to retain counsel.

Counsel was appointed.

The accused was charged with carrying a knife for a purpose dangerous to the public peace contrary to section 88(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown proceeded on one count after acknowledging lack of proof on four counts.

The accused's stated purpose was to kill himself during an incident at his apartment.

The court applied the two-stage test from R. v. Kerr: first determining the accused's subjective purpose, then assessing objectively whether that purpose was dangerous to the public peace.

The court found that even if the accused's true intent was suicide, the fact that he communicated this intent to his common-law partner, who was present and reasonably expected to intervene, made the possession dangerous to the public peace.

The court convicted the accused.

The accused was charged with sexual assault, sexual exploitation by a person in a position of trust, breach of trust, and making and possessing child pornography involving a complainant who had lived in the accused’s home as a teenager.

The Crown alleged the accused used his position as a police officer and landlord to coerce sexual activity and take nude photographs of the complainant when she was under 18.

The court found significant inconsistencies and credibility concerns in the complainant’s testimony, including contradictions regarding photographs, camera use, alleged coercion, and post‑incident conduct.

The court accepted defence evidence that certain sexual activity occurred consensually after the complainant turned 18 and found the Crown failed to prove the offences beyond a reasonable doubt.

All charges were dismissed.

The Court addressed whether Crown-requested police background checks of prospective jurors were permissible and what disclosure duties followed from that practice.

It held that limited criminal-record checks to assess juror eligibility are permissible, and that relevant information obtained for jury selection must be disclosed to the defence.

Applying the appellate non-disclosure framework, the Court found no reasonable possibility that disclosure failures changed jury composition.

The Court also held the impugned conduct did not meet the threshold for miscarriage of justice based on appearance of unfairness.

The appeals from conviction were dismissed.

The appellant challenged fraud convictions on the basis of improper jury vetting by prosecution offices and police database checks of prospective jurors.

The court held that while disclosure obligations were breached and some vetting conduct was improper, a new trial requires a reasonable possibility that proper disclosure would have produced a differently constituted jury.

On the record, that threshold was not met.

The court also held that the conduct did not amount to a miscarriage of justice based on appearance of unfairness.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Court held that broad jury vetting consultations with police should not occur, that relevant jury-selection information from police must be disclosed, and that despite non-disclosure in this case there was no reasonable possibility the jury would have been differently constituted, no unfair trial, and no miscarriage of justice.

The appellant challenged a criminal charge under s. 127(1) for allegedly disobeying an injunction, arguing Ontario civil contempt rules provided an express alternative mode of proceeding.

The majority held the statutory exception applies only where legislation provides the legal foundation for contempt, defines contempt circumstances, and provides punishment or procedure.

The Court found Rules 60.11 and 60.12 are procedurally detailed but remain dependent on common law substratum for legal foundation and contempt definition.

Accordingly, the exception was not triggered and prosecution under s. 127(1) could proceed.

The appeal was dismissed, with a dissent concluding the rules themselves constituted an express legislative mode of proceeding.