Andrea Marie Bolieiro

The moving parties sought a stay of a new Ontario government policy restricting international medical graduates from participating in the first iteration of the medical residency matching process (CaRMS) unless they attended high school in Ontario for two years.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for a stay, finding it lacked jurisdiction over the underlying application for judicial review.

The court held that the policy was not an exercise of a specific statutory power under the Judicial Review Procedure Act, nor was certiorari available against the Crown in these circumstances.

The inclusion of Charter arguments did not expand the court's statutory jurisdiction.

This decision grants an interlocutory injunction exempting all existing supervised consumption sites (SCSs) in Ontario from the operation of section 2 of the Community Care and Recovery Act, 2024, pending a final decision on the merits.

The court finds that the three-part test for injunctive relief is met: there is a serious issue to be tried regarding Charter rights, irreparable harm would result from SCS closures, and the balance of convenience favours the applicants.

The ruling details the public health crisis of opioid use, the role of SCSs in harm reduction, and the disproportionate impact of closures on marginalized populations.

The applicant, a Member of Provincial Parliament, sought judicial review of a censure decision by the Legislative Assembly of Ontario following her social media posts about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The respondents moved to strike the application for want of jurisdiction.

The Divisional Court granted the motion and dismissed the application, holding that the censure and the motion leading to it fell squarely within the established categories of parliamentary privilege, specifically the control over debates and proceedings and the disciplinary authority over members.

Consequently, the court lacked jurisdiction to review the matter, even on Charter grounds.

The moving parties, consisting of two churches and their members, brought motions to set aside judicial orders directing compliance with COVID-19 religious gathering limits.

They argued the capacity restrictions infringed their freedom of religion under s. 2(a) of the Charter.

The court found that the numerical and percentage capacity limits did infringe s. 2(a) by interfering with the claimants' ability to engage in religious activity as a collective in-person congregation.

However, applying the Oakes test, the court concluded that the restrictions were demonstrably justified under s. 1 of the Charter as a reasonable limit in a free and democratic society to protect public health during the pandemic.

The motions were dismissed.

The representative plaintiff brought a class action on behalf of inmates in Ontario correctional institutions who were placed in administrative segregation.

The plaintiff alleged that Ontario's use of administrative segregation constituted systemic negligence and violated sections 7 and 12 of the Charter.

On a motion for summary judgment, the court found that administrative segregation as practiced in Ontario was equivalent to solitary confinement and caused severe psychological harm, particularly to inmates with serious mental illness.

The court held that Ontario breached the inmates' Charter rights and was liable for systemic negligence at the operational level.

The court awarded $30 million in aggregate damages for compensation, vindication, and deterrence.

The applicant, acting as substitute decision-maker for his incapable elderly father, brought an application for judicial review challenging a hospital's COVID-19 visitor restriction policy and a related memorandum from the Chief Medical Officer of Health.

The applicant argued the restrictions violated his father's rights under sections 7, 12, and 15 of the Charter by preventing in-person visits.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that neither the hospital's policy nor the CMOH memorandum were subject to judicial review as they did not involve the exercise of a statutory power of decision with a sufficient public character.

Furthermore, the court held that even if reviewable, the policies did not infringe the Charter, as they were based on sound medical and epidemiological evidence rather than discriminatory presumptions, were not arbitrary or overbroad, and did not constitute state-imposed punishment or treatment.

Paul Boone, a person under disability, and his parents, challenged the constitutionality of Rule 7.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and s. 5 of O. Reg. 195/04, arguing they compel disclosure of solicitor-client or litigation privileged information, thereby infringing s. 15(1) of the Charter.

The court dismissed both constitutional challenges, finding a lack of factual basis to support the assertions of discriminatory effect and concluding that the impugned provisions do not mandate or inevitably require the disclosure of privileged information.

The motion for approval of a partial settlement was adjourned for the plaintiffs to provide the necessary evidentiary support.

This decision provides reasons for an inquiry into an incident where the accused, David Baichoo, appeared in a security gown, naked underneath, on the first day of his first-degree murder trial.

The incident, which led to the loss of a trial day and compromised the dignity of the proceedings, was attributed to the Toronto South Detention Centre (TSDC).

The court found that the TSDC's reliance on unreliable body scans for contraband and the indifference of staff, particularly Sgt. Polanski, led to the deplorable situation.

Despite the subsequent abandonment of the defence's application for costs, the court issued these reasons to highlight systemic failures in the treatment of accused persons and to ensure accountability.

The Ontario Human Rights Commission sought leave to intervene in a pending motion for leave to appeal from a Divisional Court decision dismissing a Charter challenge to Ontario's sex education curriculum directive.

The OHRC argued it would make unique contributions by addressing the public interest dimension and alleged errors in the Divisional Court's discrimination analysis.

The motion judge dismissed the OHRC's request for intervener status on the motion for leave to appeal, finding that such interventions should be rare and extraordinary, and that the applicants were already capable of advancing these arguments.

The motion judge adjourned the OHRC's request for intervener status on any subsequent appeal.

The applicants, including the Elementary Teachers' Federation of Ontario and the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, brought applications for judicial review challenging the Ontario government's decision to withdraw the 2015 sex education curriculum and replace it with the 2010 curriculum.

They argued the directive infringed teachers' freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter, and students' rights under ss. 7 and 15(1) of the Charter.

The Divisional Court granted the applicants public interest standing but dismissed the applications on the merits.

The court found no infringement of s. 2(b) because teachers remained free to address topics from the 2015 curriculum, and no infringement of ss. 7 or 15(1) because the 2010 curriculum did not inherently deprive students of security of the person or substantively discriminate against protected groups.

Appellants sought a declaration that section 14 of the Health Insurance Act, which prohibits OHIP-eligible Ontario residents from purchasing private health insurance for OHIP-covered services, violated their Charter rights under section 7.

The appellants' OHIP coverage had been cancelled for failure to prove Ontario residency, and they claimed private insurers refused to sell them insurance citing section 14.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding the appellants were not affected by section 14 itself but rather by an alleged misinterpretation of it by private insurers.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, holding that the appellants failed to demonstrate that section 14 of the HIA, rather than a misinterpretation by non-parties, was affecting them.

The plaintiff, a self-represented litigant, commenced three separate actions alleging various misconducts over 20 years against numerous defendants, including government entities, police services, healthcare facilities, and media corporations.

The defendants brought a motion under Rule 2.1.01 to dismiss or stay the actions as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process, citing rambling pleadings, grandiose claims for damages (exceeding $800 million), and potential limitation period issues.

The court found the actions to be frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process but, considering the plaintiff's self-represented status and lack of prior opportunity to amend, decided to continue the stay rather than dismiss the actions outright.

The plaintiff was granted a limited opportunity to seek leave to amend his Statements of Claim by a specified date, failing which the actions could be dismissed.

The plaintiff, Conrey Francis, brought a proposed class action against Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario, alleging negligence and breaches of sections 7 and 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms due to the use of Administrative Segregation (solitary confinement) in correctional facilities.

The parties sought approval of a consent order certifying the action as a class proceeding.

The court found that all criteria for certification under s. 5(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992 were met, including an identifiable class, common issues of fact or law, preferability of a class proceeding, and an adequate representative plaintiff.

The certification motion was granted.

The appellant physician appealed a decision of the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board upholding the revocation of his hospital privileges.

The revocation followed a series of incidents involving workplace harassment of a nurse and unauthorized access to her personal health records.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Appeal Board applied the correct test under the Public Hospitals Act, did not improperly reverse the burden of proof regarding the appellant's mental health claims, and reached a reasonable and proportionate decision given the egregious nature of the past misconduct.

The appellant brought an application under s. 11 of the Solicitors Act to assess paid accounts rendered by the respondent solicitors.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding no special circumstances justified a referral, noting the appellant's principal was a sophisticated lawyer and businessman who paid the detailed accounts voluntarily.

On appeal, the appellant argued the judge failed to independently assess if the fees were excessive based on partial indemnity costs sought on a motion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle or unreasonable result in the application judge's exercise of discretion.

The appellant employer appealed a trial judgment finding that it wrongfully dismissed the respondent employee without cause and awarding 15 months' reasonable notice plus damages for lost bonus payments.

The employer argued the employee breached its Code of Business Conduct by sharing a private placement memorandum with a third party.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the document was not confidential and its disclosure did not violate the Code.

The Court also upheld the 15-month notice period and the award of damages for lost bonuses, finding that unilateral changes to the bonus plan introducing forfeiture provisions had not taken effect.

The appellant, a municipal councillor, sought a declaration that he did not have a pecuniary interest under the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act regarding an appeal his son's law firm was handling.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding the son's interest was neither remote nor insignificant.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the application judge erred by conflating the analyses under sections 3 and 4(k) of the Act.

Applying the reasonable elector test, the Court concluded that the appellant's deemed pecuniary interest was so remote or insignificant that it could not reasonably be regarded as likely to influence his participation in council matters.

Appeal from a Master's Report in ten lien actions tried together by reference concerning unpaid amounts under an elevator maintenance contract.

The appellant abandoned all grounds except the rejection of an equitable set-off claim based on alleged inadequate maintenance, suspension or termination of service, and a new promissory estoppel theory tied to a flood emergency.

The court held that the estoppel argument was a new issue not raised at trial, and that the Master made no reviewable error in finding the respondent had suspended service in accordance with the contract and that the alleged $75,000 set-off had not been proven.

The Master's Report was confirmed.

The appellant, who was involved in operating a restaurant on City property, sued the respondent, a mayoral candidate, for libel over comments made during a newspaper editorial board interview.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding the comments did not refer to the appellant and were not defamatory.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings, noting the respondent's comments focused on the City Council process rather than the appellant personally, and explicitly disavowed accusing anyone of corruption.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his defamation action against a municipal election candidate.

The candidate had delivered a confidential letter to City Council referencing allegations of improper influence regarding an untendered lease agreement with the appellant's family business.

The trial judge found the letter defamatory but protected by qualified privilege, and found no express malice.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings, concluding that the communication was reasonably appropriate to the occasion and that the appellant failed to prove malice.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.