John Charles Longworth Ritchie

The court considered motions for security for costs and for summary judgment regarding a possessory lien under the Repair and Storage Lien Act (RSLA) in a dispute over helicopter repairs.

Mansfield Heliflight Inc. sought security for costs from USCAN Aviation Sales Ltd., while USCAN cross-moved for summary judgment to confirm its possessory lien and for an order requiring Mansfield to provide security.

The court dismissed the security for costs motion, finding USCAN had a good chance of partial success and that the defendant conceded some amount was owing.

The court granted a declaration that USCAN has a possessory lien over the helicopter, but declined to order Mansfield to pay security into court, maintaining the status quo until the amount of the lien is determined.

The applicant railway company sought a declaration that its railway right‑of‑way lands were exempt from municipal taxation under s. 315(1) of the Municipal Act, 2001, on the basis that the lands were leased to another entity for valuable consideration.

The court examined the contractual arrangements between the railway owner, a rail users’ consortium, and a licensed rail operator governing the operation and maintenance of the railway line.

Applying principles distinguishing leases from licences, the court held the agreements did not grant exclusive possession or create a landlord‑tenant relationship but instead resembled a joint venture or operational arrangement.

The court further found that the consortium did not pay rent or other valuable consideration within the meaning of the statute.

As a result, the railway lands were not exempt from municipal taxation.

The applicant, a municipal councillor, brought an application for a declaration that he did not have a pecuniary interest under the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act regarding an appeal where his son acted as counsel for the appellant.

The applicant argued that his deemed pecuniary interest was so remote or insignificant that it fell under the exemption in s. 4(k) of the Act.

The court dismissed the application, finding that a reasonable elector would likely conclude that a father would be influenced by his son's direct involvement as counsel in the matter, and therefore the interest was not remote or insignificant.

The applicant, a municipal councillor, brought an application for a declaration that he did not have a pecuniary interest under the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act regarding an Ontario Municipal Board appeal in which his son's law firm represented the appellant.

The applicant named Her Majesty the Queen as the respondent, following previous case law, but the Crown declined to participate.

The court declined to decide the application on its merits, finding that the relevant municipalities should be given notice and an opportunity to participate to ensure an adversarial context and a complete review of the facts.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment regarding a promissory note, arguing statutory defences under the Bills of Exchange Act for failure to present the note and notify the guarantor of dishonour.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellants failed to plead these statutory defences at trial and did not seek leave to amend their pleadings upon discovering the relevant evidence.

The court noted that the appellants' prior conduct of making payments on the note could infer a waiver of presentment, and without amended pleadings, the respondent had no need to reopen the case.

Supplementary reasons regarding a sealing order and costs following an appeal.

The court varied the broad sealing orders made by the Master and a single judge, restricting the sealing order to only the inadvertently disclosed privileged document, as there was no demonstrable prejudice to justify sealing the entire court file.

The court also fixed the successful plaintiff's costs of the motion for leave to appeal and the appeal at $25,000 on a partial indemnity basis, declining to award substantial indemnity costs.

The defendant appealed a decision of a Superior Court judge that overturned a Master's order removing the plaintiff's solicitors of record.

The plaintiff's solicitors had inadvertently received a privileged opinion letter from the defendant's counsel.

Applying the test from Celanese Canada Inc., the Divisional Court found no real risk of material prejudice to the defendant, as the document could not be used at trial and the solicitor had not read the details.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondent applied for an official plan amendment, zoning change, and subdivision approval, providing the prescribed information but refusing to provide additional information requested by the appellant municipality.

The municipality refused to forward the appeal record to the Ontario Municipal Board, arguing the 90-day period for a decision had not commenced.

The Court of Appeal held that under the Planning Act, the 90-day period begins once the prescribed information and fees are provided, regardless of whether additional requested information is supplied.

The appeal was dismissed, allowing the respondent to proceed directly to the OMB.

Following the release of the appeal judgment, the parties sought to settle the form of the order regarding costs of a letter of credit and the applicable post-judgment interest rate.

The Court of Appeal held that the appellant was responsible for the costs of the letter of credit only up to the date the appeal judgment was released.

The Court declined to vary the statutory post-judgment interest rate on the trial costs, finding no exceptional circumstances to justify departing from the Courts of Justice Act scheme.

The appellant general contractor appealed the trial judge's assessment of damages for construction deficiencies and delays in building a commercial office building.

The trial judge awarded $1.7 million for diminution in value due to floor slab deficiencies and $770,000 for lost rental income from prospective tenants due to a five-month construction delay.

The Court of Appeal upheld the $1.7 million award, finding the owner did not fail to mitigate its damages.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding the delay damages for prospective tenants, finding the $770,000 assessment was not supported by the evidence, and reduced that portion of the award to $65,000.

The appellants challenged a summary judgment dismissing their third party claim for negligent misrepresentation, the refusal to remove the third party as the plaintiffs’ solicitor of record, and an order striking portions of their statement of defence.

The court held that the motions judge applied the proper summary judgment test and correctly found no evidence on which the negligent misrepresentation claim could succeed.

Although the court expressed concern that Rule 20 was not the proper procedural vehicle to strike part of a defence absent a motion for judgment, it upheld that order because the impugned estoppel defence was based on identical factual allegations and would amount to an abuse of process.

The appeals were dismissed with costs.