Karen E. Symes

The accused pleaded guilty to possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking and possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking on charges arising from Toronto in 2021 and Durham in 2024.

The court imposed a global sentence of six years, reduced by one year for harsh pre-sentence custody conditions, resulting in approximately two years and one day remaining to be served after credit for pre-sentence custody at 1.5:1 and credit for strict bail conditions.

The sentence was followed by two years of probation.

The court considered the accused's difficult background, including loss of his mother to suicide, exposure to violence and poverty, addiction issues, rehabilitative potential, and the serious nature of fentanyl trafficking.

Omer Arshi was found guilty of aggravated assault and Salvatore Caravella of common assault, stemming from a bar fight on New Year's Eve 2017-18.

The court determined fit sentences, considering the gravity of the offences, the degree of responsibility of each offender, and various aggravating and mitigating factors.

Arshi received a 15-month conditional sentence followed by 15 months probation, with conditions including house arrest.

Caravella received a suspended sentence and 12 months probation.

Ancillary orders for DNA and weapons prohibitions were also imposed on both.

The appellant, Dorothy Groves, appealed her conviction for second-degree murder and her sentence of life imprisonment with 13 years parole ineligibility.

She argued the trial judge erred in admitting a statement she made to a special constable, claiming it was not voluntary, and in failing to properly instruct the jury on the two forms of accident.

She also sought a reduction in her parole ineligibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding the trial judge correctly assessed the voluntariness of her statement and adequately instructed the jury on the defence of accident as it related to intent.

The court also found the sentence imposed was fit, considering both aggravating factors (criminal record, violent offences) and mitigating factors (intellectual disability).

Henry Morales was found guilty by a jury of second-degree murder of his wife, Malena Morales, committed in 2006.

The court imposed a mandatory life sentence and determined the parole ineligibility period.

The Crown sought 16-18 years, while the defence argued for 12 years, reduced from 13 due to harsh pre-sentence custody conditions.

The court considered aggravating factors, including domestic violence, abuse of trust, the presence of children during the murder, and post-offence conduct (staging the scene, flight to Mexico).

Mitigating factors included no prior criminal record, genuine remorse, pro-social behaviour while in Mexico, and participation in rehabilitation programs.

The court also extensively discussed whether harsh pre-sentence custody conditions could be a mitigating factor for parole ineligibility, concluding they could.

Ultimately, the court set the parole ineligibility period at 15 years, commencing February 20, 2020.

The defendant, a Type-1 diabetic, was charged with two counts of dangerous driving causing bodily harm after a head-on collision.

The defense argued that the defendant lacked the capacity to appreciate the risk due to severe hypoglycemia (neuroglycopenia) and was in a state of automatism.

The court found that the defendant was in a state of neuroglycopenia when he began driving erratically and lacked the capacity to appreciate the risk, distinguishing the case from R. v. Elson where the driver was aware of dropping blood sugar.

The court concluded that the Crown failed to prove the requisite mens rea beyond a reasonable doubt, leading to the defendant's acquittal.

The automatism defense was not fully analyzed but the court was not satisfied it was proven on a balance of probabilities.

The appellant, Davide Duncan, appealed his conviction for aiding or abetting the importation of cocaine and conspiracy to import cocaine.

The appeal raised two main issues: the admissibility of wiretap evidence, challenged on the basis of alleged misleading or fraudulent affidavits used to obtain the authorization, and the trial judge's instructions to the jury regarding the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge did not err in allowing amplification or excision of the affidavit errors, as they were not deliberate and the affiant acted in good faith.

The court also upheld the finding that the wiretap authorization fell within the criminal organization exception under s. 186(1.1) of the Criminal Code, negating the need to prove investigative necessity.

Finally, the court found no error in the trial judge's jury instructions on the burden of proof.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown moved for a mistrial in a jury trial for multiple charges of bank robbery due to an unprecedented six-month hiatus caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

The defence opposed, seeking an adjournment.

The court granted the mistrial, finding that the prolonged interruption compromised the jury's ability to fairly recall oral testimony and engage with the trial, thereby jeopardizing the fairness of the proceedings.

The court emphasized that the interests of expediency could not trump the goal of a fair trial.

A youth, L.L., charged with second-degree murder, applied for bail.

The Crown sought detention on secondary and tertiary grounds under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The court found that the Crown did not meet its onus, emphasizing the strong presumption of release for youth and the requirement of exceptional circumstances for tertiary ground detention.

The proposed plan of release with residential and community sureties was deemed adequate, and L.L. was released on house arrest with conditions.

The appellants were convicted of manslaughter following a trial by judge and jury.

Their convictions on break and enter to commit robbery were stayed pursuant to the Kienapple principle.

The appellants appealed their manslaughter convictions on various grounds and sought leave to appeal their sentences.

The Crown also sought leave to appeal the sentence imposed on one appellant.

The Court of Appeal found that the jury charge on the critical counts of manslaughter was insufficient to meet the functional requirements for an adequate jury charge, particularly in failing to adequately relate the evidence to the key issues and the parties' positions.

The conviction appeals were allowed and a new trial was ordered on all original charges.

The accused, Andrew Carthew Tidey, was charged with aggravated assault.

The Crown brought a motion to admit evidence of prior discreditable conduct and after-the-fact conduct to establish animus, motive, context, and to rebut a potential self-defence theory.

The defence opposed, arguing the evidence was irrelevant and highly prejudicial.

The court applied the probative value versus prejudicial effect balancing test.

It admitted evidence concerning the accused's financial difficulties, a dispute with tenants over rent and laundry, the accused "picking a fight" with a tenant, and a "nice try" text message sent by the accused shortly after the incident.

However, the court excluded evidence of a prior alleged attack, theft, mischief, and damage to property (crib) due to low probative value and high prejudicial effect, finding that such evidence would distract the jury and risk unfair prejudice.

The defendant, charged with aggravated assault, brought a motion to edit two videotaped statements given to the police, seeking to remove prejudicial and irrelevant comments.

The defence argued for redaction of officer opinions on case strength, witness credibility, injury causation, references to independent witnesses, exercise of right to counsel and silence, and miscellaneous court process information.

The Crown opposed, arguing for context and flow.

The court applied principles of balancing probative value against prejudicial effect, largely granting the redaction requests for specific portions deemed more prejudicial than probative, while retaining others necessary for context and admissions.

The Superior Court of Justice delivered sentencing reasons for three defendants convicted of culpable homicide following a home invasion and robbery.

Tin Wai Hong was convicted of second-degree murder, receiving a life sentence with 13 years parole ineligibility, and a concurrent 4-year sentence for assault causing bodily harm.

Mason Gillard-Gatza and Nathaniel Cain were convicted of manslaughter, each receiving an 11-year sentence (net 4 years 3 months after pre-trial custody credit) and a concurrent 2-year sentence for assault causing bodily harm.

The court considered aggravating factors such as the violent, drug-related home invasion, gratuitous violence, and prior criminal records, alongside mitigating factors including youth, lack of prior record, family support, expressions of remorse, and, for one defendant, reduced life expectancy.

Ancillary orders included a lifetime weapons prohibition, DNA sample, and no-contact orders with victims.

Following a lengthy jury trial for murder and attempted murder arising from a home invasion, the court addressed post‑charge objections raised by the Crown and several defence counsel regarding the jury instructions.

The objections concerned the adequacy of instructions on forcible confinement, party liability, the mental state required for planned and deliberate murder, and the temporal‑causal connection required for constructive first degree murder under s. 231(5) of the Criminal Code.

The court held that the charge, when read as a whole, correctly conveyed the applicable legal principles and adequately reflected the parties’ positions.

With one limited exception, the court declined to give additional corrective instructions, finding the charge clear and legally sufficient.

The defendants, on trial for first-degree murder arising from a home invasion and robbery, raised numerous objections to the Crown's closing address to the jury.

The defence argued that the Crown misstated evidence, improperly referenced out-of-court statements, and undermined the presumption of innocence, seeking a mistrial or the right to make reply submissions.

The court reviewed the objections and found that while some of the Crown's comments required corrective instructions in the final jury charge, the conduct did not render the trial fundamentally unfair.

The applications for a mistrial and for reply submissions were dismissed.

During a lengthy jury trial for murder and attempted murder arising from a home invasion, the court ruled on several pre‑charge issues affecting the jury instructions and evidentiary materials.

The court addressed whether transcripts of recorded police statements should accompany the jury, whether certain medical records required redaction, and whether instructions on wilful blindness and alternative routes to first‑degree murder should be given.

The court allowed transcripts of most recorded statements to go to the jury but excluded the transcript of one accused’s statement due to lack of probative value.

Medical records referring to “severe hypoxia” were admitted without redaction.

The court declined to instruct the jury on wilful blindness for the driver accused, finding insufficient specificity of suspicion to impute knowledge.

During a multi-accused jury trial for murder and attempted murder arising from a home invasion, the Crown sought to revisit a pre‑trial editing ruling that had excluded a portion of one accused’s police statement referencing a conversation with a co‑accused driver.

The Crown argued that subsequent cross‑examination created a material change in circumstances because the witness acknowledged misleading the driver about the purpose of the trip, making the excluded statement relevant as a prior inconsistent statement and to credibility.

The court held that the threshold for revisiting the ruling was met but declined to change the original decision.

Although the probative value of the statement had increased, its prejudicial effect against the co‑accused—against whom it remained inadmissible—continued to outweigh its value, particularly given the stage of the trial and fairness concerns.

The Crown’s application was therefore dismissed.

During a jury trial for murder arising from a home invasion, the accused sought to call a cardiologist to testify that a congenital heart condition could have caused hypoxia leading to confusion and impaired cognition during the incident.

The Crown opposed the evidence, arguing it lacked relevance, necessity, and proper qualification and risked misleading the jury.

Applying the Mohan framework as refined in White Burgess and Abbey, the court held the proposed expert testimony was logically relevant, necessary to explain the accused’s serious medical condition, and within the expert’s qualifications.

The court further concluded that any limitations in the opinion affected weight rather than admissibility and that the probative value of the defence-led evidence was not substantially outweighed by prejudice.

The expert evidence was therefore admitted for consideration by the jury.

During a jury trial for murder and attempted murder arising from a home invasion, the accused sought to call a cardiologist to provide expert evidence regarding congenital heart disease and its potential impact on mental functioning.

The Crown challenged the admissibility of the expert testimony, arguing issues of relevance, qualification, and reliability under the Mohan framework.

The court determined that a focused Mohan voir dire was required to clarify the precise opinion and assess the expert’s qualifications.

The judge held that the expert could testify on the voir dire only to identify the proposed opinion and establish qualifications, and that broader cross-examination was unnecessary for the admissibility determination.

During a jury trial for offences arising from a home invasion and robbery, the Crown sought to revisit a prior evidentiary ruling that had ordered references to the accused’s consultation with duty counsel removed from a police statement.

The Crown argued that subsequent testimony placing the reliability of the statement in issue increased the probative value of the fact that the accused had received legal advice before speaking to police.

The court reconsidered the issue under the residual discretion to exclude evidence where prejudicial effect outweighs probative value.

The judge held that the probative value of the consultation with counsel remained slight and that admitting the evidence would invite improper speculation about privileged communications.

The earlier ruling requiring redaction was therefore maintained.

The accused, along with three co-accused, was charged with first degree murder and attempted murder arising from a home invasion.

The accused brought a Corbett application to restrict cross-examination on his criminal record, which included five prior convictions for assault.

The Crown and a co-accused brought cross-applications to adduce evidence of the underlying facts of those assaults and other violent conduct as propensity evidence.

The court granted the accused's application, limiting cross-examination to his non-violent convictions, and dismissed the cross-applications.

The court found that the prejudicial effect of admitting the prior violent conduct substantially outweighed its probative value, particularly given the risk of propensity reasoning in a trial involving blunt force trauma.