Glen M. Perinot

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their motion to set aside the Registrar's dismissal order and restore their collection action to the trial list.

The Court of Appeal found two reviewable errors: the motion judge erred in principle by failing to consider the respondent's lackadaisical conduct in assessing prejudice, and made a palpable and overriding error in finding the appellants showed disinterest in the action despite evidence they had contacted their lawyer multiple times seeking updates.

Considering the matter afresh, the court allowed the appeal, set aside the dismissal order, and restored the action to the trial list.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal.

The Court of Appeal fixed the costs of the appeal at an all-inclusive amount of $10,000, payable by the appellant from their share of the estate to the respondent.

This appeal concerned an acrimonious estate dispute between two sisters regarding their deceased mother's modest estate.

The primary issue was an allegation that a joint tenancy in the matrimonial home had been severed by a testamentary disposition.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's decision, finding no error in dismissing an adjournment motion, appointing one sister as the sole executrix, and ruling that the joint tenancy was not severed by a testamentary disposition alone.

The court emphasized the importance of expeditious and proportionate resolution of estate matters.

The applicants, claiming to be the rightfully elected directors of a temple, applied for an order appointing a monitor over the temple's affairs and freezing its assets.

They alleged that the respondent former directors misappropriated funds and failed to hold lawful elections.

The court found the applicants' allegations of breach of trust were unsubstantiated and did not raise a serious issue to be tried.

The application was dismissed, as there was no basis to impose a monitor under the court's equitable jurisdiction.

The applicant applied under s. 57(1) of the Trademarks Act to strike the respondent's trademark registration for 'NORSTEEL'.

The applicant claimed it had prior use of the trade name 'NORSTEEL BUILDING SYSTEMS' and that the respondent's mark was invalid because it lacked distinctiveness and the respondent was not the person entitled to secure the registration.

The Federal Court held the applicant had standing as a 'person interested' and rejected the respondent's defence of acquiescence.

The Court found the applicant established prior use and confusion, rendering the respondent's mark invalid under ss. 18(1)(b) and (d).

The application for expungement was granted.

The defendants moved to strike the plaintiff's Statement of Claim under Rule 21.01(1)(b) for failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

The plaintiff, a lawyer, sued the defendants (a former client's new lawyer, his firm, and the former client) for various torts including defamation, malicious prosecution, and abuse of process, arising from complaints made to the Law Society of Ontario (LSO) regarding his professional conduct and capacity.

The court found that the complaints and related statements made in quasi-judicial proceedings before the LSO were protected by absolute privilege, which is a complete defence to all claims, even if made with malice.

The Statement of Claim was struck without leave to amend, and costs were awarded to the defendants.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board, which upheld a College committee's decision regarding an emergency physician's conduct.

The physician had begun completing a Form 1 under the Mental Health Act after the applicant staged a suicide attempt, but stopped when the applicant admitted it was faked.

The applicant sought the unconditional removal of the incomplete Form 1 from his hospital chart.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Board's decision reasonable, as the Personal Health Information Protection Act does not grant patients the right to demand the destruction of their medical records.

The appellant, a 52-year-old investment advisor, was petitioned into bankruptcy in 2011 by RBC Dominion Securities Inc. after misappropriating $5 million from clients.

While in bankruptcy, he had a net monthly income of $14,600 with surplus monthly income of $12,500 but failed to make any surplus income payments.

The registrar in bankruptcy ordered that as a condition of discharge, the appellant pay $284,346 in surplus income at $5,000 per month, plus an additional $5,000 per month for six years ($360,000 total), with discharge suspended for two years.

The appellant appealed, arguing the treatment of surplus and other income was in error and that the lower court judge improperly rewrote the registrar's decision.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the registrar's order was discretionary, well-supported by evidence, and reasonable given the appellant's substantial income and ability to pay.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment that imposed a constructive trust over their properties, declared that Venanzio Pingue was not a shareholder of the respondent company, and removed him as an officer and director due to breach of fiduciary duties.

The trial judge found that Venanzio had misappropriated $592,671.43 from the company and never paid for his shares.

The appellants argued the trial judge erred in interpreting the parties' written agreements and in refusing to admit their expert report.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's interpretation of the agreement or her discretionary decision to exclude the late expert report.

The court also dismissed the motion to admit fresh evidence and the motion for leave to appeal the costs order.

This is a procedural appeal concerning the construction of the trial record.

The respondents sued the appellants for misappropriation of funds from an apartment building.

At trial, the trial judge relied on expert accounting evidence from the respondents' expert and refused to allow the appellants to adduce their own expert evidence late in the trial.

On appeal, the appellants sought to include in their appeal book both their own expert's report and portions of the respondents' expert's report that had not been made exhibits at trial.

A chambers judge ordered these materials excised from the appeal book.

The appellants appealed this decision to the panel.

The bankrupt appealed a Master's order granting a conditional discharge that required him to pay $284,346 in accumulated surplus income and an additional $5,000 per month for six years.

The bankrupt argued the Master erred by treating the additional payments as a recalculation of surplus income under section 68 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the Master properly imposed the additional payments as a condition of discharge under section 172, not as a recalculation of surplus income.

The court held the condition was reasonable given the bankrupt's substantial ongoing disability income, his failure to pay surplus income during the bankruptcy, and his lack of remorse for misappropriating $5 million from clients.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action against the LCBO for damages for conversion.

The appellant's credit card was used without his authorization to purchase over $37,000 in alcohol from the LCBO, which was delivered to a nightclub.

The Divisional Court upheld the trial judge's finding that the LCBO did not commit conversion because there was no evidence of an intentional or wrongful act, as the LCBO had no knowledge the charges were unauthorized.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed an order dissolving a partnership, declaring he had no interest in a specific property, ordering him to pay $410,984.61 to the respondent, and appointing the respondent as Receiver.

The appellant had a long history of non-compliance with multiple court orders, leading to an uncontested hearing.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the lower court's order, noting it flowed naturally from the appellant's prior non-compliance, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellants commenced an action in Ontario alleging mismanagement of their investment accounts by their advisor and vicarious liability of the brokerage firm.

The brokerage firm successfully moved to stay the action based on a forum selection clause in the client account agreements requiring disputes to be litigated in British Columbia.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellants failed to show strong cause to depart from the forum selection clause, as they were sophisticated investors who had the opportunity to read the agreements, and Ontario law could be proven in British Columbia courts.

Following a short civil trial in which the defendant obtained dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The parties had streamlined the trial through an agreed statement of facts and the legal issue was comparatively narrow.

The defendant sought approximately $30,000 in costs while the plaintiff argued that approximately $18,645 would be reasonable given proportionality and the amount claimed.

Applying the principles governing costs, including reasonable expectations and proportionality, the court fixed costs payable to the defendant at $20,000 inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The plaintiff brought an action against the LCBO for damages in conversion after his credit card was used without authorization to purchase approximately $37,000 worth of alcohol for a nightclub.

The plaintiff failed to notify his credit card company of the unauthorized charges within the required 30-day period.

The court dismissed the action, finding that the LCBO did not commit the tort of conversion as it merely processed the orders and delivered the goods in the normal course of business without any wrongful act or intent to negate the plaintiff's title.

The court noted that had the action been framed in negligence, the plaintiff would have been found wholly responsible for his losses due to his failure to monitor his credit card statements.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment ordering it to repay approximately $2.3 million in loans to the deceased's estate.

On appeal, the appellant argued for the first time that the action was statute-barred under s. 38(3) of the Trustee Act, and that the trial judge erred in finding the limitation period was restarted by its acknowledgment of the debt.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, refusing to entertain the new Trustee Act argument and finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant's correspondence and partial payments restarted the limitation period.

The estate trustee sought partition and sale of residential property, alleging that the deceased's 7/13 interest remained an estate asset because a 2002 transfer deed to the respondent was invalid.

After a mini-trial on ownership, the court found the moving party failed to prove incapacity despite evidence of early-stage Alzheimer's disease, and accepted that the deceased understood the transfer and intended to gift her interest.

The court also held that non-registration of the transfer deed did not invalidate the gift as against the donor or her estate once the executed deed had been delivered to counsel for registration.

The application for partition was dismissed because the respondent owned the property outright at the deceased's death.

The plaintiffs requested that the court settle and issue a formal order reflecting an earlier endorsement that imposed interim injunctive terms restraining the defendants from disseminating defamatory allegations pending the disposition of an injunction motion.

The defendant argued that the earlier endorsement had become stale because a contemplated cross‑motion had not been argued and other events had intervened.

The court rejected that submission, finding the delay in advancing the cross‑motion was entirely attributable to the defendants and that the interim terms were not contingent on the cross‑motion being heard on a particular date.

The court held that the defendants could not benefit from their own failure to advance the motion and that the plaintiffs remained entitled to have the order formally issued.

The judge therefore signed the draft order reflecting the earlier endorsement.

The appellants, high-stakes gamblers who lost approximately $2.1 million playing roulette, sued the casino operators and the provincial gaming regulator.

They alleged that the casino's practice of removing a 'floating ball' from the roulette wheel and calling a 'no-spin' was an unapproved rule of play, rendering the games illegal under the Criminal Code and entitling them to the return of their losses via unjust enrichment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the floating ball practice was not a rule of play requiring regulatory approval, as it did not impact the fairness or integrity of the game.

Furthermore, even if the games were illegal, the casino operators had a juristic reason for enrichment based on their reasonable reliance on the legality of the games, and the regulator owed no private duty of care to the gamblers.