Adriel Sarah Weaver

Two federal inmates serving indeterminate sentences applied for reclassification from medium- to minimum-security facilities.

Despite recommendations from their case management teams and wardens, administrative decision-makers denied the reclassifications.

The appellants sought habeas corpus ad subjiciendum with certiorari in aid, challenging the denials as unlawful deprivations of their residual liberty.

The majority held that a decision to deny a lower security reclassification constitutes a deprivation of liberty reviewable by way of habeas corpus, as it has the qualitative effect of restricting liberty without requiring proof of a change in status quo or a pre-existing legal entitlement to the less restrictive state.

The dissent maintained that habeas corpus is only available where an inmate has acquired a legal entitlement to the lower security classification, consistent with the framework in Dumas.

As both appellants had been reclassified and transferred by the time the appeal was heard, the Court allowed the appeal on the moot legal question of public importance.

The appellants, Frank Dorsey and Ghassan Salah, appealed a Superior Court decision that denied their applications for habeas corpus to challenge the Correctional Service of Canada's refusal to reclassify and transfer them to lower-security institutions.

The application judge found that these denials did not constitute a deprivation of residual liberty reviewable by habeas corpus.

The Court of Appeal, in a majority decision, upheld the application judge's finding, concluding that a refusal to reclassify an inmate to a lower security level, without a change in the conditions of detention or an entitlement to greater liberty, does not amount to a deprivation of residual liberty for the purposes of habeas corpus.

The Court affirmed that the existing grievance procedure and judicial review in the Federal Court are the appropriate avenues for such challenges.

The dissenting judge argued that an unlawful reclassification refusal could crystallize an initially lawful deprivation of liberty into an unlawful one, making it reviewable by habeas corpus.

The appellant, Dorothy Groves, appealed her conviction for second-degree murder and her sentence of life imprisonment with 13 years parole ineligibility.

She argued the trial judge erred in admitting a statement she made to a special constable, claiming it was not voluntary, and in failing to properly instruct the jury on the two forms of accident.

She also sought a reduction in her parole ineligibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding the trial judge correctly assessed the voluntariness of her statement and adequately instructed the jury on the defence of accident as it related to intent.

The court also found the sentence imposed was fit, considering both aggravating factors (criminal record, violent offences) and mitigating factors (intellectual disability).

This decision addresses motions for leave to intervene in an appeal concerning the availability of habeas corpus to challenge the refusal of prisoner transfers to lower security institutions.

The appellants, Frank Dorsey and Ghassan Salah, sought to overturn a lower court's denial of their habeas corpus application.

The Court of Appeal granted intervention to the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, the Black Legal Action Centre, the Canadian Association of Elizabeth Fry Societies, and the Canadian Prison Law Association, finding that the appeal raises issues of constitutional and public importance.

The court determined that the proposed interveners offered distinct and useful perspectives, and that their participation would not cause injustice to the parties, even if aligned with the appellants' position.

The Court of Appeal addressed the status of an intervener, the John Howard Society of Canada (JHSC), in an appeal.

The JHSC had been granted party intervener status in the court below.

While the appellants and respondent consented to the JHSC's continued leave to intervene as an added party, they disagreed on the scope of its participation.

The court clarified that interveners granted party status in the lower court generally expect to continue as parties on appeal without needing a fresh motion, unless there are intervening events or exceptional circumstances.

The JHSC's status as an added party intervener was confirmed, with the terms of participation to be determined later.

The applicant sought judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board decision dismissing his duty of fair representation complaint against his union due to a 15-month delay.

The applicant argued the Board breached procedural fairness by imposing page limits, was biased, rendered an unreasonable decision, and violated his s. 15 Charter rights by applying a presumption of prejudice for delayed complaints.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Board's procedural directions fair, the delay analysis reasonable, and the Charter claim unfounded as the presumption applies equally to all parties and does not discriminate on analogous grounds.

The applicants, including the Elementary Teachers' Federation of Ontario and the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, brought applications for judicial review challenging the Ontario government's decision to withdraw the 2015 sex education curriculum and replace it with the 2010 curriculum.

They argued the directive infringed teachers' freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter, and students' rights under ss. 7 and 15(1) of the Charter.

The Divisional Court granted the applicants public interest standing but dismissed the applications on the merits.

The court found no infringement of s. 2(b) because teachers remained free to address topics from the 2015 curriculum, and no infringement of ss. 7 or 15(1) because the 2010 curriculum did not inherently deprive students of security of the person or substantively discriminate against protected groups.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second-degree murder.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the testimony of an accomplice and similar fact evidence of two prior incidents involving the appellant.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in admitting the similar fact evidence, as its prejudicial effect outweighed its limited probative value.

The evidence lacked sufficient similarity to the charged offence and posed a significant risk of moral and reasoning prejudice.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.