Tom Schreiter

The accused, Richard Flaumenbaum, applied to stay proceedings for assault and sexual assault, alleging a violation of his Charter section 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total delay was 22 months and 8 days, exceeding the 18-month Jordan ceiling for provincial court.

The court analyzed periods of delay, attributing significant portions to late Crown disclosure of crucial evidence (complainant's second videotaped statement and legible SAEK notes) and institutional delay due to lack of court time.

The defence's mid-trial Mills application was deemed legitimate and not defence delay.

After deducting 29 days for defence delay (late arrival at JPT) and 60 days for an exceptional circumstance (Crown counsel's illness), the net delay remained 19 months and 6 days.

The court found a Charter violation and entered a stay of proceedings.

The accused, Abdullah Hotaki, charged with sexual assault and assault, brought a Charter s. 11(b) motion for a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay from the laying of the information to the anticipated end of trial was 18 months and 25 days, exceeding the 18-month Jordan ceiling for the Ontario Court of Justice.

The court found the delay was primarily caused by the Crown's failure to provide core disclosure promptly, despite diligent efforts by defence counsel.

The Crown's arguments regarding implied waiver and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic were rejected as insufficient to justify the delay.

A stay of proceedings was entered on all counts.

The defendant, Marco Gutierrez, was found guilty by a jury of two counts of sexual interference against his stepson and step-nephew.

The Crown and defence jointly proposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day, followed by three years of probation.

The court rejected this joint submission, finding it demonstrably unfit as it failed to prioritize denunciation and deterrence as mandated by s. 718.01 of the Criminal Code and Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence (R. v. Friesen).

The court emphasized the gravity of the offences, the abuse of trust, and the profound harm to victims.

An 18-month term of incarceration was imposed, followed by three years of probation and ancillary orders.

The defendant, charged with sexual assault, brought a motion for directions regarding the admissibility of text messages exchanged with the complainant.

The defence argued these messages, which depicted a different relationship dynamic, did not engage the Criminal Code's record screening regime (sections 278.92-94) as they lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy.

The Crown argued for caution regarding the complainant's privacy rights.

The court granted the defence motion, finding the text messages contained "mundane information" and thus did not meet the threshold for privacy under the record screening regime, allowing their potential introduction at trial without a formal application.

The Crown brought an application under s. 715(1)(a) of the Criminal Code to admit the preliminary inquiry testimony of a deceased witness at the accused's trial for historical sexual offences.

The accused argued the evidence should be excluded under the trial judge's residual discretion, claiming its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value and that the witness suffered from dementia.

The court found the evidence had probative value as it could corroborate the complainant's testimony, and its admission would not result in moral or reasoning prejudice.

The court also rejected the unsworn expert opinion regarding the witness's dementia.

The application was granted.

In a criminal trial for sexual offenses, the Crown brought an application for a similar fact instruction, seeking to allow the jury to consider the evidence of one complainant in determining the credibility of the other.

The court dismissed the application, finding an "air of reality" to the allegation of conscious or unconscious collusion between the two complainants.

The Crown failed to discharge its onus to prove on a balance of probabilities that the complainants' testimonies were not tainted by their detailed discussions of the alleged incidents prior to reporting to the police.

The accused, C.T., charged with sexual assault, brought a pre-trial motion for directions seeking a ruling that photos and videos in his possession, taken in close temporal proximity to the alleged assault, fall outside the protections of section 276 (evidence of other sexual activity) and section 278.91 (private records) of the Criminal Code.

The court ruled that the materials were exempt from sections 276 and 278.92-94, finding they did not constitute 'sexual activity' under section 276 or 'private records' under section 278.91, as they were integrally connected to the alleged assault and the complainant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in them.

The court also addressed the procedure for such motions, including complainant participation and disclosure to the Crown, and declined to issue an order restricting the Crown from discussing the motion's contents with the complainant.

The offender, Donta Easterbrook, pleaded guilty to assault with a weapon after an unprovoked stabbing in a subway station.

The victim sustained a neck wound but recovered physically, though experiencing emotional trauma.

The offender, 23, had a history of violent convictions, drug addiction, and mental health issues, with inconsistent engagement in treatment and expressed mixed remorse.

The court emphasized denunciation and general deterrence, particularly given the public nature of the attack.

Mitigating factors included an early guilty plea and harsh pre-trial detention conditions.

The court imposed a sentence of 10 months additional custody (totaling approximately 18 months including pre-trial credit), followed by a three-year probation order, a DNA order, and a lifetime weapons prohibition.

The accused, E.G.F., was found guilty of sexual assault by a jury.

The sentencing judge considered the aggravating factors, including the accused's criminal record for violence, the assault occurring in the victim's home, the continued assault despite the victim's resistance, the serious nature of the assault (vaginal ejaculation without a condom), the exploitation of the victim's trust and vulnerable state due to alcohol withdrawal, and the severe emotional, physical, and financial impact on the victim.

The only mitigating factor noted was the accused's supportive network of friends.

The court imposed a four-year penitentiary sentence, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence, and issued several ancillary orders.

The accused was charged with three counts of sexual assault and one count of forcible confinement arising from events at the complainant's residence over a ten-hour period.

The central issues were credibility and consent.

The complainant testified that the accused made unwanted sexual advances, blocked her exit, and engaged in non-consensual sexual activity.

The accused testified that all sexual activity was consensual.

The trial judge found both witnesses credible but was left in reasonable doubt as to which version of events was true, resulting in acquittals on all counts.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level over 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

A Charter motion was heard and blended with the trial.

The defence raised six alleged Charter violations: (1) that the officer making the ASD demand lacked grounds; (2) that there was a violation of the right to counsel at roadside; (3) that the delay between suspicion and demand violated the "forthwith" requirement; (4) that there was no evidence the device was an approved screening device; (5) that the officer failed to verify calibration; and (6) that the breath tests were not taken as soon as practicable.

The court rejected all Charter violation arguments and found the accused guilty.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision awarding him $500 for a Charter breach during a traffic stop, seeking higher damages and appealing the dismissal of his claim against the OIPRD.

The respondent police cross-appealed the finding that the traffic tickets were motivated by race.

The Divisional Court allowed the cross-appeal, finding the trial judge made a palpable and overriding error by basing the racial motivation finding solely on the officer's demeanour.

The court found no Charter breach and upheld the dismissal of the claim against the OIPRD, as there was no evidence of bad faith to overcome statutory immunity.

The applicants' appeal of a decision by the Director of Land Titles was dismissed.

The respondent sought costs of $26,441.90 on a partial indemnity basis for the appeal, which involved a claim for $420 million in compensation for alleged fraudulent conveyances.

The applicants did not provide costs submissions.

The court applied the factors under Rule 57.01 and the principle that costs awarded to the Crown should not be reduced merely because counsel is a salaried officer.

The court found the requested costs reasonable given the complexity and importance of the issues, and ordered the applicants to pay $26,441.90.

The defendants, including the Ministry of the Attorney General and two Crown Attorneys, brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's Statement of Claim without leave to amend.

The plaintiff had sued the defendants for defamation and malicious prosecution arising from his criminal proceedings.

The court granted the motion, finding that the action was statute-barred by section 8(1) of the Ministry of the Attorney General Act, as the defendants were acting in the performance of their duties.

Furthermore, the court held that the Statement of Claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action, as there were reasonable and probable grounds for the charges laid against the plaintiff.

The appellant, a municipal councillor, sought a declaration that he did not have a pecuniary interest under the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act regarding an appeal his son's law firm was handling.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding the son's interest was neither remote nor insignificant.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the application judge erred by conflating the analyses under sections 3 and 4(k) of the Act.

Applying the reasonable elector test, the Court concluded that the appellant's deemed pecuniary interest was so remote or insignificant that it could not reasonably be regarded as likely to influence his participation in council matters.

The applicant, a municipal councillor, brought an application for a declaration that he did not have a pecuniary interest under the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act regarding an appeal where his son acted as counsel for the appellant.

The applicant argued that his deemed pecuniary interest was so remote or insignificant that it fell under the exemption in s. 4(k) of the Act.

The court dismissed the application, finding that a reasonable elector would likely conclude that a father would be influenced by his son's direct involvement as counsel in the matter, and therefore the interest was not remote or insignificant.

The accused was tried on charges of robbery, assault causing bodily harm with a hammer, uttering a death threat, and two probation breaches.

The court rejected the accused's evidence under the W. (D.) framework, accepted the complainant's detailed and compelling account, and found the Crown had proven the hammer assault and related probation breaches beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court was not satisfied that the loan transaction and subsequent violence established the specific intent required for robbery.

On the threatening call allegation, the court found the evidence proved a threat to cause bodily harm, but not a threat to cause death.

The applicant alleged that the respondent discriminated against him on the basis of disability during his Small Claims Court proceeding.

He claimed the respondent failed to provide a requested projector for his visual disability, failed to post his hearing room location causing him to walk unnecessarily, and previously required him to pay court fees in cash.

The Tribunal dismissed the cash payment allegation as out of time.

The Tribunal dismissed the remaining allegations, finding that the hearing room was communicated in the Notice of Hearing and the requested media cart was available in the courtroom, but the applicant chose to proceed without it and did not indicate any disadvantage.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its 2013 action seeking the return of mining claims and rights forfeited to the Crown in 1974.

The motion judge had dismissed the action on grounds including res judicata, abuse of process, and time limitations, noting the appellant had brought similar actions in 2008 and 2010.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's reliance on res judicata and abuse of process, and noting that the Coutu Gold Mines Limited Act expressly provided that forfeited mining rights were unaffected.

The applicant ministry sought judicial review of an order of the Information and Privacy Commissioner requiring disclosure of the full names of Family Responsibility Office employees contained in a requester’s file.

The ministry argued the information was excluded from disclosure under s. 65(6)3 of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act as relating to labour relations matters, or alternatively exempt under ss. 14(1)(e) and 20 due to safety concerns.

The Divisional Court held the IPC reasonably concluded the records were created in the course of the institution’s operational mandate rather than about labour relations, and therefore were not excluded from the Act.

The court also found no evidence that disclosure to the requester posed a safety risk to the employees and determined that compliance with the IPC order would not conflict with a prior Grievance Settlement Board order governing employee identification practices.