Appeared as counsel in 94 cases (2002–2019)
3 total
The young person was acquitted of dangerous driving causing death due to reasonable doubt regarding the reliability of crash data and vehicle defects.
A young person, J.S., was charged with dangerous driving causing death and bodily harm after a single-vehicle rollover collision.
The court first addressed a Charter challenge regarding the admissibility of Airbag Control Module (ACM) data, finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in the limited data extracted, thus admitting it.
On the merits, the court found that while J.S. drove too fast for the conditions and made poor decisions (e.g., too many passengers, no seatbelts, alcohol), the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that her driving constituted a "marked departure" from the standard of a reasonable driver.
This was due to significant uncertainties in interpreting the ACM data, the unknown impact of a faulty brake, and the unpredictable nature of the road and vehicle modifications.
J.S. was acquitted of all charges.
The court dismissed the accused's application to re-elect mode of trial, finding the trial had already commenced with substantive pre-trial applications.
The applicant, G.H., sought to re-elect his mode of trial from the Ontario Court of Justice to the Superior Court of Justice with a judge and jury, asserting a right to do so under s. 561(2) of the Criminal Code, or alternatively, requesting a transfer under s. 555(1).
The Crown opposed, arguing the trial had already commenced for the purposes of s. 561(2) due to substantive pre-trial applications (s. 278.4 and s. 714.2 hearings).
The court dismissed the application, finding that the trial had commenced with the substantive pre-trial applications, thus G.H. no longer had a right to re-elect without Crown consent.
The court also declined to exercise its discretionary power under s. 555(1), finding no sufficient basis to disrupt proceedings, despite the applicant's concerns about COVID-19 and judicial re-assignment.
The court held that Criminal Code amendments restricting preliminary inquiries do not apply retrospectively to vested requests.
The Crown brought a motion to vacate a preliminary inquiry scheduled for September 23, 2019, arguing that new amendments to the Criminal Code restricting preliminary inquiries to offences with maximum penalties of 14 years or more should apply retrospectively to eliminate the court's jurisdiction to conduct the inquiry.
The accused had validly requested the preliminary inquiry in December 2018 under the former law.
The court held that the amendments should not apply retrospectively to cases where the right to request a preliminary inquiry had already vested prior to the legislative change.
The Crown's motion was dismissed and the preliminary inquiry proceeded as scheduled.
